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One of the most common goals of political theory is to inform just choice; with ‘just 
choice’ referring to the class of practical, political decisions that result in society 
becoming more just. However, important questions can be asked about the best way 
political theory can perform this informing function. In this thesis I look to answer 
some of these questions through my defence of an ideal theory approach to just choice. 
This approach claims that ideals, that is, conceptions of the rules that would govern a 
fully just society, are necessary in order to arrive at just choices. I look to show the 
conditions ideal theory and ideals have to satisfy in order to perform this just choice 
informing role. In doing this this thesis underlabours for ideal theory by providing 
theoretical support for future substantive work in this area.  
This thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the structure of the 
thesis, the main areas of debate, and the implications of my research. Chapter 2 
addresses the fundamental question discussed above, seeking to demonstrate that it is 
only when our choices are informed by ideals that we are consistently able to make 
just choices. Chapter 3 considers the distinction between short-term choice, which 
aims to make society immediately more similar to an ideal, and long-term choice, 
which aims to ultimately realise an ideal in full. I look to show the conditions that 
ideals have to satisfy in order to inform each type of just choice. Particularly important 
here are the feasibility conditions that have to be met by ideals that are to inform long-
term choice. Chapter 4 considers a conundrum confronting those aiming to make just 
choices. All other things being equal long-term choice offers greater rewards than 
short-term choice does; however short-term choice is lower risk, requiring less 
investment of political resources such as time, labour, and money, and promising more 
likely returns on these investments. In this chapter I look to show the conditions that 
have to hold for it to be defensible to favour a long-term approach over a short-term 
approach. Chapter 5 considers whether the methods required of ideal theory, 
particularly the feasible ideal theory required of long-term choice, may be inherently 
contradictory. This is due to possible tensions between fact-sensitive and fact-
insensitive aspects of the theorising process. In this chapter I look to show that this is 
not the case and that the ideal theory process is not contradictory. Chapter 6 
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It is uncontroversial to say that one of the primary aims of much political theory is to 
inform just choice. By ‘just choice’ I refer to the type of practical, social and political 
decision-making that results in society becoming more just. As we shall see below, 
recent years have witnessed a renewal of debate around the precise role that political 
theory should play in such choice. On one hand there are those who argue that political 
theory ought to exclusively provide concrete and fact-sensitive recommendations, 
which speak directly to particular instances of decision-making. On the other hand 
there are those who stress the importance of more abstract, moral philosophising to 
any attempts to arrive at just choices. From one perspective this can be seen as an 
irrevocable conflict between nonideal theorists and ideal theorists respectively. While 
I believe that conceptualising these enterprises in this manner is ultimately misguided, 
it is right to highlight a seemingly fundamental tension surrounding the proper role of 
abstract and concrete thinking in political theorising.  
This thesis offers a response to these competing perspectives on just choice. I will look 
to defend the fundamental assumptions of the ideal approach, while, at the same time, 
stressing the important role that more contextual, fact-sensitive considerations should 
play in formulating ideals of justice. This is not an attempt to find a middle ground 
between the two approaches. Rather I look to work firmly within the basic assumptions 
of the ideal approach while seeking to reinforce it where necessary with insight from 
more concrete perspectives.  
In what follows I want to briefly outline the four areas of debate that this thesis will 
focus on. Here I will also state four Key Objectives that my thesis will meet in 
responding to these points (§ I). Following this I consider the notions of ideal theory 
and non-ideal theory discussed above. I will defend a complimentary approach to 
conceptualising the two enterprises, which treats the latter as logically dependent on 
the former. I will show how this model provides a framework that my discussion of 
ideals and just choice fits within (§ II). I will then consider the specific challenges that 
I look to address in this thesis, and in doing so summarise the main points that 
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subsequent chapters will discuss, before explaining how each chapter meets one of the 
Key Objectives mentioned above (§ III). Having offered this overview of the structure 
of this thesis I then consider some of the theoretical and practical implications of 
pursuing this line of inquiry (§ IV). 
 
I. Key Objectives 
(1) As stated above, this thesis responds to debates between defenders of ideal 
approaches to just choice and their critics. A fundamental concern of this debate is 
establishing whether or not ideals are necessary in order to make just choices. As 
noted, I look to defend an ideal based approach to just choice, where ‘ideals’ are 
understood to be conceptions of the rules that would govern political decision making 
in a just society. This thesis will demonstrate that it is only when our choices are 
informed by ideals that we are able to consistently make just choices.  
(2) Just choices can be divided into short-term choices, which aim to make society 
immediately more similar to a given ideal, and long-term choices, which aim to 
eventually make society confirm to a given ideal in full. The standards that ideals will 
have to meet will differ according to which type of choice they need to inform. While 
it may be imperative that the ideals that inform long-term choice are feasible, this may 
not hold for those ideals informing short-term choice. This thesis will identify the 
conditions ideals have to satisfy in order to inform each type of just choice. 
(3) The question of whether to pursue short-term or long-term choice prompts a range 
of responses. At first glance we may intuitively favour long-term choice as it yields 
greater gains over time, and secures a fully just society. On the other hand, short-term 
choice strives for smaller gains and only partial justice. However the issue of 
prospective gains is not the only, nor the most important, factor. More pertinent are 
the costs and risks associated with each type of choice. All other things being equal, 
while the gains from short-term choice are ultimately lower, they are achieved 
immediately with relatively low risk. In contrast, long-term choice requires greater 
investment of political resources such as time, labour, and money, yet, again all other 
things being equal, is less likely to be achieved and is thus a higher risk approach to 
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just choice. This thesis will identify the conditions that have to hold in order for it to 
be defensible to favour long-term choice over short-term choice. 
(4) A further issue arising from the use of short-term and long-term ideals are the 
methods appropriate to theorising them. As we shall see, in order to arrive at 
normatively accurate ideals, we have to use ‘idealisations’, that is, assumptions that do 
not accurately represent real world phenomena. This distance from facts as they hold 
at present allows us to formulate ideals without being constrained by certain 
contemporary factors. However it will also be shown that long-term choice requires 
that ideals meet certain standards of feasibility that requires that they show greater 
sensitivity to facts. There thus appears to be a contradiction at the heart of the methods 
we use for theorising long-term ideals. This thesis will show that we can arrive at 
feasible ideals while employing idealisations, and thus that just choice informing 
ideals do not rely on contradictory methods.   
In summary then, this thesis looks to meet the following Key Objectives.  
1. Demonstrate that it is only when choices are informed by ideals that we are 
able to consistently make just choices. 
2. Identify the conditions ideals have to satisfy in order to inform just choice.  
3. Identify the conditions that have to hold in order for it to be defensible to favour 
long-term choice over short-term choice. 
4. Demonstrate that we can arrive at feasible ideals while employing 
idealisations.  
 
II. Ideal Theory and Nonideal Theory 
Having sketched the general aims of this thesis we can now turn to consider the broader 
framework within which to situate this debate about ideals and just choice. In this 
section I want to provide definitions of ideal and nonideal theory, and consider how 
we ought to conceptualise the relationship between these two enterprises. 
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The distinction between ideal theory and nonideal theory is drawn by John Rawls in A 
Theory of Justice.1 We can define ideal theory in terms of both its product and its 
process.2 The former refers, unsurprisingly, to ideals themselves. As we saw above, 
ideals are conceptions of the rules that would govern a fully just society. To illustrate 
how this works, consider a hypothetical ideal that states that justice requires that all 
individuals have their basic needs met and are able to democratically participate in the 
organisation of society’s production. Call this the ‘Socialist Ideal’.3 A society could 
perhaps be termed ‘just’ by the standards of this ideal if its laws took privately owned 
businesses into common ownership and regulated wages to ensure lower levels of 
inequality.  
The process of ideal theory on the other hand refers to the methods that are employed 
in order to generate ideals. As mentioned in the previous section, idealisation is the 
primary method used in ideal theorising. We have seen that idealisation refers to the 
process of intentionally using conceptualisations of real world phenomena that do not 
accurately reflect the form these phenomena actually take. Such conceptualisations, 
which themselves are also referred to as ‘idealisations’, are used to help create 
theoretical spaces that we otherwise would not have access to. While idealisations can 
do this in various ways, the most important function they perform from the perspective 
of ideal theory is the normative function.  
The normative function is used to create premises that are suitable for deriving ideals 
of justice from. In order to generate ideals of justice we have to use conceptualisations 
of important phenomena such as how compliant we can expect people to be to laws 
that adhere to a given ideal. However if we use a realistic, accurate conceptualisation 
of compliance then we may end up with counter-intuitive results. To illustrate, 
                                                 
1 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1971/1999), p. 8. While Rawls’s work is generally viewed as an early and particularly 
important discussion of these terms, conceptual distinctions between ideal theory and nonideal theory 
can be traced much further back than this. Lea Ypi for instance identifies such a distinction in Plato’s 
Republic. See Lea Ypi, ‘On the Confusion between Ideal and Non-ideal Theory in Recent Debates on 
Global Justice’ Political Studies Vol. 58, pp. 536-555 (2010), p. 537. 
2 A similar approach is favoured by Pablo Gilabert in his definition of Rawls’s understanding of ideal 
theory. See Pablo Gilabert, ‘Global Justice and Poverty Relief in Nonideal Circumstances’ Social 
Theory and Practice Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 411-438 (2008), pp. 417-418. 
3 This is not intended to be a robustly theorised ideal of socialism but rather an indication of what an 
ideal of justice looks like and the function it plays.  
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consider again the Socialist Ideal discussed above. If we looked to derive an ideal of 
justice from true levels of compliance then we would likely find that we would not 
arrive at the Socialist Ideal. We can imagine that such an ideal with its appropriation 
of private property and regulation of wages may be deeply unpopular at present, 
conflicting with contemporary attitudes to economics and taxation, particularly 
amongst the wealthy. As such, any ideal that was derived from current levels of 
compliance would likely be far less egalitarian and radical.  
However those with socialist intuitions may feel that such a result would be 
‘normatively inaccurate’.4 We might think that ideals should not represent what people 
will comply with now but rather what we hope they will comply with in the future. For 
this reason it is prudent to replace an assumption premised on contemporary levels of 
compliance with a more permissive, idealised conceptualisation of compliance. Doing 
this allows us to arrive at ambitious, normatively accurate ideals. This is important as 
we may reasonably feel that ideals that are not feasible now, may be feasible in the 
future, as current levels of compliance are not fixed.5  
How then do we define nonideal theory? Again it is helpful to consider both the 
product and the process of this enterprise. Nonideal theory aims to produce judgements 
that lead to the just choices discussed above. Thus the outcome of successful nonideal 
theorising is society either becoming immediately more just, via short-term choice, or 
moving in the direction of full justice, via long-term choice. The contrast with ideal 
theory is clear: nonideal theory takes a more practical outlook and the product of its 
theorising is tangible increases in justice. 
The process of nonideal theory is similarly distinct from that of ideal theory. Nonideal 
theory engages with the world as it currently is and thus generally employs much more 
accurate conceptualisations of phenomena such as compliance. As it is the aim of 
nonideal theory to increase justice it is necessary to be realistic about how this can be 
                                                 
4 The term ‘normatively accurate’, and the derivative, ‘normatively inaccurate’, are employed by Zofia 
Stemplowska. See Zofia Stemplowska, ‘What’s Ideal about Ideal Theory?’ Social Theory and Practice 
Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 319-340 (2008), p. 333. 
5 For a discussion of the uses of idealisation for this function see Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 216.  
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done given current levels of compliance and so on. Thus where ideal theory idealises 
away from reality, nonideal theory confronts it.  
Clearly then, ideal theory and nonideal theory are markedly different enterprises. 
Where ideal theory is concerned with arriving at conceptions of the rules that would 
govern a fully just society, nonideal theory is concerned with making the real world a 
more just place. Where ideal theory uses idealisation, nonideal theory engages with 
real world phenomena. Given these differences it is understandable that some theorists 
have portrayed ideal theory and nonideal theory as completely unrelated and distinct 
enterprises. Particularly notable are those critics of ideal theory who, citing this 
approach’s abstract and disconnected character and apparent disinterest towards 
actually increasing justice in the real world, argue that we ought to reject it in favour 
of the more concrete and immediate nonideal alternative that takes a practical and 
intuitive approach to ethics and questions of justice.6 
It can appear reasonable to assume that ideal theory and nonideal theory ought to be 
treated as necessarily distinct and conflicting approaches, with political theorists 
having to choose one over the other. However this assumption is misplaced. Rawls 
provides a compelling case for why we should see both theories as constituent parts of 
a complete theory of justice. For Rawls, it is only when we know what full justice 
demands that we are able to make just choices. Without such ideals, we lack both the 
standards of comparison necessary for short-term choice and the ultimate goal required 
by long-term choice. It is not the case then, as Shane. J. Ralston would put it, that ideal 
theory is simply abstract ‘arm chair philosophy […] of little use to the institutional 
designer.’7 Rather, it is a logical necessity for all nonideal theorising.  
In defending this position, we are thus able to accept some of the concerns raised by 
ideal theory’s critics. As Rawls rightly observes, it is those issues that fall under 
nonideal theory’s auspices that ‘are the pressing and urgent matters’, ‘[t]hese are the 
                                                 
6 For examples of the non-ideal or anti-ideal approach see Charles W. Mills, ‘“Ideal Theory” as 
Ideology’ Hypatia Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 165-184 (2005); Elizabeth Anderson, ‘Reply to Critics of The 
Imperative of Integration’ Political Studies Review Vol. 12, pp. 376-382 (2014); Jack Knight, ‘The 
Imperative of Non-Ideal Theory’ Political Studies Review Vol. 12, pp. 361-368 (2014); and Leif Wenar, 
‘Property Rights and the Resource Curse’ Philosophy & Public Affairs Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 2-32 (2008). 
7 Shane J. Ralston, ‘Can Pragmatists be Institutionalists? John Dewey Joins the Nonideal/Ideal Theory 
Debate’ Human Studies Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 65-84 (2010), p. 78.  
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things that we are faced with in everyday life.’8 However, we are only able to properly 
confront these matters when we are equipped with ideals of justice, which we can only 
possess through ideal theorising. As such we should reject approaches that look to 
operate exclusively within one theory or the other and instead see ideal theory and 
nonideal theory as two aspects of a cohesive and complete theory of justice.  
This thesis is thus at one level a study in the relationship between ideal theory and 
nonideal theory. I begin from Rawls’s above quoted assumption that we want to deal 
with the ‘urgent’ injustices that confront us in the real world. That is, we want to be 
able to make choices that will improve the justness of society. However, like Rawls, I 
acknowledge that ideal theorising is a vital part of making just choices. Moreover, I 
also look to go beyond Rawls in showing the conditions that have to hold in order for 
ideal theory to be able to perform this crucial just choice informing role.  
For these reasons, my argument cannot be understood as an example of ideal theorising 
itself. I spend little time defending particular conceptions of ideals, nor explaining how 
they are arrived at.9 This is to say that I do not argue for example that egalitarianism 
is more just than conservatism or that libertarianism is to be preferred over 
utilitarianism. Nor is this a case for a particular nonideal theory of justice. Indeed, there 
is even less time dedicated to discussion of the specific theoretical processes required 
if nonideal theory is to be able to apply ideals to either short-term or long-term choice. 
Relatedly this thesis also does not engage with important normative arguments in 
nonideal theory about the extent to which ends can justify means and the sacrifices 
required by current generations for the sake of later ones.  
Indeed there are very few normative arguments present here at all, at least few that are 
normative in a conventional manner or in any sense pertaining to justice. The 
normative claims made here relate to how we ought to theorise ideals and how we 
ought to understand the relationship between ideal theory and nonideal theory. They 
are thus methodological prescriptions rather than ethical prescriptions. For these 
reasons this thesis is more properly understood as being at the level of metatheory. I 
                                                 
8 It is for this reason that, for Rawls, ‘the nature and aims of a perfectly just society is the fundamental 
part of the theory of justice.’ See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 8. 
9 While there is discussion of specific nonideal theories and ideals, these are almost always used to 
illustrate more general theoretical processes, rather than to defend particular normative claims.  
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want to understand why an ideal approach to just choice is necessary and viable, and 
the conditions that ideals have to meet in order to be able to inform just choice. This 
thesis is thus a process of underlabouring for ideal theory and just choice.10 By 
‘underlabouring’ I mean that this research looks to establish the necessity of, and the 
conditions within which, ideal theory operates, and in doing so provide a theoretical 
framework that justifies and enhances subsequent ideal theorising.  
In doing this I engage with a series of notable challenges that confront this ideal 
approach to just choice. In the following section I will briefly summarise the structure 
of this thesis, stressing the different challenges that each chapter addresses. I will also 
discuss how I respond to these and in doing so sketch how I intend to meet the four 
Key Objectives stated in Section I.  
 
III. Challenges to the Ideal Theory Approach to Just Choice 
Chapter 2 looks to defend the ‘ideal claim’ that in order to arrive at both short-term 
and long-term just choices, judgements have to be informed by ideals. The main threat 
to this position comes from Amartya Sen who makes the claim that ideals are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for short-term choice, offering in place of this an ideal-free 
model for arriving at just choice.11 The challenge posed by Sen is significant. If he is 
correct and ideals are not required for short-term choice then not only will half of the 
ideal claim be invalid but long-term choice will be undermined as well. Sen presents 
a direct route to just choice that avoids demanding and extensive debates about ideals, 
                                                 
10 The term ‘underlabouring’ can be traced back to John Locke’s remarks that for philosophers, ‘It is 
ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some 
of the rubbish which lies in the way to knowledge.’ Locke’s point here being that one of philosophy’s 
purposes is, not to compete with science, but to facilitate scientific endeavour. See John Locke, An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding ed. by A.D. Woozley (London: Collins, 1690/1964), p. 58. 
Underlabouring has more recently become a central pillar of ‘critical realist’ approaches to philosophy, 
with Roy Bhaskar summing it up as the pursuit of the ‘knowledge of the necessary conditions of 
knowledge’. See Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the 
Contemporary Human Sciences, 3rd Edition (London: Routledge, 1979/1998), p. 10. See also Roy 
Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (New York: Verso, 1975/1997), p. 10. For a critical, rejection of 
this approach see Richard Gunn, ‘Marxism and Philosophy: A Critique of Critical Realism’ Capital and 
Class No. 37, pp. 87-116 (1989), p. 89.  
11 Amartya Sen, ‘What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?’ The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 103, 
No. 5, pp. 214-238 (2006). 
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ideal theory methodology, and so on. As such he offers an enticingly simple alternative 
to any ideal-based approach.  
In responding to Sen I make the distinction between internal categories and external 
categories, with instantiations of the former having standards of comparison inherent 
within them, and instantiations of the latter requiring further, ideal instantiations of the 
category from which to derive standards of comparison. For example, while we can 
compare the height of two mountains without referring to a third ‘ideal mountain’, we 
cannot compare the justness of different political choices, without reference to what 
true, ideal justice is.  
This chapter also makes the philosophically less contentious claim that ideals are 
necessary for long-term just choice. As long-term choice aims to achieve ideals in full 
it is much harder to defend the claim that we can make such choices without their being 
informed by ideals. In the case of making either short-term choices or long-term 
choices I reject the claim that ideals can ever be sufficient. By arguing this position I 
establish the necessity of a distinct nonideal theory to help employ ideals in arriving 
at just choices. In making these claims I seek to meet the first Key Objective, by 
demonstrating that it is only when nonideal decision-making is informed by ideals that 
we can expect to arrive at consistently just choices.  
Having thus established the necessity of ideals Chapter 3 turns to the question of the 
conditions these ideals have to meet in order to inform just choice. In doing this I build 
on the more abstract definition of ideals employed in Chapter 2. Crucial to this is 
identifying the different conditions required of ideals informing short-term choice, 
compared to those informing long-term choice. I begin by making the uncontroversial 
claim that in order for ideals to inform long-term choice they have to be feasible, on 
the grounds that as infeasible ideals cannot be achieved, they make poor targets for 
long-term choice. I then discuss those ideals that are consciously made without 
reference to feasibility conditions. As well as defending these ideals from various 
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criticisms from David Miller,12 I show that while infeasible ideals are unable to inform 
long-term choice, they ought to be able to inform short-term choice.  
I conclude the chapter by considering a challenge to the notion of feasibility. The 
‘uncertainty gambit’ suggests that in conditions of uncertainty about what is and what 
is not feasible it is sensible to largely avoid concerns about feasibility altogether to 
minimise the risk of losing the opportunity of achieving an ideal due to wrongly 
dismissing it as infeasible. Here I am particularly interested in Marxist arguments in 
support of this position, drawing on that tradition’s attempts to denaturalise supposedly 
objective facts, showing them instead to be contingent and ideological. I reject this 
claim though, suggesting that uncertainty should push us, towards, rather than away 
from, feasibility conditions. Moreover I suggest that Marxist theory can be used to 
conceptualise a stringent approach to feasibility that can give us greater confidence in 
our feasibility assessments. This chapter thus meets the second Key Objective by 
identifying the conditions ideals have to meet in order to inform just choice, with a 
notable feature of this chapter being the more specific claims relating to the feasibility 
conditions required of ideals that inform long-term choice.  
Chapter 4 pursues this point further in expanding on the earlier discussion of feasibility 
assessments. I begin by introducing the concept of ‘obstacles’ to feasibility. These 
represent phenomena or processes that either have to be avoided or removed if an ideal 
is to meet feasibility conditions. For example, while an ideal must avoid the fixed 
obstacle of being premised on a logical impossibility, it can potentially at some stage 
remove a contingent obstacle such as insufficient compliance.  
While the discussion up until this point is generally at a formal level of abstraction, 
the remainder of Chapter 4 necessarily introduces a more concrete perspective. More 
specifically I look to populate the formal feasibility model postulated in the first half 
of the chapter with particular insights from Marxist social theory. Building on the 
conclusion to Chapter 3, I argue that Marxism is particularly useful for this purpose as 
its theories naturally lend themselves to especially stringent and exclusive feasibility 
conditions. I suggest that if Marxist explanations of the logic and structure of capitalist 
                                                 
12 David Miller, Justice for Earthlings: Essays in Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), p. 230. 
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societies are correct then liberal ideals, in the sense of ideals that are premised on 
capitalist economies, will be infeasible, due to the incorrigibility of capitalism in the 
face of attempts to either stabilise markets or use wealth redistribution to offset its 
tendency towards inequality. 
I conclude this chapter by suggesting that according to the Marxist model of feasibility, 
Rawls’s ideal of justice may not meet his own conditions of ‘realistic utopianism’, and 
instead be merely ‘utopian’.13 The Marxist model on the other hand suggests one 
potentially profitable way of meeting the third Key Objective, i.e. demonstrating the 
conditions that have to hold in order for it to be defensible to favour long-term choice 
over short-term choice. First, it provides a stringent and exclusive conception of 
feasibility that ought to decrease the likelihood that the ideals that are used to inform 
just choice will turn out to be infeasible and thus a waste of political resources. Second, 
it also makes a practical case against short-term choice by suggesting that due to the 
structurally necessary features of capitalism, attempts to reform it in order to increase 
justice will likely fail.   
Having done this, Chapter 5 returns to a more abstract level of discussion, concerned 
with identifying general standards that ideal theory ought to adhere to. Here I move 
from focusing on the product of ideal theory, i.e. ideals themselves, to discussion of 
the process, i.e. the methods used to generate these ideals. Paramount to this discussion 
is the method of idealisation. I begin by outlining three functions performed by 
idealisations, namely abstraction, simplification, and normativity. I look to show that 
these functions are necessary for a range of fundamental philosophical arguments. 
Having done this I turn to consider the normative function in particular, as this is the 
method that is necessary to arrive at normatively accurate ideals. This function 
prompts two major criticisms. The first is that the necessity of idealisation conflicts 
with the necessity of feasibility assessments, as it seems that where one pushes us 
towards facts the other pulls us away from them. The second is that even if 
idealisations are necessary for ideals to escape real world constraints, they may result 
                                                 
13 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, with ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ (London: Harvard 
University, 2001), p. 6. 
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in ideals that are too distant to inform just choice. This latter point being what Laura 
Valentini refers to as ‘the paradox of ideal theory.’14 
In response to these concerns I show that idealisations are actually required in order to 
make thorough feasibility assessments. Moreover, I argue that idealisations need not 
be completely independent of factual considerations, and that by having idealisations 
that are also constrained by feasibility we can produce long-term ideals that are neither 
limited by contemporary facts nor too distant from them to inform just choice. I also 
address Charles W. Mills’s claims that normative idealisation is necessarily 
ideological,15 showing that it is actually, among other things, a way of escaping 
ideological thought. In doing all of this then I meet the fourth and final Key Objective 
of this thesis by demonstrating that we can arrive at feasible ideals while employing 
idealisations, and that there are thus no contradictions inherent in the necessary 
methods of ideal theory.  
Chapter 6 provides an overview of the previous four chapters and discusses the 
repercussions that this thesis has on the ideal theory and nonideal theory relationship 
more broadly.  
 
IV. Implications 
Having outlined the structure of my thesis and the Key Objectives I aim to meet I 
would now like to discuss some of its theoretical and practical implications. In this 
section I will consider what my argument means for how we conceptualise the 
relationship between ideal theory and nonideal theory, as well as the structure that we 
impose on each approach to theorising individually. I will then conclude by 
considering the political implications of this work, particularly as it pertains to the 
future of radical, long-term just choice.   
A fundamental implication of this thesis is that it should prompt a rethinking of the 
relationship between ideal theory and nonideal theory. We saw in Section II that we 
                                                 
14 Laura Valentini, ‘On the Apparent Paradox of Ideal Theory’ The Journal of Political Philosophy Vol. 
17, No. 3, pp. 332-355 (2009), p. 333. 
15 Mills, pp. 171-172. 
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require ideals, and thus ideal theory, if we are to know what to do in nonideal 
conditions, and thus if we are to make just choices. While nothing I claim seeks to 
undermine this fundamental assumption, I will suggest that the seemingly 
unidirectional conceptualisation of this relationship cannot lead to ideals that will 
inform just choice. Rather, if ideals are to perform this function then the relationship 
will have to move in both directions.  
Ideals need to be theorised in a manner that is highly sensitive to feasibility conditions. 
This means that ideal theorists have to take nonideal inputs seriously. A consequence 
of this is that political theorists may find that they need to work with social scientists, 
and possibly even natural scientists, in order to best model feasibility conditions. 
Throughout this thesis I look to clarify the consequences that my methodological 
claims have on the interdisciplinarity required of political theory.  
More fundamentally though, the need for robust conceptions of feasibility will likely 
mean that at least some explanatory theorising at the nonideal level must occur before 
we can expect to formulate helpful ideals for long-term choice. As we shall see 
however, this claim should not be overstated, ideal theory must retain its logical 
priority, even if it ought not to have temporal priority. The fact that we can only make 
just choices when informed by ideals of justice is not challenged by these claims.   
As noted above, this thesis looks to perform an underlabouring service for ideal theory. 
It does this by establishing both the necessity of ideal theory for just choice and the 
conditions that ideals and ideal theory methods have to satisfy if they are to perform 
this just choice informing function. In doing this I hope to strengthen the case for ideal 
theory and provide a framework that subsequent ideal theorising can draw on in order 
to be optimally effective. This is particularly the case with the methodologically more 
complex, feasible ideals that are required for long-term choice.  
While I believe this framework establishes standards that are applicable to ideal 
theorising in general, the work on feasibility in Chapters 3 and 4 highlights the 
contribution that Marxism can make in delineating feasibility. Thus while I want to 
show the necessity of ideal theory more generally, I believe that Marxist social theory 
provides a particularly strong route to arriving at feasible ideals for long-term choice.  
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The most fundamental practical repercussions of this project are reasonably clear. 
Most would accept that we ought to be trying to make the world more just. However 
failure to properly interrogate the best means of doing this will lead to sub-optimal 
choices and wasted political resources. This thesis aims to provide some clarity on this 
subject in order to set the standards and conditions that look to ensure, all other things 
being equal, that we can arrive at just choices; that is that our political decision-making 
is optimal and a sound investment of political resources.  
Another important practical point comes from the discussion of short-term and long-
term approaches to just choice. The persistence of these debates is evidenced in, for 
example, the division within the British Labour Party regarding whether the party 
should be committed to common ownership of the means of production.16 The question 
of whether progressive legislation can be truly secured within capitalism or only 
beyond it remains a pertinent one, which this thesis hopefully provides some further 
insight into. In this particular case it also suggests that the incorrigibility of capitalism 
lends further support to more long-term, socialist answers to the questions social 
democrats ask.  
Perhaps more importantly though, demonstrating that higher-risk long-term choice can 
be a defensible approach over superficially lower-risk short-term choice is important 
in itself. Not only is there an intuitive appeal inherent in achieving a fully just society 
rather than merely a partially just one, there are also urgent practical reasons for doing 
so. Humanity currently faces a range of potentially existential threats, in the forms of 
global warming, economic crises, terrorism, and the continuing possibility of nuclear 
                                                 
16 Debates centre round Clause IV of the Labour Party’s constitution. For most of Labour’s history, 
Clause IV stated the party’s commitment to ‘common ownership of the means of production, 
distribution, and exchange’. See Ian Adams, Political Ideology Today, 2nd Edition (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2001), p. 100. However in 1995 the constitution was revised significantly 
with references to common ownership replaced with a statement that looks to serve ‘the public interest’ 
through ‘a dynamic economy’ that functions via ‘the enterprise of the market and the rigour of 
competition’ and ‘a thriving private sector’. See The Labour Party, Rule Book (2013). For a defence of 
the original version of Clause IV see G.A. Cohen, ‘Is Socialism Inseparable from Common Ownership?’ 
Socialist Renewal Pamphlet 1 (1995). 
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war.17 In such circumstances the need to make choices that aim towards truly radical 
change becomes an even greater necessity.  
 
V. Conclusion 
This thesis thus aims to defend an ideal theory approach to just choice. Within this I 
look to show why ideals are necessary for just choices. I also seek to identify the 
conditions that ideals have to satisfy in order to inform just choice, before considering 
which further conditions have to hold in order to favour the apparently higher risk and 
higher reward long-term approach to just choice, over the safer, short-term alternative. 
I also show that ideal theory is a methodologically coherent and non-contradictory 
approach. In making these claims I demonstrate the relevance and importance of ideal 
theory for real world politics.  
                                                 
17 Not only do issues such as these pose serious challenges on their own but each can also act as a 
catalyst for the development of the rest. For example, inequality and the unequal impact of climate 




2. The Necessity of Ideals for Just Choice 
This chapter argues that in order to make choices that generally increase justice it is 
necessary to employ ideal conceptions of justice.1 As I noted in the previous chapter, 
ideal conceptions of justice (or simply ‘ideals’) are the sets of rules or principles that 
would govern legislation in a just society. In other words, if one does not possess a 
conception of the rules that would govern a just society then one will be unable to say 
whether any given available option is better or worse than any other given available 
option. Without ideals, acts of political choice will be speculative and less likely to 
result in just choices. Just choices are understood to be choices that prefigure action 
that improves the justness of society. As we have seen, just choices, and by extension 
the actions they prefigure, can either lead to an increase in the immediate justness of 
society (short-term choices) or move society towards fully adhering to the ideal (long-
term choices).  
As we saw in the previous chapter, while the formulation of ideals is generally 
considered a part of ideal theory,2 the question of which of a given set of available 
choices will further justice is a part of nonideal normative theory.3 In these terms, this 
chapter claims that to properly adhere to nonideal theory, i.e. to generally make just 
choices, it is necessary that our choices be informed by ideals. Due to the centrality of 
this claim let us refer to it simply as ‘the ideal claim’. For the purposes of this chapter 
we will want to separate the ideal claim into two further constituent claims. Let us call 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise stated ‘just choice’ implies ‘generally just choice’. There will be instances where 
just choices can be made without appeal to ideals of justice, and others where, despite possessing a 
sound ideal of justice, just choices will not be made. My claim is only that ideals are generally required 
to make just choices. It is unlikely that this claim could be defensible without an ‘in general’ caveat.  
2 While ‘ideal theory’ is the conventional terminology for this enterprise it is not uncontested. Alan 
Hamlin and Zofia Stemplowska for instance refer to ‘theories of ideals’. For a discussion of the 
distinction between ‘ideal theories’ and ‘theories of ideals’ see Alan Hamlin and Zofia Stemplowska, 
‘Theory, Ideal Theory and the Theory of Ideals’ Political Studies Review Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 48-62 
(2012), p. 53.  
3 As I am largely interested in the normative aspects of nonideal theory, I will treat ‘normative’ as given, 
and employ the shorter ‘nonideal theory’ to refer to ‘nonideal normative theory’. This is consistent with 
the term’s usage from Rawls’s seminal discussion to more recent contributions to nonideal theory 
scholarship. For an overview of recent literature on nonideal theory, see Zofia Stemplowska and Adam 




the claim that ideals are necessary for short-term just choice, ‘the short-term ideal 
claim’ (SIC), and let us call the claim that ideals are necessary for long-term just 
choices, ‘the long term ideal claim’ (LIC).  
One significant challenge to the former is presented by Amartya Sen,4 who claims that 
ideals can never help us know which of a range of choices yields the greatest increase 
to the current justness of society. Sen’s challenge to SIC ought to be taken seriously. 
If he is right, and ideals are not necessary for short-term just choice, then the practical 
value of political theory that proceeds from SIC will be significantly undermined. If 
we can generally make society more just without reference to ideals there is little or 
no practical need to theorise them. The particular appeal of Sen’s claim is that he 
presents an enticingly direct path to just choice. If he is correct then we will be able to 
make just choices without lengthy theoretical discussions about ideals nor the intricate 
methodological debates that accompany these. 
While this discussion is necessary for a defence of the ideal claim more generally, in 
rejecting any approach that circumvents ideals, it also responds to a significant, if 
indirect, challenge to long-term choice in particular. We saw in the previous chapter 
why long-term choice is inherently more risky than short-term choice, but if, on top of 
this, Sen’s ideal-free approach is also valid then the relative riskiness of long-term 
choice versus short-term choice will become even more pronounced. If Sen is correct 
then long-term choice will be faced not only with an alternative that offers more 
immediate and guaranteed gains (as short-term choice does) but does so without the 
complexity of ideal theorising. For this reason it is necessary to respond to Sen not 
only in order to comprehensively defend the ideal claim but also to defend a long-term 
approach to just choice.  
In disproving Sen this chapter will show why ideals are necessary for short-term 
choice. However to defend the ideal claim as a whole it is also necessary to show why 
ideals are required for long-term choice. LIC is philosophically less contentious than 
SIC: it is difficult to dispute the claim that, if the goal of political action is the 
realisation of an ideal, then we have to know what that ideal is. However while it is 
                                                 
4 Sen, pp. 214-238. 
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less susceptible to philosophical scrutiny serious questions can be asked about the 
practical feasibility of this approach. This includes the question of whether we ought 
to sacrifice probable short-term gains for speculative, and thus less probable, long term 
gains; an issue that will be addressed in Chapter 4. There I will outline some of the key 
conditions that are necessary if one is to justify adopting a riskier long-term approach 
to the ideal-nonideal theory relationship. For now it will suffice to show that both 
constituent claims of the ideal claim are valid. In doing this I am able to meet the first 
Key Objective of this thesis.   
In defending the ideal claim I will first offer a short recap of Rawls’s model of the 
relationship between ideals and nonideal theory, including an indication of the basic 
rationale underpinning the claim itself. Following this I will introduce Sen’s objections 
to SIC (§ I). I will then address Sen’s major claim that ideals are not necessary for 
short-term just choice, disputing this with reference to the distinction Sen fails to make 
between internal categories and external categories (§ II). I follow this with an 
anticipation of two possible critical responses to this position. I first argue that 
accepting that justice is an external category entails accepting the necessity of ideals 
(§ III). My second claim is that accepting this also entails accepting that theories of 
justice are necessary to order and rank individual principles (§ IV). Having defended 
SIC from claims that ideals are not necessary for short-term choice I proceed to 
challenge a series of objections Sen makes to the SIC on the grounds of the supposedly 
over-demanding nature of ideals (§ V).  
Having addressed arguments against the necessity and value of ideals I then proceed 
to discuss Sen’s claim that ideals are not sufficient for short-term choices. While I 
ultimately agree with this, I disagree with Sen’s rationale. Sen claims that ideals cannot 
be sufficient for short-term just choice on the grounds that we also require a theory of 
distance to make such choices. However, I look to show that any conception of 
distance that we require for such choices will be inherent within ideals themselves 
(§VI). 
The final substantive section of this chapter examines the validity of LIC, showing that 
ideals are also necessary for long-term just choices; on the grounds that we require 
ideals of justice to provide us with a goal towards which to orient nonideal political 
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decision-making. As with SIC, ideals are not sufficient for long-term just choice, and 
in the latter’s case they are farther from being so than in the case of the former, with 
nonideal theorising playing a much more prominent role in long-term choices (§ VII). 
The discussion concludes that both constituent claims of the ideal claim are valid.   
 
I. The Ideal Claim, the Practicality Critique, and Sen’s Alternative to SIC 
The majority of Rawls’s work in political theory seeks to formulate and defend an 
ideal of justice.5 This ideal, ‘justice as fairness’, takes the form of the two principles 
that Rawls claims would govern the form and actions of a just society’s political, legal, 
and economic institutions. The first principle states that people are to have the greatest 
individual liberty compatible with an equal liberty for all others. The second principle 
states that material inequalities are only acceptable when they are both (a) to the benefit 
of the least well off in society (i.e. the ‘Difference Principle’) and (b) attached to 
positions that are open and accessible to everyone.6 Were institutions to operate in 
accordance with these principles then society’s ‘basic structure’, i.e. body of public 
institutions, would be just.7  
An intuitive objection to Rawls’s approach is that there is no practical, political value 
in ideals. Such arguments suggest that knowing the principles that would govern a just 
society is unhelpful when trying to improve unjust societies such as our own. This 
objection thus makes no claim about the veracity of ideals such as Rawls’s but rather 
only how valuable they are given the dissimilarities between just societies and real 
ones. That is, even if we accept that the ideals formulated by Rawls, or others using 
                                                 
5 Comprehensive accounts of Rawls’s ideal of justice are offered in John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 
and John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). A concise version 
of his theory of justice is presented in John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. by Erin Kelly 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001).  
6 Rawls advocates fair rather than merely formal equality of opportunity. Fair equality of opportunity 
demands not only that people are not excluded from opportunities due to their race, gender, religion, 
and so on, but that people of the same ability and ambition are equally able to pursue opportunities. In 
short this entails policies that at the very least balance the unequal material starting positions of equally 
talented and ambitious individuals. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 63. For a discussion of fair 
equality of opportunity and how it differs from other conceptions of equality of opportunity see Richard 
Arneson, ‘Equality of Opportunity’ in The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy ed. by Edward N. 
Zalta (2015).  
7 For a statement of Rawls’s principles of justice see Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 53.  
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his approach, are true they are nonetheless irreparably disconnected from reality and 
are unable to inform our choices. We can call this line of criticism: ‘the practicality 
critique’. 
The practicality critique is not a concern for theories of justice tout court. It would be 
unproblematic for those, such as G.A. Cohen, who do not see informing just choice as 
the discipline’s primary aim. Rather for Cohen, ‘the question for political philosophy 
is not what we should do but what we should think, even when what we should think 
makes no practical difference.’8 Cohen’s claim is that ‘truly normative question[s]’, 
and the ideals we offer in response to them, have no connection to questions of 
practicability, feasibility, and any other categories relevant to nonideal decision 
making.9 In short, we ought to aim to know what true justice is even if it does not help 
inform choices that make the world any more just.  
However, as we saw in the previous chapter, this response is not available to Rawls. 
First, in Rawls’s view, political theory ought not to be concerned with merely 
improving our understanding of ideal justice but primarily with articulating ideals that 
can be of practical value to those wishing to make just choices. Second, Rawls states 
that the ‘urgent and pressing matters’ that we are confronted by are not those associated 
with determining which ideals reflect true justice, i.e. the focus of the majority of his 
own work, but rather real world problems of actual injustice, i.e. the concerns of 
nonideal theory.10 I am in full agreement with these two Rawlsian positions. It is thus 
necessary to respond to the practicality critique and demonstrate that ideals are a 
prerequisite for engagement with these ‘urgent and pressing matters’.  
The ideal claim is essentially the central response to this critique. It states that if we do 
not know what justice demands then we will be unable to say whether or not given 
choices in the nonideal sphere benefit justice. This is why, for Rawls, ideals offer ‘the 
only basis for the systematic grasp’ of the problem of what we ought to do here and 
now.11 As we have already seen, the ideal claim comprises two constituent claims. In 
                                                 
8 G.A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (London: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 268. 
9 Ibid., p. 270. We will return to the question of this more epistemologically radical form of ideal 
theorising in the following chapter. See Chapter 3, Section III.     




the case of long-term choice the relationship is more intuitive. LIC states that ideals 
are necessary to provide the goal that nonideal decision-making aims to arrive at.12 
This entails doing what can be expected to make society fully just in the long term, 
rather than what will lead to optimal justice in the immediate future. SIC, which is 
concerned with the relationship between ideals and short-term choice, is, on the other 
hand, less simple, and prone to more philosophical criticism. To better understand this 
claim I will now turn to the most significant proponent of the practicality critique, 
Amartya Sen, and consider his alternative, ideal-free approach to short-term choice. 
For Sen the fundamental difference between Rawls’s approach to theorising justice 
and his own is that where Rawls believes that short-term just choice is predicated on 
possessing an ideal conception of justice, Sen argues that we can actually assess the 
relative justness of alternative political options directly, without the aid of ideals.13 
Sen’s aim then is to show that a focus on theorising ideals is misplaced and that in 
order to make short-term just choices ideals are neither necessary nor sufficient;14 
claiming that they ‘do not help at all’ with nonideal decision-making.15 
Sen notes that his critique does not undermine the worth of ideals of justice as a 
‘freestanding achievement.’ This is to say that whether or not ideals are necessary or 
sufficient to make just choices they may yet be valuable for other reasons.16 However 
as stated above, while this would be unproblematic for those like Cohen, Rawls’s 
position, and my own, requires that one can demonstrate that ideals have practical 
value. As such it is necessary to prove that Sen’s claim, that we cannot make just 
choices with ideals but can make just choices without them, is invalid. 
Sen distinguishes between two types of necessity, both of which he rejects, which can 
be seen as underpinning SIC. The first is a ‘strong’ necessity that states that ideals have 
                                                 
12 See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, pp. 89-90. 
13 While I refer to Rawls’s approach as ‘ideal’ and to Sen’s as ‘ideal-free’, Sen’s own article uses 
different terminology. Thus Rawls’s approach is ‘transcendental’ and his own is ‘comparative’. 
However, as what makes Rawls’s approach transcendental is the fact that it involves employing an ideal 
to assist decision making at the nonideal level and what makes Sen’s comparative is that it allows for 
ideal-free short-term just choice, I believe my substitutes are sufficiently synonymous with the original 
terms. 
14 Sen, pp. 216-217. A similar claim is made by Elizabeth Anderson, who notes that ‘knowledge of the 
better does not require knowledge of the best.’ See Anderson in Knight, p. 362. 
15 Sen, p. 221. 
16 Ibid., pp. 220-221. 
22 
 
to be identified before ‘sensible’ comparisons can be made of available options. The 
second is a ‘weak’ necessity that states that even if strong necessity does not hold then 
we ought to be able to derive ideals from a series of just choices.17 The rationale that 
underpins the second type of necessity is the idea that if we can say whether we prefer 
A over B, and C over D, and A over C and so on, then eventually we would be able to 
determine, purely through a series of discrete just choices, what our ideal choice would 
be. In what follows I want to show that a form of strong necessity holds. While I find 
the idea of weak necessity to be plausible in itself I will not discuss this further in order 
to focus on strong necessity.18  
 
II. Internal Categories and External Categories in Comparative Evaluations 
To develop his claim that we do not require ideals to make short-term choices Sen 
likens theorising about justice to comparing the height of two mountains and 
evaluating the relative merits of two paintings. His claim being that just as knowing 
the world’s highest mountain or the world’s finest painting are not necessary for these 
comparisons, knowing what ideal justice demands is not necessary when comparing 
the relative justness of two nonideal options. He concludes with the general claim that 
‘there would be something very deeply odd’ in thinking that one is unable to properly 
compare two things without first knowing what the ‘supreme alternative’ to those 
things is.19 
Is this really so odd though? I believe Sen mistakenly proceeds from the true claims 
he makes about the uselessness of the external reference points he mentions in the 
mountain and painting examples to the false claim he makes about the general 
uselessness of supreme alternatives. I see no problem in accepting that the Mona Lisa 
is not necessary to evaluate the relative merits of a painting by Gauguin and a painting 
by Van Gogh, or that Mount Everest is not necessary to compare the heights of 
Kanchenjunga and Mont Blanc; while disagreeing with the generalisation that Sen 
infers from these claims that when comparing two instantiations of a category it is 
                                                 
17 Ibid., p. 222. 
18 For a discussion of weak necessity see Miller, p. 235. 
19 Sen, p. 222. 
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never necessary to know what the ideal instantiation of that category is. In explaining 
why his claims about paintings and mountains are correct I will show why these are 
not analogous with justice and thus unable to undermine SIC. 
The validity of Sen’s analogies rest on his being able to prove that in all of the cases 
he considers, standards of comparison can be provided by features that are internal to 
the things being compared. I use ‘standards of comparison’ to refer to the systems of 
measurement used when performing comparative evaluations. To illustrate this let us 
start with the Mount Everest example. As I have said, Sen is correct when he claims 
that knowing the height of a given set of mountains’ highest peak does not help us 
know which of two different smaller peaks within that set is higher. Why is this the 
case? Well we may think of height as an internal category. In order to know what the 
category ‘height’ is we do not have to discover any particular instantiation of height 
or a perfect embodiment of height. Rather, height is a feature that is inherent within 
objects. 
So if we want to know whether Kanchenjunga or Mont Blanc is higher, it is of no value 
to our project to know the height of Mount Everest or indeed any other peak. If we 
already have the relevant empirical facts, i.e. the heights of the two peaks, or the 
technical ability necessary to discover these facts, i.e. appropriate systems and tools of 
measurement, we can compare their heights. If we do not possess these things and the 
peaks are beside each other (although they are not in the case of Kanchenjunga and 
Mont Blanc) we may be able to estimate on appearance which is higher. In no case 
though would it ever be helpful to refer to an external instantiation of height.   
I think Sen would agree with this summary of the nature of height. The same could be 
said for many other categories such as ‘weight’, ‘mass’, ‘velocity’, ‘population’, and 
so on. These are all, similar to height, internal categories. However it seems clear that 
there are other types of categories that we might call external categories that do rely 
on external instantiations when comparing two or more other instantiations of a 
category. To illustrate this let us continue with our comparison of Kanchenjunga and 
Mont Blanc but imagine that we are not interested in comparing the height of these 
two mountains but rather with comparing the everestness of them. Say that everestness 
is a category used to allow Mount Everest aficionados to measure different mountains 
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according to how similar they are to Mount Everest; the greater their everestness, the 
more similar they are to Everest, and therefore, the better.  
As we have seen, in order to compare the different mountains we will require standards 
of comparison. Evidently the standards of comparison we require are not in this case 
inherent within Kanchenjunga and Mont Blanc themselves. Rather we have to look to 
an external instantiation of everestness in order to find our standards of comparison. 
This external instantiation is our ideal of everestness. In this case this ideal is Mount 
Everest itself, as this is the only possible reference point we could use if we wanted to 
test how similar other mountains are to Mount Everest. Perhaps the standards of 
comparison take the form of sub-categories such as snowfall, height, and wildlife. 
Using these we could grade other peaks based on whether they have too much or too 
little snow in July, whether they are exactly 29,029 feet tall or disappointingly either 
smaller or taller than this, and whether they attract the same species of snow leopard 
that is found on Mount Everest. By referring to our ideal then we are able to establish, 
firstly what categories to use, and secondly how similar Kanchenjunga is to Mount 
Everest and how similar Mont Blanc is to Mount Everest in each category. With this 
information we are then able to see which peak is more ‘everistic’. This comparison 
then, unlike a comparison of the height of the mountains, necessarily requires an ideal. 
External categories are thus defined by their reliance on ideals for standards of 
comparison.  While everestness is a patently incredible external category it seems, 
contra Sen, that there may exist an extensive list of wholly credible external categories, 
and moreover that justice falls into this list. If this is the case then we will be unable 
to make short-term choices without ideals. Alternatively, if justice is, like height, an 
internal category, then we should be able to evaluate the justness of two options 
without reference to the demands of ideal justice, as the standards of comparison will 
be inherent within the options that are compared.  
In what way might ideals be useful to nonideal theorists who want to make short-term 
just choices? Let us imagine a strict-egalitarian nonideal theorist, Ana, who is being 
guided by the ideal of full material equality. The society she strives to make more just 
is conveniently divided into three equal-sized groups of people: the unskilled, the 
averagely-skilled, and the highly-skilled. Ana is confronted by three immediately 
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available political options which yield different distributions of material wealth across 
society’s three groups: 
 




Option A 1 3 12 
Option B 3 5 6 
Option C 3 3 4 
 
If Ana referred to her strict-egalitarian ideal she would likely conclude that just 
societies are those that have full material equality, perhaps due to the positive effects 
she expects this distribution to have on goods such as solidarity, happiness, and human 
flourishing. Having this information she may then decide that Option C, offering the 
distribution most similar to full material equality, would be the short-term choice. 
Option B would be her second choice as it would be more similar to full material 
equality than the distribution offered by Option A. By the same token we would 
imagine that Rawlsian nonideal theorists guided by the Difference Principle would 
select Option B (see §1), while those who associated justice with rewarding the 
talented or maximising societal wealth would opt for Option A.20  
How though can Ana know which option is most just if she does not have an ideal of 
justice? She will be able to see that different options yield different distributions with 
different levels of remuneration, equality, poverty and whatever else. However she has 
no way of translating these facts into a comparative judgement about the relative 
justness of these different arrangements. The standards of comparison cannot be found 
within the options being compared and thus the different distributions have no inherent 
meaning. The justness of political options then, like the everestness, but not the height, 
                                                 
20 A more generalised version of this point is made by Pablo Gilabert when he observes that ‘the 
principles underlying the perfect society should be relevant to comparing imperfect ones.’ See Pablo 
Gilabert, ‘Comparative Assessments of Justice, Political Feasibility, and Ideal Theory’ Ethical Theory 
and Moral Practice Vol. 15, No.1, pp. 39-56 (2012), p. 44. 
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of mountains, is measured in terms of those political options’ relative similarity to an 
ideal. Justice is thus reliant on ideals as we are only able to measure instantiations of 
justice through standards of comparison derived from ideals. Without ideals we simply 
cannot know what constitutes an increase or a decrease in justness.  
 
III. The Necessity of Ideals of Justice 
Somebody endorsing Sen’s position at this stage may concede the point that justice is 
an external category and that therefore, when pursuing short-term choices, we require 
an external instantiation of justice in order to gain the requisite standards of 
comparison. However they may argue that accepting this does not entail that we have 
to accept the stronger claim that ideals of justice are necessary. Thus they may claim 
that we do not require ideals in order to make short-term just choices, as superior but 
imperfect, contemporary instantiations are sufficient.  
To flesh out this gambit let us return to Sen’s analogies, focusing this time on the 
example of comparing paintings. Recall that Sen claims that in order to know whether 
a Van Gogh is better or worse than a Gauguin it is unhelpful to know that the Mona 
Lisa is the world’s finest painting. Once again he is quite right. However, unlike the 
internal category of height used in the mountain example, we can imagine that 
‘painting perfection’ is probably an external category. It would be bizarre to think that 
an aesthetic category could be measured as simply as one would measure a descriptive 
category such as height or weight.21 In this instance then the problem is not, as it was 
with height, that an ideal of painting perfection is a red herring that does not exist in 
any form but rather that Sen exchanges whatever this ideal of painting might be with 
the clearly different instantiation: ‘best existing painting’.22 Examining this analogy 
                                                 
21 This is not to say that people may not display reactions to art that give the impression that artistic 
categories are internal. Indeed people may have very intuitive and automatic responses to pieces of art. 
However it should be kept in mind that an intuitive reaction like this can still rely, subconsciously on 
external standards of comparison. The precisely same logic applies to intuitive moral judgements.  
22 It is at least logically possible of course for the best existing thing to be identical to the ideal, i.e. the 
best possible, thing. It is unlikely though that even if the Mona Lisa is the best painting in the world that 
it is also the best painting that could possibly be painted.  
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allows us to draw out the problems that will confront the critic of SIC who wants to 
argue that external instantiations need not be ideal.  
Before proceeding I would like to address a major, intuitive weakness of this criticism 
of SIC. Recall that ideals provide us with standards of comparison that tell us which 
sub-categories are relevant to a category and provide a benchmark from which we can 
determine how well non-ideal instantiations of the category are performing. A serious 
and well-founded concern may thus be that without an ideal instantiation of a category 
we are unable to even know which of a set of actual instantiations the best existing 
instantiation is. Evidently this is a fact we need to know in order to arrive at a non-
ideal instantiation to be used to compare lesser instantiations. This is a major problem, 
but in order to identify some of the other errors in the ideal-free position it is necessary 
to bracket this concern for the moment.23 As such we will assume for just now that we 
can say which of a given set of instantiations is the best existing instantiation without 
reference to an ideal.  
So why then might it be otherwise problematic to replace ideal with ‘best existing’? 
Firstly it is very unlikely that any best existing painting will not be in some sense 
flawed, and may indeed be weaker in certain aspects than the, all things considered, 
inferior painting it is providing standards of comparison for. Accepting for argument’s 
sake that the Mona Lisa is the world’s finest painting we can still imagine that it may 
have poorer brushwork than Van Gogh’s Sower and less interesting use of perspective 
than Gauguin’s Vision after the Sermon. If this is the case then we cannot rely on the 
Mona Lisa to provide standards of comparison by which we can evaluate either the 
relative strength of the brushwork or use of perspective of the two otherwise inferior 
paintings. Moreover we can easily imagine that some feature that is important to the 
paintings under consideration may not be manifested in any form in the Mona Lisa, 
rendering it even more deficient as an external reference point. 
Let us extend this logic to the question of justice. Imagine a world comprising three 
societies, A, B, and C. Now, imagine that we have an ideal that emphasises the equal 
importance of civil liberties and economic equality, and from this ideal we are able to 
                                                 
23 For a thorough discussion of bracketing methods in philosophy see Chapter 5, Section I’s discussion 
of abstracting idealisations. 
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assess how societies perform in each sub-category according to a five point scale 
running from very weak (one point) to very strong (five points). From the perspective 
of this ideal imagine that A is the most just society. It is very strong on civil liberties 
though weak on economic equality (thus scoring seven points in total). B is, from the 
perspective of the ideal, the second most just society. It is strong on economic equality 
but very weak on civil liberties (scoring five points in total). Finally C, is the least just 
society, being neither strong nor weak on civil liberties but very weak on economic 
equality (scoring four points in total):  
 Civil Liberties Economic Equality 
Society A 5 2 
Society B 4 1 
Society C 3 1 
Now imagine that we are comparing B and C, but rather than using our hypothetical 
ideal we are using the best existing instantiation of a just society, i.e. A; remembering 
that for now we are bracketing the very serious question of how we are to know that A 
is the best instantiation of justice without reference to an ideal! Using standards of 
comparison from A we would have to say that C is the more just of the two as its 
stronger civil liberties make it more similar to A. As A has weak economic equality we 
cannot use it to compare the respective achievements in economic equality of B and 
C, even though it is the relative strength in this category that means that it is actually 
B which is overall the more just of the two societies. By relying on ‘best existing’ 
instantiations for standards of comparison then we risk blunting our comparative 
evaluations and making significant errors of judgement. 
Indeed if we were to derive standards of comparison from best existing instantiations 
of categories then the resultant conservativism would disable critical thought. In 
political theory we would be unable to choose courses of action that reached beyond 
current standards.24 In the case of Ana the strict-egalitarian it would perhaps make it 
                                                 
24 For a discussion about unduly conservative political theory, and ways of avoiding it see Pablo Gilabert 
and Holly Lawford-Smith’s discussion of ‘cynical realism’ in Pablo Gilabert and Holly Lawford-Smith, 
‘Political Feasibility: A Conceptual Exploration’ Political Studies Vol. 60, pp. 809-825 (2012), p. 815.  
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impossible for her to be a strict-egalitarian, as no strictly-egalitarian societies currently 
exist. Irrespective of one’s thoughts on the benefits of full material equality there 
would surely be many desirable ideals of justice that would be made irrelevant to short-
term choice if we were to restrict ourselves to the best existing, rather than the best 
possible, instantiations of justice.25 
Let us now return to the serious question we bracketed at the start of this section. Recall 
that we considered the concern that without ideals we would be unable to know which 
of a set of instantiations the best existing instantiation of that category is. In other 
words, without an ideal of justice we could not say which existing society is currently 
the most just society in the world. Thus even if we choose to employ non-ideal external 
instantiations we will still rely on ideals to tell us what those non-ideal instantiations 
are; whether we are aware of doing this or not. It appears then that the choice is not 
between using ideals and not using them but rather on consciously using ideals or 
unconsciously using them. If we assume we can do without ideals then we will be still 
be using them, only doing so in a non-reflexive manner. Failing to theorise ideals then 
will lead to standards of comparison that are more likely to be deficient in some sense. 
If this is the case then it will be sensible to engage with our short-term choices in the 
most rigorous and prepared manner possible, and we can only do this by consciously 
drawing on ideals.  
 
IV. The Necessity of Theories of Justice 
Although the necessity of ideals of justice for short-term just choice has now been 
established, critics may still argue that SIC does not hold. One might claim that even 
if ideals are necessary we only need discrete individual categories of justice rather than 
theories of justice that explain the order or ranking of those individual categories. To 
illustrate this problem let us again consider the painting analogy. 
We know that we require ideals because non-ideal external instantiations are not 
sufficient for good comparative judgements. What type of ideal might we employ 
                                                 
25 We will return to consider this discussion from the perspective of the assumptions that ideals are 
derived from, rather than the ideals themselves, when discussing idealisation in Chapter 5.  
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then? Well, we can imagine an artist who would be able to combine a brilliant artistic 
mind with an analytical clarity of expression in order to describe exactly what an ideal 
painting would look like. Somebody reading the artist’s account of this ideal could 
then piece together in their head how this hypothetical painting would look. From this 
abstract idea of an ideal painting, art critics, along with the brilliant and analytical artist 
herself, could derive the standards of comparison necessary to compare works by 
Gauguin and works by Van Gogh.  
While this scenario is not strictly beyond the realms of imagination I think most people 
on reflection would be doubtful that such a system could ever be put into practice. 
First, we may think that a process like this would be too demanding on people’s 
capacity for abstract visualisation. In order for this to function as an ideal people would 
have to be able to picture the painting in their minds and then use this to compare the 
merits of sets of actual paintings. It may be though that this is simply beyond the 
cognitive abilities of most, if not all, human beings. Second, we may also be doubtful 
that we can say with any confidence what ‘best possible’ is when it comes to aesthetic 
categories. It seems probable that the value we attribute to art is too closely connected 
to contextual and subjective factors. 
However, accepting the validity of these concerns need not entail rejecting the use of 
ideals in aesthetics or accepting that the category ‘perfect painting’ is internal rather 
than external. Instead, we may use individual categories rather than ideals holistically 
embodied in a single hypothetical painting. We still need ideal categories such as form, 
tone, brushwork, and so on to make sense of the relative merits of the works in 
question; even if, in response to the second concern, these are quite contextual 
categories, perhaps sensitive to the artist’s aims and contemporary standards. We can 
then evaluate the relative merits of actual paintings using these ideal standards.  
If we think that ideal aesthetic categories are necessarily discrete and individual in 
nature we may worry that the same holds for justice. What if theories of justice place 
implausibly high demands on our capacities for abstract reasoning and this forces us 
instead to employ a series of discrete and individual ideal categories? If this is the case 
then we face a problem. If we are unable to process a theory of what a just society 
demands and instead only use individual categories then we will be unable to rank the 
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relative importance of different ideals. We would lack a theory that gives us a 
conception of the priority or hierarchy of certain ideals over others. To illustrate, 
imagine three societies, each of which has fully realised a different aspect of Rawls’s 
ideal. One has secured the principle of greatest equal liberties, another the principle of 
fair equality of opportunity, and another the Difference Principle.26 Without a theory 
of justice we would be unable to rank the societies by justness.  
Fortunately there is little reason to believe that aesthetic categories such as perfect 
painting and political categories such as justice are the same in this respect. Crucially 
for one, politics is a naturally verbal practice. Constitutions and legislation are written 
down, parliaments host debates, and political analysis is largely expressed in the 
written and spoken words of commentators. Due to this characteristic of politics we 
have the experience, concepts, and vocabulary to talk about prospective political 
systems without placing unrealistic demands on our capacity for abstract reasoning. 
There is no translation problem involved in politics as there may be in art as ideals do 
not have to be converted from abstract images into words and so on. The ready 
intelligibility of the systems of governance of utterly incredible societies outlined in 
works of fantasy and science-fiction illustrate how we are able to grasp governing 
principles and ideals of justice that are entirely divorced from reality. As such there is 
no inherent problem is similarly codifying ideal conceptions of justice, such as 
Rawls’s, which are generally written with far greater clarity and with greater fidelity 
to the world and its inhabitants as they are at present.  
Therefore we have no reason to reject the possibility of theories of justice that allow 
us to not only measure individual categories but to weigh up the relative value of 
different principles.27 Thus in the case mentioned above, we would be able to use 
Rawls’s ‘lexical’ ordering of his principles of justice, to state that the society that has 
secured the liberty principle is more just than the society that has secured the fair 
equality of opportunity principle, which is more just than the society that has secured 
                                                 
26 Again, see Section I above for a brief statement of Rawls’s ideal of justice. 
27 Martijn Boot makes a similar point when contrasting ‘one-dimensional’ categories such as height 
with ‘multifaceted’ categories such as justice. See Martijn Boot, ‘The Aim of a Theory of Justice’ 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Vol. 15, pp. 7-21 (2012), pp. 11-12. 
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the Difference Principle.28 By the same token, the concern that we might be unable to 
rank categories in artistic comparison is perhaps also overstated. There is no reason 
that a theory that provided the ideal categories required for comparing paintings could 
not also have some rules in place to state which categories are generally more 
significant than others.  
Before concluding our discussion of necessity we should consider a final possible 
counter argument to SIC. Laura Valentini suggests that Sen may be right to claim that 
in some instances at least we may not require ideals in order to inform short-term 
choice. Thus she asserts that ideals are not necessary to know that a society with 
arbitrary arrest is worse, other things being equal, than one without it.29 One immediate 
response to this could emphasise that SIC, and the ideal claim more broadly, only rests 
on our proving that ideals are generally necessary for just choice, and therefore it is 
able to survive Valentini’s endorsement of Sen.  
However this response may overlook the more significant threat that this argument 
poses to SIC. This takes the form of a slippery slope, whereby conceding that there 
exist some apparently obvious cases in which we do not require ideals to make just 
choices will lead us to concede far more. To this we can say, as shown above in Section 
III, that we always rely on ideals when we make short-term choices. Thus even when 
our choices are made without conscious consideration of any robustly theorised ideal, 
some form of intuitive ideal is at work. In these circumstances surely it is better to 
think reflexively and consciously rather than intuitively or unconsciously. While in 
some instances, failure to do this will not lead to us making unjust or otherwise poor 
choices, it is likely that in most matters of justice we ought to be equipped with robust 
and well theorised ideals.   
                                                 
28 For Rawls’s discussion of how lexical priority should be used to inform short-term just choice see 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 216. For commentaries on this see A. John Simmons, ‘Ideal and Nonideal 
Theory’ Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 5-36 (2010), §§ 2-3, and Laura Valentini, ‘A 
Paradigm Shift in Theorising about Justice? A Critique of Sen’ Economics and Philosophy Vol. 27, No. 
3, pp. 297-315 (2011), p. 308.  
29 Valentini’s acceptance of Sen’s claim is a critical one, namely that Sen ends up ‘proving too much’ 
by showing not only that we do not need ideal theory to make these judgements but that we do not need 
any theory at all. Thus for Valentini, Sen invalidates the contribution that both Rawls’s approach and 
his own approach are able to make to the matter of ‘obvious cases’. See ibid., p. 306. 
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This response seems to be consistent with Martijn Boot’s thoughts on this point. Boot 
claims that we ought not to confuse a lack of discord with a lack of ideals. It is not that 
ideals do not underpin judgements but rather that on certain issues all reasonable 
approaches will be in agreement on a particular issue.30 However as Boot also rightly 
notes, we ought not to assume that this will generally be the case. Political theory tends 
to be most useful when it is urgent; we need ideals of justice to help us make sense of 
difficult problems, and conceding that we may not need complex ideals for smaller 
problems need not mean accepting that they are anything less than vital in general.  
These points aside, focusing only on the theoretical necessity of ideals may risk 
overlooking the important instructive role that they play. Even when they are not 
necessary to tell us what we ought to do, ideals will often be vital in helping us 
understand why we ought to do what we ought to do. Choices that are merely 
intuitively obvious to us may not be obvious at all to others and it may be necessary to 
explain why our intuitions are correct. Even moral positions that are widely accepted 
at present may not be in the future. While Valentini and Sen are right that we do not 
need full ideals for all short-term just choices, we should also remember that they are 
always beneficial in helping us and others understand exactly why these choices ought 
to be seen as obvious. We might think that the benefit of this is not only that it helps 
understand specific moral positions but that it also preserves a healthy and reflective 
attitude towards moral and political decision-making.31    
To summarise the discussion thus far. We have seen that justice is an external category, 
and that therefore when making short-term choices it is necessary to refer to an external 
instantiation of justice. We also saw that this external instantiation has to take the form 
of an ideal as non-ideal instantiations of justice will be unable to provide the standards 
of comparison required to arrive at just choice. Following this we discussed why we 
also require a theory of justice to help us make sense of the values of the constituent 
principles of this ideal if and when they conflict with each other. For these reasons we 
                                                 
30 Boot, p. 10. 
31 There is a similarity here with John Stuart Mill’s desire that valuable truths not become ‘dead 
dogmas’. See John Stuart Mill, ‘On Liberty’ in Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on 
Representative Government, and Selections from Auguste Comte and Positivism’, ed. by H.B. Acton 
(London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1859/1972), pp. 95-96.  
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can assert that SIC, that is, the claim that ideals are generally necessary for short-term 
just choice, holds.  
 
V. Are Ideals Prohibitively Demanding? 
Having discussed why ideals are necessary for short-term just choice, we can now turn 
to consider some other possible issues with SIC. These criticisms are not designed to 
show that ideals are not necessary for short-term choice but rather that the claim is 
problematic for other reasons. A major concern here is that if these objections stand 
then while SIC will remain the only possible route to short-term just choice, it may be 
one that is at best challenging and at worst politically disabling. We will consider three 
criticisms offered by Sen that he believes show the advantages that his ideal-free 
approach has over SIC. The first is that with SIC we are unable to criticise the 
immediate injustices of problems such as famine or gender equality without first 
clarifying meticulous and possibly irrelevant details such as the exact rate at which 
income tax would be set in an ideal society. The second is that as ideals demand 
institutions that may be beyond the scope of some societies, such ideals would be 
unable to inform short-term choice. The third criticism is that disagreement over ideals 
may stand in the way of agreement over short-term choice, and as such if we did not 
have to theorise ideals there would be fewer obstacles to improving justice. 
The first criticism seems to have plenty of intuitive force. We do not want to be unable 
to say anything about current injustices until we have a complete conception of ideal 
justice. Moreover, if ideals are this demanding we may find that we are unable to ever 
proceed to long-term choices, as we will not be able to find sufficiently satisfactory or 
widely accepted solutions to every possible question regarding the governance of ideal 
societies.  
Thankfully we can be sceptical that this attack truly hits its target. First, it is doubtful 
that Sen is aiming at a faithful representation of the Rawlsian approach to ideals being 
defended here. Recall from our earlier discussion that Rawls’s own conception of 
justice does not provide precise details on exact levels of taxation but rather general 
principles that establish the framework that stipulates the acceptable boundaries of, 
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among other things, taxation policy. He does not specify whether ‘a top income tax 
rate of 45 percent [is] more just or less just than a top rate of 46 percent’,32 but rather 
that inequalities of wealth have to benefit the least well off, with any implications this 
may have for what is to count as an acceptable rate of taxation.33 Rawls has good 
reasons for avoiding the specificity that Sen attributes to him. The former believes his 
principles are compatible with a range of different socio-economic systems such as 
property-owning democratic states, liberal socialist states, and welfare-state capitalist 
states.34 This generality, which Rawls sees as a strength of his approach, would not be 
possible if every detail of just governance had to be specified at the outset. Rather his 
approach provides scope for different types of socio-economic systems to determine 
how best to realise his principles based on their specific social and historical 
circumstances. Rawls is not willing to connect his principles of justice to a single 
model of ownership, let alone to specific rates of taxation. If Sen’s representation of 
Rawls is correct then the latter’s conception of justice would be at best only applicable 
to a single society and at worst too specific for any society. 
Avoiding dealing with the minutiae of governance at the ideal level is generally 
sensible as changing conditions will make different rates of taxation preferable at 
different times. We can imagine that even societies that fully adhere to principles of 
justice may have to alter rates of taxation. Technological changes that increase or 
decrease the costs of redistributive policies or increase or decrease social solidarity 
may lead to necessary changes in taxation rates that are nevertheless consistent with 
the principles of justice that govern policy-making. This does not mean that the fine 
details do not have to be ironed out at some stage, only that this is largely a task for 
nonideal theory rather than ideal theory.  
There is no reason to think that it is only liberal egalitarian ideals of justice that can be 
or should be versatile. Differences in historical circumstances and so on also mean that 
                                                 
32 Sen, p. 223. 
33 See Valentini, ‘A Paradigm Shift’, p. 304. 
34 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. xiv-xvi and pp. 247-248. For a more detailed discussion of how 
Rawls’s principles might function within different socio-economic systems see Martin O’Neill and 
Thadd Williamson (eds.), Property Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond (Oxford, Blackwell, 2012) 
and Martin O’Neill, ‘Liberty, Equality, and Property-Owning Democracy’ Journal of Social Philosophy 
Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 379-396 (2009). 
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the form which any ideal might take at different times, in different societies, and being 
advanced by different groups and individuals, will be highly varied. As Al Campbell 
remarks on forms of socialism in particular, ‘there were many different types of slave 
societies, many different types of feudalism and many different specific types of 
capitalism […] many different forms of socialism are possible.’35 Rawls aside then, 
the general conceptualisation of ideals of justice defended here is still as sets of 
principles that establish the general parameters that just policies and institutions ought 
to adhere to. As such, Sen’s over-specificity criticism holds neither for Rawls’s ideals 
nor for any conception of ideals that this thesis recognises.  
What then of Sen’s second criticism, that ideals require ‘a plethora of institutions’, and 
that often these institutions put an ideal beyond the reach of some societies?36 Ignoring 
the fact that we have just seen why ideals may be less demanding than Sen claims they 
are, there is a fundamental mistake here. Sen seems to make a category error in stating 
that this rules out ideals of justice in general. If it is the case that an ideal requires the 
establishment of certain institutions that are beyond the possible reach of particular 
societies then this only rules out using this ideal in conjunction with LIC, i.e. long-
term choice. This would be on the grounds that the full realisation of justice, which is 
the objective of this enterprise, would be rendered impossible. The short-term 
approach that Sen engages with on the other hand would still be able to issue 
recommendations on the grounds that even if an ideal was unachievable one would 
still be able to state how similar different options would be to the ideal.  
To illustrate, let us consider Ana and her strict-egalitarian ideal once again. Let us 
imagine that she has two options, one that lowers society’s Gini coefficient to .3 and 
another that raises the Gini coefficient to .6. Now let us assume that the society she is 
choosing for lacks the incredibly strong state needed to reach and preserve a Gini 
coefficient of zero and that what is more this society will never be able to achieve this 
state.37 Now while this may prevent Ana using this ideal to inform long-term choice, 
                                                 
35 See Al Campbell, ‘Designing Socialism: Visions, Projections, Models’ Science & Society Vol. 76, 
No. 2, pp. 140-146 (2012), p. 141. 
36 Sen, p. 226. 
37 In fairness to this hypothetical society, a state like this might be beyond any society’s institutions. A 
state that was able to ensure that no single individual ever possessed a single penny more than any other 
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it should not prevent her using it to inform short-term choice. Indeed it seems to be 
very clear that guided by this ideal she will pick the first option as it will make society 
more similar to the strict-egalitarian ideal. Infeasibility then is not necessarily an 
obstacle to short-term choice.38   
More generally, Sen’s claim that possibly permanent knowledge gaps, such as 
uncertainty about the feasibility of ideals, are especially threatening to ideal 
formulation is likely overstated.39 The problem of making sound normative statements 
without full information is of course a significant problem, but it is a significant 
problem for political theory in general, and there is no reason to think that it is more 
of a challenge for ideal theory than it is for Sen’s ideal-free approach, let alone an 
argument in support of rejecting the former in favour of the latter. The solution, it 
would seem, is to focus on theorising information and gaps in information as fully as 
possible so ideal theory methods are as robust as possible.  
Sen’s third criticism is that disagreement about ideals can stand in the way of 
agreement about shorter-term choice, and that if we set aside questions of ideals we 
will be able to engender greater consensus.40 Sen is logically correct here though it 
paints a somewhat pessimistic picture of political theorists as being either too dim-
witted or too stubborn to set aside their disagreements at more abstract levels and 
acknowledge their agreements at more concrete ones. Even if we assume Sen is correct 
we would only succeed in postponing the inevitable clash when people who otherwise 
would have disagreed at the level of ideals end up disagreeing at a more advanced 
stage in the process of making short-term choices. To use a simplified example, Robert 
the right-wing libertarian and Gerald the socialist may have profound disagreements 
about what an ideal society would look like but both readily agree that when offered a 
choice between an economic policy of slavery and one of capitalist wage-labour, the 
latter option would undoubtedly be optimal in terms of its short-term justness. 
However later, when they have to decide whether to retain the system of capitalist 
                                                 
individual seems very improbable indeed. However as this is a purely hypothetical point I won’t pursue 
this question of feasibility further.  
38 This discussion is continued in the following chapter where I consider the different ways that 
infeasible ideals can inform short term just choice. See Chapter 3, Section IV.   
39 Sen, p. 223. 
40 Ibid., pp. 225-226. 
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wage-labour or move towards a system of socialist production, they are likely to find 
themselves in intractable disagreement.  
More significantly, Sen’s claim overlooks other important aspects of the nonideal 
theorising process. While it does involve deciding which political options are 
preferable it also involves questions about the methods that are acceptable to achieve 
ends as well as how we ought to allocate finite political resources. Assume that Robert 
and Gerald, having established a system of capitalist wage-labour, are in agreement 
that the new most pressing goal ought to be treating a number of epidemics that a large 
proportion of the population are afflicted with. However where Robert believes that 
healthcare should be purchased in the same manner as other goods or insurances, 
Gerald believes that health care should be nationalised. This disagreement may mean 
that Robert and Gerald are unable to agree on how to deal with the problem, as they 
will each have different ideas about the resources that ought to be allocated to each 
problem. Indeed they may not even be able to agree on what resources are available 
due to fundamental differences on subjects such as taxation, state borrowing, monetary 
policy in general, and so on. These insurmountable obstacles to consensus on the 
matter of short-term just choice are not only caused by Robert and Gerald’s radically 
divergent ideals of justice but also due to their disagreement at the level of nonideal 
theory.  
In short, it is optimistic to assume that a shared agreement about the importance of a 
particular goal necessarily implies a shared agreement about political practice. Thus 
even if Sen is right about the difficulty of setting aside disagreements about ideals, we 
may find that if we bracket ideals, consensus will still be quickly blocked by other 
obstacles.  
Just as Sen is unable to show that ideals are not necessary for short-term choice he is 
also unable to show that they are prohibitively demanding. Far from needing 
exhaustive ideals in order to engage in nonideal theory, the normative force of ideals 
comes, in part, from there being generalisable. Similarly, even excessive institutional 
demands do not render ideals inapplicable to short-term choice even if they may render 
those ideals inapplicable to long-term choice. Finally, assuming that bracketing ideals 
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will allow political theory to bracket disagreement overlooks the distinction between 
short-term just choice and political strategy.  
 
VI. Sen’s Insufficiency Claim 
Thus far I have tried to show that, contra Sen, ideals are necessary for just choice and 
that by extension Sen’s ideal-free approach is unable to arrive at just choices. Recall 
though that Sen also claims that ideals are not sufficient for short-term choice. Now as 
SIC states that ‘ideals are necessary for short-term just choice’, its validity does not 
rest on the success or failure of Sen’s insufficiency claim. Nonetheless it is worth 
considering Sen’s argument, partly as it helps us better understand SIC and partly as I 
believe that ideals are closer to being sufficient for these choices than Sen claims.  
Sen asserts that for ideals to be sufficient for short-term choice they would need to 
provide, unaided, ‘rankings of departures from justness in terms of comparative 
“distances” from perfection.’41 That is, ideals would have to provide the means to tell 
us how far from justice a society would be if a given action was carried out. For Sen 
there is nothing inherent within an ideal that tells us how to calculate the extent to 
which nonideal configurations deviate from it. His own ideal-free approach to just 
choice on the other hand is of course tailored for such calculations.42 
To evaluate Sen’s claims, let us return again to our hypothetical strict-egalitarian Ana. 
Recall that Ana’s strict-egalitarianism in Section II led her to select Option C, on the 
grounds that the distribution it led to was closest to full material equality. At the time 
we treated this decision as unproblematic. However there are various reasons why this 
might not be the case. Let us begin by considering what kind of ideal Ana’s strict-
egalitarianism might be. We can imagine that it may be an incremental ideal, where 
each move towards the ideal improves the justness of society. Ana’s ideal would be 
incremental if it were the case that as a distribution becomes more equal, happiness, 
solidarity, and human flourishing all increase.43 If this is the case then each step 
                                                 
41 Ibid., p. 219. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Assuming that these are all indicators of increasing justness.  
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towards full equality will make society more just,44 and therefore for Ana, more equal 
societies will always be preferable to less equal societies. Thus her ideal will be able 
to unproblematically inform her short-term choices.  
However what if in Ana’s case full material equality is an absolute ideal, where the 
ideal is only desirable if realised in full? Perhaps Ana still expects skyrocketing 
solidarity, happiness, and human flourishing will occur with material equality, but only 
when it is achieved fully, and not at all before. If Ana’s ideal is of this second kind 
then it may be that one, or even both, of the other, superficially less egalitarian, options 
is preferable. 
A second reason would be if the applicability of the ideal was pegged to some external 
factor. For instance, it may be in Ana’s case that strict-egalitarianism is an incremental 
ideal but that the benefits of it only apply in societies where nobody is living in poverty. 
If with Option C, the unskilled would be impoverished by the wealth distribution, then 
it might again be the case that another option would be preferable to Ana.  
One might assume that these examples show us that we require some kind of separate 
theory of distance that mediates between ideals and choices. Mark Philp’s concern that 
ideals alone do not tell us what to do in nonideal circumstances is a claim of this type.45 
On this view we need this additional type of theory to tell us whether Ana does or does 
not want the option that brings us closest to full material equality. While this is a 
tempting conclusion it may place the onus to provide a theory of distance on the wrong 
enterprise. Rather than requiring an additional theory of distance it seems that what 
Ana needs is a more precise set of ideals. She needs to know whether her ideals are 
incremental or absolute and whether or not they are desirable irrespective of the levels 
of societal wealth. In some cases she may also require a secondary theory that tells her 
which principles to adhere to when her primary strict-egalitarian ideal is unable to offer 
recommendations. In short, if Ana’s ideals were more thoroughly theorised then she 
                                                 
44 A more technical way of expressing this would be to say that justice and inequality are inversely 
correlated:  a society becomes more just when that society’s Gini coefficient is lower, and less just when 
that society’s Gini coefficient is higher.  
45 Mark Philp, ‘Political Theory and the Evaluation of Political Conduct’ Social Theory and Practice 
Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 389-410 (2008), p. 391. 
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would be able to say which of the available options was, in terms of her ideal (or one 
of her ideals), preferable. 
A response to my position may concede this point but suggest that it overlooks 
unavoidable questions of distance that an unaided ideal-based approach cannot answer. 
One might assert that distance is not only about similarity to an ideal but also closeness. 
To illustrate what I mean by these terms, consider a choice that makes society more 
similar to an ideal but also makes it harder for that society to fully realise the ideal, i.e. 
makes it less close to the ideal. We can readily imagine situations where immediate 
improvements in the justness of society slow down or reverse progress towards full 
justice. Perhaps one set of actions is politically ‘exhausting’ and having performed it 
people no longer have the desire for further change. Alternatively it may be a 
psychological fact about people in general or people in certain societies that they will 
only strive for full justice when conditions are sufficiently poor, and therefore, gradual 
improvements away from poor conditions are likely to make people complacent. I do 
not want to claim that either of these theories are necessarily valid, I only use them to 
illustrate a probably irrefutable truth that at least in some instances a choice that yields 
greater similarity to an ideal may not yield greater closeness. Sometimes short-term 
just choices can undermine long-term just choices.  
While distance is indeed a matter of both similarity and closeness, the latter category 
does not apply here. Rather, it is only relevant if one is pursuing long-term choices, 
not the short-term choices that Sen is interested in. If we are only interested in doing 
what makes society immediately more just, then similarity is the only relevant category 
of distance. Questions of closeness only become relevant if we are interested in the 
long-term full realisation of the ideal.   
Does this mean that short-term just choice is not reliant on nonideal theorising? This 
would be too strong a claim. The question of what we ought to do given nonideal 
circumstances is inherently a matter for nonideal theory. In responding to this question 
nonideal theory also has to marshal a set of theories and models that can help us 
understand what specific nonideal circumstances there are, whether or not they can be 
42 
 
altered to make society more compliant to ideals, and how we might do this.46 The 
question, ‘what should we do?’ even when informed by ideals, remains one for 
nonideal theory. As such it is wrong to claim that ideals are sufficient for short-term 
choice. As Gilabert rightly notes ‘no reasonable defender of ideal theory would try to 
show that it provides, “on its own,” a solution to “all comparative issues”’.47 
However, ideals are not insufficient for the distance-based reasons that Sen suggests, 
or that we might infer from his comments. Evaluating distance as similarity does not 
require an additional theory either within nonideal theory or to mediate between ideals 
and nonideal theory. Rather, the problem and its solution are internal to ideals 
themselves and are concerned with (a) better understanding the type of ideals our 
choices about justice are premised on and (b) ensuring that we know whether we will 
require alternative ideals and what they are when we anticipate that our first choice 
ideal will be unable to inform short-term choice. Evaluating distance as closeness on 
the other hand is simply not an issue for short-term choice, concerned as closeness is 
with choices that aim towards the eventual full realisation of an ideal rather than 
making society immediately more just. 
 
VII. Are Ideals Necessary or Sufficient for Long-Term Just Choice? 
Thus far we have seen that SIC holds and that therefore ideals are necessary for short-
term just choice. We now turn to the question of whether the other constituent aspect 
of the ideal claim holds, i.e. LIC, that ideals are necessary for long-term choice. As 
with the above discussion of SIC I will also consider the related claim that ideals may 
be sufficient for long-term choice.  
Recall that with long-term choice we are not interested in making choices that lead to 
an immediate increase in the justness of society but rather with choices that lead to the 
eventual full realisation of an ideal. The necessity of ideals in this process ought to be 
                                                 
46 Aspects of this discussion are taken up, albeit pertaining to ideal theory rather than nonideal theory, 
in Chapters 3 and 4. 
47 See Gilabert, ‘Comparative Assessments of Justice’, p. 44. 
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clear. If long-term choice is premised on moving society towards an ideal then it is 
obviously the case that we require an ideal in place in order to do this.  
To illustrate this, let us turn again to Ana the strict-egalitarian, imagining that she now 
wants to make the choice that will be best for justice in the long-term. For the purpose 
of this example let us treat Option C as the definitively optimal choice from a short-
term perspective. What though if Option C is a choice that would turn out to be 
politically exhausting for society, while Option B, although making society less 
immediately similar to the ideal, would have the opposite effect? Perhaps the road to 
Option C is more demanding than the road to Option B. Alternatively perhaps the 
proximity to the ideal causes a sufficient number of people to settle for things as they 
are rather than push for change. For any of these reasons we might find that Ana may 
make a different choice when approaching nonideal theory from the perspective of 
long-term choice than she would from the perspective of short-term choice. When 
adopting the former perspective, the category of distance that becomes relevant is 
closeness rather than similarity. As this example shows, greater similarity need not be 
concomitant, though it often will be, with increased closeness to justice.  
One might suggest that this approach may be susceptible to the criticism that we do 
not actually require ideals in order to engage in long-term just choice, but rather we 
only require any instantiation of justice that can fulfil the requisite target setting role. 
Instead of aiming to achieve full justice we could aim for a more realistic short-term 
goal that would increase the justness of society without realising justice in full. Once 
this was achieved we could set another sub-ideal goal, and then another and so on. The 
ideal could thus even be achieved without necessarily using an ideal itself until we 
were much closer to reaching it.  
Several points can be made in response to this. First, we want to avoid the problem of 
path dependence. If our target is achieving a particular medium-term increase in justice 
we might find that in achieving this we are not as close to justice as we would have 
been had we been working towards the ideal all along. Second, we ought to avoid 
falling into the trap of assuming that full justice is over-demanding or highly 
improbable. As the following two chapters will argue, ideals of justice that are 
consistent with long-term just choice ought to be feasible and sensitive to a range of 
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necessary and contingent facts about human beings and societies. Working towards an 
ideal need not mean engaging in hopelessly optimistic political decision making. 
Third, as we saw above, we can only know what sub-ideal instantiations of justice are 
because we know what full justice is. Thus when not using an ideal as a target, long-
term choice would, necessarily, still be reliant on ideals. 
Another question might be whether a theory of justice is necessary for long-term 
choice. Recall that we use theories of justice to rank the importance of different 
discrete principles. For example, faced with a choice between otherwise equal 
improvements in liberty or equality, we require a theory of justice to tell us which 
discrete ideal is more important. While we can accept their necessity for short-term 
choice, we might be doubtful of their necessity for long-term choice.  
In response to this then one can point out that if we have no way of discerning between 
the relative worth of different discrete ideals then we will be unable to properly direct 
our political choices. Steps that would represent an enormous achievement in the 
journey towards realising a society that emphasised the importance of individual 
liberty first and happiness second may be a disastrous set-back in the journey towards 
realising a society that emphasised the importance of happiness first and individual 
liberty second. We thus need to have a conception of priority when making long-term 
choices.   
Ideals of justice are thus, at least, as necessary for long-term choice as they are for 
short-term choice. As such both constituent parts of the ideal claim hold. It is likely 
the case that LIC is the harder claim to disprove. As noted above it is unsurprisingly 
difficult to defend the logic of the claim that we do not require an ideal if we want 
political choice to be oriented towards the realisation of an ideal. As such, ‘ideal-free’ 
alternatives to LIC, in the fashion of Sen’s alternative to SIC, are likely to be thinner 
on the ground.  
In the previous section we saw that ideals were perhaps nearer to being sufficient for 
short-term choice than Sen claimed. The same is likely not the case with long-term 
choice. It is true that it is important that we have a clear idea of what our ideal is in 
order to be sure that our choices will lead us towards this and not some other, less 
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desirable outcome. However in the case of long-term choice we are interested in 
distance as closeness. Here closeness refers to how much nonideal ‘space’ we have to 
cover before we can expect to achieve our ideal. As such we require a nonideal theory 
of distance to help us calculate how far we are from the ideal, that is, the different 
obstacles that stand in the way of full realisation. Without a detailed nonideal theory 
of distance then we will be unable to make long-term choices. We also require a 
nonideal theory of transition to tell us what to consider when making decisions, e.g. 
‘how do we know which issues are most urgent?’, ‘how do we determine which actions 
are acceptable means to achieve our ends?’, and so on. 
This point highlights the error in too readily assuming that we ought to pursue long-
term, rather than short-term, choices. The choice is not simply between small gains 
and large gains but rather between more probable small gains and less probable large 
gains. Chapter 4 will return to the question of the theoretical criteria that have to be 
met in order for long-term choice to be a prudent option. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to show that if we want to make just choices it is generally 
necessary to refer to ideals. In defending SIC, I disputed claims made by Amartya Sen 
that ideals were unnecessary for short-term choice. I did this by examining the 
analogous reasoning Sen employs to challenge SIC. This showed how Sen fails to 
distinguish between internal categories such as height and complex, external 
categories such as justice; which result in his analogies being invalid. I then addressed 
two possible criticisms of SIC by showing that justice requires ideals as well as 
theories of justice to order and rank competing principles.   
I then defended SIC from claims that ideals are in various ways over-demanding. Here 
we saw that, contra Sen, ideals necessarily have to be open to historical and contextual 
interpretation. Sen was similarly mistaken in his claim that institutions being beyond 
the reach of poorer societies invalidate the ideals that require them; as this would only 
hold in some instances where we were interested in long-term just choice. The final 
criticism of Sen’s I addressed here was that bracketing ideals allows us to sidestep 
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disagreement; showing instead that Sen overlooks the distinction between just choices 
and choices about political strategy; and that even if people agree on the former point, 
cooperation may be prevented due to disagreement on the latter point. 
My discussion of SIC concluded with the claim that while Sen is correct that ideals are 
not sufficient for short-term choices, this is due to the general need for nonideal theory 
when making political decisions. It is not due to the inability of ideals to respond to 
questions about distance.  
I then showed that the philosophically less contentious claim that ideals are necessary 
for long-term just choice also holds; indeed it is possibly an axiom that if we wish our 
choices to lead to the realisation of an ideal, we have to possess an ideal to make those 
choices. However I rejected the further claim that ideals are sufficient for long-term 
choice, stressing the relatively greater importance of nonideal theory for such choices.  
Having shown that the ideal claim holds in both forms I intend to have demonstrated 
why the alternative approach, offered by Sen, is ultimately flawed. Moreover in doing 
so I have sought to meet the first Key Objective of this thesis, namely to prove that it 
is only when choices are informed by ideals that we are able to consistently make just 
choices.  
As it is the case that ideals are a prerequisite for just choice it is prudent that these 
ideals are as robustly theorised as possible. For the sake of simplicity and clarity this 
chapter has operated with an intentionally abstract and partial conceptualisation of 
ideals, however if we wish to formulate ideals that will be up to the task of informing 
just choice then it is necessary to build on this conceptualisation. With this in mind 
Chapter 3 will now proceed to discuss how ideals ought to be theorised, and the 
conditions that they have to meet in order to inform both short-term and long-term just 
choice. Of particular significance here will be the role that feasibility constraints will 
play in theorising the ideals that are to inform long-term choice. Equipped with a more 
thorough understanding of ideals, Chapter 4 will return to the pertinent question of 
whether theories of justice ought to be structured on the more cautious terms of SIC or 
the more ambitious but risky terms of LIC; seeking to identify the conditions that have 




3. Informing Just Choice 
In the previous chapter I defended the ideal claim, that is the claim that ideals of justice 
are generally necessary for just choice. Throughout that discussion ideals were 
conceptualised in an abstract and pared down manner; only as conceptions of the rules 
that would govern political decision making in a just society. In employing this 
simplified model of ideals the discussion was not clouded by the complexities that 
come with more concrete conceptualisations of ideals, and I was better able to bring 
into relief the tension between the ideal approach I defended and Sen’s ideal-free 
alternative. However, having now shown that ideals of justice are required to inform 
both short-term just choice and long-term just choice, it is necessary to build on this 
hitherto abstract conception of ideals. Doing this will allow us to respond to questions 
concerning the conditions ideals actually have to meet in order to perform this just 
choice informing function.  
As may be imagined, what these conditions actually consist of will differ according to 
the type of just choice that the ideal has to inform, and thus standards that hold for 
short-term choice may not hold for long-term choice; and vice versa. The previous 
chapter highlighted the differences in these types of just choice and their relationship 
with ideals. For this reason I will not look to identify any general conditions that ideals 
have to meet but rather the conditions specific to each type of just choice. 
We will see below that understanding the distinction between feasible ideals and 
infeasible ideals is crucial to identifying these necessary conditions. Where feasible 
ideals are those which meet certain standards of possibility, probability, and stability, 
infeasible ideals do not. The former are largely normative and practical, designed 
primarily to inform just choice, while the latter are ostensibly evaluative, designed 
primarily to improve our understanding of the abstract concept of justice. The first aim 
of this chapter is to offer a preliminary analysis of the above feasibility conditions, and 
show why ideals have to meet these conditions if they are to inform long-term choice. 
The second aim is to show that the branch of ideal theory concerned with infeasible 
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ideals is compatible with, and poses no challenge to, the branch concerned with 
feasible ideals. Moreover, I want to show that despite being unachievable, infeasible 
ideals can still be of practical value as they will generally be able to inform short-term 
choice.  
In defending these claims I will meet the second Key Objective of this thesis, that is, 
to demonstrate the conditions ideals have to meet in order to perform ideal informing 
functions. In establishing the necessity of feasibility for long-term just choice this 
chapter also lays the foundations to address the third Key Objective in Chapter 4. As 
we shall see, in order for long-term choice to be defensible over short-term choice the 
ideals that are used to inform the former have to meet stringent feasibility conditions.  
I will begin by restating, and then expanding on, the understanding of ideals presented 
in Chapter 2 (§ I).  I will then offer preliminary definitions of the key feasibility 
conditions of possibility, sufficient probability, and stability, and explain why it is 
necessary for ideals to meet these conditions if they are to inform long-term choice (§ 
II). The next section will turn to the question of infeasible ideals. Here I want to show 
that such ideals are not conceptually incoherent and nor do they pose a practical 
challenge to the feasible ideal approach (§ III). Continuing the discussion of infeasible 
ideals I will proceed to show that infeasible ideals can still be of normative value in 
informing short-term choice (§ IV). The final substantive section of this chapter will 
bring the infeasible ideal approach to bear on the feasible ideal approach in considering 
the ‘uncertainty gambit’; this is the claim that in conditions of uncertainty it may be 
better that ideals of the former type, rather than ideals of the latter type, inform long-
term choice. Here I am particularly interested in how certain key aspects of Marxist 
theory may be used to support this claim. I will reject this challenge though, arguing 
instead that uncertainty ought to push us towards, rather than away from, feasibility 
conditions (§ V). 
 
I. Defining Ideals 
In the previous chapter we saw that ideals of justice establish the range that just laws 
fall within. We also saw that ideals often comprise a number of principles that are 
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responsible for particular aspects of governance. To illustrate the form that ideals take, 
consider again the Rawlsian ideal outlined in Chapter 2.1 There we saw that Rawls’s 
‘Difference Principle’ engages with the distribution of material wealth and states that 
material inequalities are only just when they benefit the least advantaged in society. 
Related to this principle is Rawls’s empirical assumption that societies with wealth 
inequalities can produce more wealth in total than strictly egalitarian societies. This is 
due to the belief that if people are able to retain a percentage of the wealth they generate 
then they will be incentivised to work harder in order to generate greater personal 
wealth. If a portion of the additional ‘incentivised’ wealth is then redistributed to the 
least advantaged then this group will be better off (in absolute terms) in an unequal 
society than they would in an equal one. Hence this inequality, and whatever tax-law 
produced it, would be in adherence with the Difference Principle.2  
Recall from the previous chapter that the Difference Principle only requires conformity 
to certain patterns of wealth distribution.3 As such the means through which wealth is 
gathered to be redistributed, be it income tax, wealth tax, property tax, transaction tax, 
etc. is an open question. As indeed is the question of whether the Difference Principle 
is best met by conventional redistribution or rather some form of predistribution. The 
latter aiming for more equitable ownership and control of property and means of 
production in part as an alternative to conventional redistributive methods of adhering 
to patterns of distribution.4 From the example of the Difference Principle then, we can 
see that ideals of justice display a number of characteristics. Fundamentally they 
establish the range that just laws fall within. They may be reasonably inclusive in their 
scope, being compatible with a range of contexts and laws, and potentially, as is the 
case with the Difference Principle, a range of institutional-systems. 
                                                 
1 For a summary of Rawls’s ideal of justice and its constituent principles see Chapter 2, Section I. 
2 For Rawls’s account of the Difference Principle see Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Ch. 2, § 13. For more 
critical perspectives on the Difference Principle see for example Lawrence Crocker’s egalitarian 
response in ‘Equality, Solidarity, and Rawls' Maximin’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 6, pp. 262–
266 (1977); John C. Harsanyi’s utilitarian critique in ‘Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for 
Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’s Theory’ The American Political Science Review Vol. 29, No. 2, 
pp. 594-606 (1975); and Robert Nozick’s libertarian objections to Rawls and non-voluntary 
redistribution of wealth in general in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974/2013), 
esp. Ch.7. 
3 See Chapter 2, Section V. 
4 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, xiv-xvi & 247-248. 
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As we shall explore in greater detail shortly, a distinction can be drawn between 
feasible ideals and infeasible ideals. Ideals of the former type have to meet particular 
standards of possibility, probability, and stability. An ideal that was impossible, 
insufficiently probable, or would be unstable in practice would fail to meet feasibility 
conditions, and we might think this to be problematic for various reasons that will be 
considered below. Ideals of the latter type alternatively need not meet any of these 
conditions. As we shall see, while this latter approach is subject to criticism, it can 
nonetheless be both epistemically and practically useful.  
Before exploring these two forms of ideals further a question of terminology ought to 
be addressed. One might claim that feasible ideals of justice are not ideals that would 
govern the most just society we can imagine but only the most just society that is 
possible, sufficiently probable, and stable. As such, one may ask whether such a 
limited conception of justice or indeed any other concept is best described as ‘ideal’. 
It may be felt that the conceptualisation of ideal used in this section is at best counter-
intuitive and at worst contradictory. 
One response to this is to consider one of the ways in which ‘ideal’ is commonly used 
outside of philosophy in everyday English. By way of example consider the following 
case. Somebody suffering from toothache phones her dental surgery and on being 
offered an appointment that same morning responds that the time offered to her would 
be ‘ideal’. By this the toothache sufferer is implying that this is the outcome she hoped 
for when she made the phone call. However it is evidently not the best outcome that 
she could have imagined. It would have been better, though highly improbable, if the 
receptionist told the toothache sufferer that her mediocre dentist had been replaced by 
the best dentist in the country and that this new wonder-dentist’s services were 
provided free of charge. It would be better again, though very likely impossible, if 
toothache simply ceased to exist, without the need for treatment of any kind. I believe 
that this example highlights that there exists, in everyday English, a sense of ‘ideal’ 
that is used to describe those outcomes that are the best one could hope for given 
certain constraints.  
This sense of ideals as not necessarily referring to the best conceptions of things that 
we can imagine has been noted by others as well. Alan Hamlin and Zofia Stemplowska 
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for example assert that ideals of justice can be used to state what the best ideal is ‘under 
some particular non-ideal conditions.’ What they refer to as ‘a local maximum.’5 
Similarly, Pablo Gilabert claims that one of ideal theory’s functions is looking ‘beyond 
certain social settings towards morally more desirable ones’, irrespective of whether 
these are ideals ‘with respect to which no moral improvements are possible’.6 
Conversely, there are also other, non-philosophical uses of ‘ideal’, which are employed 
to refer to things that are far less constrained by feasibility. This is perhaps especially, 
but by no means exclusively, the case with derogatory uses of ‘ideal’ that dismiss ideas 
and policies on the grounds that they are unrealistic. For example, more cooperative 
systems of governance or more egalitarian patterns of distribution are frequently 
dismissed on the grounds that they are ‘mere ideals.’  
I do not point to either everyday usage in order to justify my choice of terms but rather 
because I believe these examples are instructive. They show how ‘ideal’ can be used 
to refer both to the best outcome that we can reasonably hope for given either the 
situations we find ourselves in or due to other limitations we impose on our theorising; 
or indeed to those aspirations that may fall under the heading of either hopeful 
optimism or hopeless pipedreams. In short we are discussing a reasonably inclusive 
term that admits both feasible and infeasible ideals.  
What connects these two types of ideals is that both are concerned with establishing 
the most ethically desirable outcome within given boundaries. This is the case whether 
these boundaries are drawn in a very strict manner, tightly constrained by what is 
deemed feasible, or in a much freer sense with little or no regard for feasibility. Either 
way, it is this aspect of ideals, as conceptualising the most desirable outcome, that this 
thesis treats as essential. For this reason it seems acceptable to refer to both as, different 
types of, ‘ideals’. If this nomenclature is not acceptable though this should not be an 
issue. If only one of these concepts are fit to be classed as ‘ideals’ then the other 
concept can be termed something else. Although I believe that this is not the case I am 
ultimately interested in the categories and concepts themselves, not the terms used to 
refer to them. The character of feasible ideals and infeasible ideals, as well as the 
                                                 
5 See Hamlin & Stemplowska, p. 52. 
6 Gilabert, ‘Global Justice and Poverty Relief’, pp. 417-418. 
52 
 
relationship between them is unchanged if one of them is termed something other than 
‘ideal’.  
 
II. Feasible Ideals and Just Choice 
Having clarified this matter of terminology I can now proceed to properly address the 
category of feasible ideals. In this section I want to demonstrate why for an ideal to be 
able to inform long-term choice, it has to be possible, sufficiently probable, and stable. 
The rationale behind this claim is intuitive. As long-term choice aims at the eventual 
full realisation of a given ideal, it is necessary that the ideal in question is possible and 
sufficiently probable, i.e. can realistically be achieved, and there would be little point 
in pursuing it if the ideal could not be expected to be durable over time, i.e. stable.7 
How then ought one to understand the above three feasibility conditions? In what 
follows I will define each category in turn and outline how they relate to the feasibility 
of ideals.  
The possibility condition requires that political laws that adhere to an ideal do not 
violate laws of nature or laws of formal logic. To put this differently, an ideal is 
possible if we can imagine it informing political laws that could be put into practice in 
the best conditions that we believe could ever hold. To remain with our above example, 
the Difference Principle discussed is undoubtedly possible because political laws 
informed by this principle could be implemented without violating laws of nature or 
laws of formal logic.8 We might also consider this ideal to be, at least apparently, 
plausible if for no other reason than that many developed economies already possess 
the institutions necessary to implement it in some form. 
                                                 
7 For an example of a defence of a feasibility-based approach to conceptualising ideals see Anderson, 
p. 377. 
8 Mark Jensen draws a similar distinction in his discussion of possibility in referring to ‘logical 
possibility’ and ‘nomological possibility’ with the latter term essentially referring to a given thing not 
violating laws of nature. See Mark Jensen, ‘The Limits of Practical Possibility’ The Journal of Political 
Philosophy Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 168-184 (2009), p. 170. 
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To extend this point let us consider an ideal that is often considered to be less plausible 
– Marx’s conception of communism.9 Distribution of material goods in Marx’s 
communist society is to be governed by the principle ‘from each according to their 
abilities, to each according to their needs’.10 We shall call this ‘the Communist Ideal’. 
This implies that people contribute to the communal pot as best they are able and in 
turn take what they need from it, with people’s level of contribution in no way affecting 
their entitlement to need-satisfying goods. It seems that for such an ideal to function, 
the society governed by it would have to meet one or both of the following conditions. 
First, a subjective condition requiring all individuals to be significantly altruistic and 
honest, to ensure they will willingly work to contribute to the common good 
irrespective of the contributions of others, and to do so in the occupation that is most 
beneficial to society as a whole, rather than the occupation that they find easiest or 
most enjoyable. Second, an objective condition of material abundance where 
technology has developed to the point where levels of production allow individuals to 
take what they wish without depriving others of those things. Due to the marked 
subjective and objective differences between this ideal of communism and both 
historical and contemporary societies many will doubt that this society could ever be 
implemented.11 However it is still possible in the sense that people may one day 
become sufficiently altruistic and honest or technology may become sufficiently 
productive as to allow for a society that adheres to this ideal. 
Contrast these ideals with one that states that a just society must always act to protect 
the equal enjoyment of the greatest number of individual rights and always act to 
maximise net utility. Unlike both the apparently plausible Difference Principle and the 
apparently implausible Communist Ideal, it is likely that we can say that this third ideal 
                                                 
9 This thesis adopts the common distinction of referring to Marx’s ‘first phase of communism’ as 
‘socialism’ and referring to his ‘higher phase of communism’ as ‘communism’. For Marx’s original 
discussion of socialism and communism see Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1875/1970), p. 11. For an early and influential discussion of this particular 
nomenclatural approach to communism and socialism see Lenin’s discussion of the Critique of the 
Gotha Programme in Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, ‘The State and Revolution’ in V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, 
Vol. VII: After the Seizure of Power (1917-1918) ed. by J Fineberg (London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., 
1937), p. 84.  
10 Marx Critique of the Gotha Programme, p. 11. 
11 G.A. Cohen for one believes that Marx’s reliance on a ‘technological fix’ providing the abundance 
that a functioning communist society would require has been significantly undermined by recent 
developments in ecological science. See G.A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 127-128.   
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would be flatly impossible.12 Its impossibility stems from the fact that it is premised 
on a logically contradictory principle that could not be satisfied. Laws that protect the 
equal enjoyment by all of the greatest number of rights would lead to lower utility; 
while laws that maximise utility would likely require the violation of the rights of some 
or all citizens.13 Having seen how this ideal would contradict laws of formal logic, we 
could also contrast the above two possible ideals with any further ideal that would 
require time travel, immortality, or some other condition that violates a generally 
accepted law of nature.  
It should be clear that hypothetical, impossible ideals such as those mentioned above 
are unable to inform long-term just choice. If long-term choice aims to realise a society 
where laws fully adhere to the conditions set out by a given ideal conception of justice, 
then the ideal conception of justice in question must be able to be adhered to. An ideal 
that fails to satisfy the possibility condition clearly cannot perform this function.   
Satisfying the possibility condition then requires that ideals not violate logical and 
natural laws. The sufficient probability condition requires that ideals not only be 
possible but also meet some established threshold of likeliness. This is to say that one 
should be able to have a sense that with sufficient political action there would be an 
acceptable probability that the ideal in question could be realised. A useful way of 
understanding probability more generally is of a given possible event occupying a 
position on a spectrum between zero and one, with zero referring to things that are 
completely improbable that will not happen, and one referring to things that are 
completely probable that will happen.14 Establishing where on this spectrum 
                                                 
12 I do not want to discuss whether either ideal is actually more or less plausible than the other at this 
stage, though I do consider the plausibility of the Communist Ideal in Section V. For the purpose of this 
claim I merely want to show how plausible and implausible ideals can both be possible. 
13 We ought to take this logically impossible ideal as being premised on a deep and irrevocable meta-
ethical contradiction between rights and utility. This is to say that the rights-based ideal I have in mind 
is suitably comprehensive and not merely a utility-based ideal dressed up as a rights-based ideal, as 
would be the case in an ideal premised on a claim such as: ‘every individual has a right to live in a 
society that maximises utility.’ The reverse also holds in that the utility-based ideal is not one where 
optimising utility simply demands that we adhere to some given comprehensive framework of rights. 
The tension I want to draw out in this example is thus not merely semantic but logically fundamental 
and thus necessarily irrevocable.   
14 Geoffrey Brennan, ‘Feasibility in Optimising Ethics’ Social Philosophy and Policy Vol. 30, No. 1-2, 
pp. 314-329 (2013), p. 323. Holly Lawford-Smith discusses a similar conception of probability in, Holly 
Lawford-Smith, ‘Non-Ideal Accessibility’ Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 653-
669 (2013), pp. 656-657.  
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sufficiency would start is of course a difficult and inevitably subjective task. However, 
irrespective of the precise way this is fleshed out, what is clear is that we want our 
assessment of ideals to ‘set the bar at the proper height’ at a threshold ‘very much 
greater than zero.’15  
Using sufficient probability we can imagine that a distinction may be drawn between 
the Difference Principle and the Communist Ideal. Where with the former one may 
think that the ideal is sufficiently close to reality to be achievable, in that it does not 
require any significant technological developments or radical attitudinal shifts, with 
the latter one may worry that it is too demanding on one or both of these accounts. As 
such it may be the case that while both ideals satisfy the possibility condition, only the 
former meets the sufficient probability condition, while the latter does not. Though we 
can map out with some confidence how to move from society at present to one that 
adheres to the Difference Principle, we lack this confidence when mapping a move 
from society at present to one that adheres to the Communist Ideal. Given the low 
probability of achieving the latter ideal one might argue that it does not meet the 
sufficient probability condition and thus cannot be used to inform long-term choice. 
We will return to the question of the Communist Ideal and feasibility in Section V. 
Before proceeding to discuss the final feasibility category, stability, I would like to 
address two possible objections to my conceptualisation of possibility and probability. 
First, one might assume that as the probability of an ideal being achieved decreases, 
so does the possibility of that ideal being achieved; with the same correlation holding 
for increases in probability. For this reason it may seem reasonable to treat possibility 
and probability as different terms within the same concept. If this is the case we do not 
really need to make the distinction I do between the two terms. A counter to this 
assumption is offered by David Estlund, who stresses the essential conceptual 
difference between the two terms. To illustrate how such an essential difference holds 
Estlund uses the example of his dancing like a chicken while giving a lecture.  
He notes that while it is highly improbable that he will ever do this it is certainly not 
impossible. That is to say he is physically able and has sufficient awareness of what 
                                                 
15 Brennan, p. 324 
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dancing like a chicken would entail. Let us imagine that his willingness to dance like 
a chicken is determined by how good or bad the morning has been prior to his 
afternoon lecture. Yet however good or bad his morning has been and thus however 
more or less probable it is that he will dance like a chicken, the possibility of this 
happening remains the same. The dance does not become more possible when he has 
had a good morning, nor less possible when he has had a bad morning. The possibility 
of the dance happening is fixed and is independent of its probability. Probability is a 
matter of degrees inasmuch as it measures the extent to which it is likely that something 
will happen, whereas possibility is categorical inasmuch as something is either 
possible or impossible. While we can speak of things being ‘slightly probable’, 
‘extremely improbable’, and so on, it is nonsensical to speak of something as being 
‘slightly possible’ or ‘extremely impossible’.  The probability of an event happening 
is a question of the likelihood that it will happen, while the possibility of an event 
happening is a question of whether that thing can happen.16 
A second challenge to my conceptualisation of possibility and probability is to suggest 
that I might allow the latter to encroach upon the proper domain of the former.  Some 
may see my definition of the realm of possibility as too parsimonious, drawing as it 
does only on logical and natural possibility, while, for the most part, placing questions 
of human nature and its limits under the auspices of probability. Others, such as Mark 
Jensen, outline alternative conceptions of possibility that actively incorporate 
discussion of ‘natural human abilities’. Jensen rightly stresses that human abilities are 
categorical issues: it either is, or it is not, possible for humans to do certain things. 
Clear cut examples of the former include the human ability to possess a sense of 
justice, while clear cut example of the latter include humans living without sustenance. 
However outside of these ‘paradigmatic extremes’ he observes ‘a great deal of space 
in the middle where we do not have a clear sense of human abilities.’17  
I take Jensen’s point to be emblematic of a general concern about human nature and 
how we theorise it when formulating ideals. This concern is that we cannot know if 
human beings are capable of sufficiently high levels of a particular, relevant set of 
                                                 
16 David Estlund, ‘Utophobia’ Philosophy & Public Affairs Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 113-134 (2014), pp. 118-
119. 
17 Jensen, p. 173. 
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characteristics as to make certain ideals, such as the Communist Ideal, possible. The 
high levels of altruism and honesty required by the Communist Ideal may seem, to 
many, to be beyond the scope of human nature. Indeed some will also believe that the 
less demanding and state-enforced form of redistribution required by socialism may 
also be too much to bear for human nature.18 Given these concerns, why then do I treat 
these questions about the limits of altruism, honesty and so on, as matters of probability 
rather than possibility? 
I place these within the domain of probability because although the ‘paradigmatic 
cases’ are uncontroversial issues of possibility, the other cases that sit in the middle 
ground between these are not questions of possibility at all. We know it is a fact that 
humans necessarily require oxygen and sustenance; this is part of the essential 
characteristics of humans qua animals. When we make these statements we know that 
they can be safely applied to all human beings. However when discussing subjective 
qualities such as altruism and honesty and their limits, we cease to speak in universal 
terms. This is because the world both at present and in the past contains many 
individuals and even small-scale societies that embody very high levels of qualities of 
the desirable sort listed above.  
As stressed above, while possibility is concerned with what can happen, probability is 
concerned with whether something will happen. It is unquestionably the case that 
people can possess the requisite levels of altruism and honesty required for ideals such 
as the Communist Ideal, the pertinent question is rather whether it is sufficiently 
probable that people will ever possess these qualities in the numbers required to sustain 
a society that adheres to this ideal. Put slightly differently it is not a question of whether 
human beings are sufficiently altruistic and honest for communist society or indeed 
sufficiently altruistic and honest for socialist society, but whether it is sufficiently 
probable that sufficient numbers of people will display such characteristics as to allow 
either or both of these societies to function.  
                                                 
18 Cohen’s concerns about the viability of an economy built on generosity is an instructive example of 
this type of concern about socialism. See G.A. Cohen, Why Not Socialism? (Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2009), p. 56. For a suggestion of what a socialist ideal may look like see Chapter 1, 
Section II.  
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I feel then that it muddies the waters of possibility to introduce questions about the 
limits of human subjectivity. These are questions of probability. On the other hand, 
those questions about human capacities that refer to universal physiological processes, 
for example the need for sustenance and air, are appropriately questions of possibility 
and indeed sit comfortably within the existing category of natural laws.  
This brings us on to the final condition: stability. What does it mean for an ideal to be 
stable? In essence an ideal is stable if a society whose legislation adheres to it is durable 
over time. A more technical perspective is offered by Rawls who defines a stable 
society as one that is able to return to an ‘equilibrium state’ following any deviation 
from stability. While all societies will be prone to instability, the test of a stable society 
is its capacity to ‘elicit forces sufficiently strong to restore these equilibria’.19 When 
we talk about an ideal being unstable, we are referring to whether the necessary effects 
of implementing that ideal make the society that implements it irredeemably unstable.   
To illustrate this let us consider two ways in which an ideal might be unstable. We 
may imagine that certain ideals, although possible and sufficiently probable, would be 
over-demanding, perhaps requiring that people commit to unsustainable levels of 
taxation or have to dedicate too much of their time to social projects. Thus while the 
laws the ideal informs may appear bearably demanding at first, they may strain 
compliance over time. We can also consider a similar but significantly different cause 
of instability where continued implementation of the law actually creates or 
compounds compliance issues. In the first instance then the negative effects of the law 
are unchanged, it is merely that they become less bearable over time. In the second 
instance there may be few or even no negative effects from a law at first, yet over time 
the law tends to produce or compound negative effects that make continued 
compliance to it difficult.  
To illustrate the latter stability concern, consider the implementation of laws that 
adhere to Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice. For Nozick, an individual has 
a just entitlement to a ‘holding’ (i.e. money or property), provided that holding is 
voluntarily given to her by another individual or group, call this ‘the Entitlement 
                                                 
19 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 400. 
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Ideal’. For this reason, all taxation, except that required to pay for minimal public 
judicial institutions, is unjust, as taxation occurs without the consent of the taxpayer.20 
By extension of this premise the role of the state is confined to that of a ‘night-
watchman’, existing to protect contracts and adjudicate disputes, rather than to provide 
its citizens with other public goods such as healthcare, education, and welfare.21 Even 
assuming that the Entitlement Ideal would be wholly welcome at first we might still 
have concerns that the laws (or absence of laws) that it informs, would, over time, 
become excessively demanding. As any distribution premised on free transactions 
would be just, there would be nothing to prevent wealth being increasingly held by 
fewer and fewer individuals.22 Moreover, if such a concentration of wealth did occur 
there would be no public welfare system to act as a safety net to supplement the income 
of the poor. We might also be concerned that without free education or healthcare 
increasing numbers of people would be unable to pay for private provision of these 
services. This might then lead to greater numbers of people suffering and dying from 
preventable diseases, whilst also entrenching poverty and minimising the available 
‘escape routes’ out of poverty for the disadvantaged. All of this may in turn have more 
widely felt consequences such as low supplies of skilled labour and low levels of 
effective demand, due to widespread poverty.23  
Of course these apprehensions about an Entitlement Ideal informed state may be 
invalid. It might be the case that the market would guarantee high levels of 
employment, and with it low poverty, high effective demand and so forth. 
Alternatively it may be that wealthy individuals would be sufficiently philanthropic as 
to provide what would in wholly or partially socialised economies be publicly provided 
goods.24 However if one thought it likely that the above problems would emerge from 
                                                 
20 See Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Ch.7, §1 
21 Ibid., Ch. 3, esp. pp. 27-28, and Chs. 4 and 5. 
22 For some explanations of why wealth might become concentrated overtime see for example Thomas 
Picketty, Capital in the 21st Century (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: London, 2014), 
esp. Pt. 3, and Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 1867/1976), p. 777. Marx’s argument on 
capitalism’s tendency to lead to concentrations of wealth will be considered in the following chapter. 
See Chapter 4, Section III.  
23 Nozick himself was concerned that his entitlement theory of justice may over time yield significant 
and potentially ‘unfair inequalities’. See Robert Nozick, The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations 
(London: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1989), p. 30. 
24 J.K. Galbraith offers one example of a critical response to such assumptions about the provision of 
goods and social equality through market mechanisms. See his remarks on ‘trickle down theory’ or ‘the 
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implementing laws that adhered to the Entitlement Ideal and that society would not be 
able to generate the forces required to return itself to an equilibrium state then we 
would say that such an ideal was unstable. The high-costs that accompany the 
Entitlement Ideal may lead to demands for laws that adhere to a different ideal of 
justice, perhaps one that involves a ‘patterned’ principle of distribution such as 
Rawls’s Difference Principle, which seeks to establish limits on what a just distribution 
of wealth is. 
The first stability concern that I briefly considered above ought to be reasonably easy 
to anticipate, as ideal theorists need only ask whether one can expect that individuals 
will be able to tolerate a particular law, with fixed costs, over time. The second stability 
concern on the other hand involves more variables, asking the ideal theorist to consider 
the long term effects of a particular policy, and whether it generates additional costs 
over time. As such it requires the application of explanatory theories in order to best 
model these effects. In the case of the Entitlement Ideal we would have to consider 
various economic and social theories that explain the effects that deregulated markets 
and a flat rate on minimal taxation have on factors such as wealth distribution and what 
these in turn mean for other factors such as healthiness, educational attainment, 
unemployment and so on. For this reason stability concerns of the second type ought 
to arise more regularly, as concerns of the first type may be easier to anticipate and 
definitively respond to.    
Before moving on from questions of stability, it is important to state that a ceteris 
paribus condition holds when we discuss stability. This is to say that there are a 
number of types of factors that can cause a government to replace a law that adheres 
to a particular ideal with a law that does not. Notably, external factors beyond the 
control of the government in question such as ecological pressures and geo-political 
and global-economic forces may force it to abandon a policy that it would otherwise 
have retained. The point that I hope is brought out in the example of the Entitlement 
Ideal is how, in an important way, it is the ideal that generates its own stability 
                                                 
horse and sparrow theory’ in John Kenneth Galbraith, ‘Recession Economics’ New York Review of 
Books (February, 1982).  
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concerns; they are not a product of external or contingent factors but are rather a 
necessary product of the ideal itself.  
The question of measuring and assessing stability with regards to ideals will be 
considered in the following chapter.25 At present it is sufficient to state that for an ideal 
to be stable it is necessary that, all other things being equal, a society that adheres to 
that ideal will be able to continue adhering to it over time and that departures from 
stability caused by that ideal can be sufficiently overcome or remedied as to return the 
society to an equilibrium state.  
The case for expecting long-term ideals to meet stability conditions is an intuitive one. 
There is little point striving to realise an ideal that will not be durable over time. 
However one may still object to labelling stability a ‘feasibility’ condition, on the 
grounds that ideals that are not stable are not literally infeasible. Commonly 
understood, feasibility refers to whether something can and will happen, essentially 
mapping directly onto possibility and probability respectively. The sense of 
‘feasibility’ used here is thus somewhat idiosyncratic in being extended to encompass 
stability as well, and is selected due to its being preferable to alternative, possibly more 
awkward expressions such as ‘fact-sensitivity’ that come with their own ambiguities 
and definitional issues as well. What is most important though is that in order for an 
ideal to be able to inform long-term just choice it has to be possible, sufficiently 
probable, and stable. Feasibility is thus a convenient, if imperfect, term for referring 
to this set of conditions.  
Let us recap our discussion thus far. For an ideal to be possible it must not require that 
the political laws that it underpins violate laws of logic or nature. In order for an ideal 
to be sufficiently probable, the likelihood that, with the correct political action, it can 
be achieved needs to meet some established threshold. Finally, for an ideal to be stable, 
laws that it informs must be durable over time in society being able to return to an 
equilibrium point following any destabilising events that are a necessary product of 
the ideal itself.   
                                                 
25 See Chapter 4, Section II.  
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In arguing how important it is that ideals be informed by robustly theorised feasibility 
conditions it may be claimed that I am conflating ideal theory and nonideal theory, by 
having the former concern itself with issues that may conventionally be considered to 
be properly within the domain of the latter. However, this is not the case. Ideal theory 
remains concerned with determining the ideals of justice necessary to inform just 
choice, and nonideal theory remains concerned with making these just choices in order 
to bring society closer to realisation of the ideal. I am not claiming that it is necessary 
for ideal theorists to actually plot the precise journey from contemporary society to 
ideal society; this remains the task of nonideal theory. What I am claiming is that in 
order for ideal theory to produce ideals that can inform long-term choice, it is 
necessary that we can show that such a course can be plotted.  
This broad claim about the necessity of feasible ideals for long-term choice will not 
go unchallenged. In Section V I will consider, and ultimately reject, a possible 
challenge to this claim premised on an alternative approach to long-term choice in 
which it is informed by infeasible ideals. However as this discussion requires a 
preliminary discussion of infeasible ideals more broadly it is necessary to address this 
first. 
Before proceeding to the following section I would like to offer a further point of 
clarification. I noted at the outset that the conception of ideals being discussed in this 
chapter is more concrete than that employed in Chapter 2. However for the sake of 
clarity I have continued to bracket certain issues that affect actual ideals, and thus my 
conceptions of both feasible and infeasible ideal are still abstract in certain senses. 
First I bracket questions about discrepancies between the intentions of theorists and 
the character of the ideals they theorise. We can imagine that a theorist may intend to 
produce a feasible ideal of justice but unbeknownst to her actually produces one that 
is infeasible; perhaps her conception of stability or sufficient probability is too 
generous and no society could reasonably be expected to adhere to laws governed by 
her ideal. Such an error may significantly undermine her theory as her ideal would be 
unable to properly inform long-term choice. The exact same issue may hold for 
infeasible ideal theorists who unwittingly pollute their infeasible ideals with 
consideration of feasibility categories. In order to simplify this discussion we can 
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assume that ideal theorists achieve what they set out to achieve. In doing this we also 
bracket for the moment the difficult question of establishing what is and is not a stable 
ideal, or a sufficiently probable ideal, or even a possible ideal, and instead simply 
assume that ideals meet or do not meet necessary conditions. 
Another issue to be bracketed is how close a given infeasible ideal is to being feasible 
or vice versa. By way of example, consider two abstract infeasible ideals of justice. 
The first is clearly unachievable; each of its principles is far beyond the capabilities of 
any possible human society, and even if a society governed by it could somehow be 
realised it would collapse within minutes. The second on the other hand would be 
achievable but for the fact that each of its principles were just slightly too demanding, 
that is, a society would be able to virtually satisfy each principle but never satisfy them 
in full.  
I think we can agree that the first ideal would be an inadequate basis for long-term 
choice. The ideal can never be achieved because the distance between nonideal reality 
and the ideal is too great. This is to say that even our best efforts could not bring us 
any nearer to realising the ideal in full. Indeed in this situation it may be that the ideal 
is so far-fetched that we might struggle to even determine distance. With the second 
ideal though, the principles can be all but realised in full and, assuming we are talking 
about an incremental ideal,26 the distance from the ideal that could potentially be 
reached would be very small in terms of closeness. In this instance we can very nearly 
realise the idea in full.  
We can likely say then that there is no reason that the latter ideal could not do a very 
good job of informing long-term choice, essentially by performing the minimal 
theoretical work required to convert it from an infeasible ideal into a feasible ideal. 
However for the purposes of this discussion the infeasible ideals we are interested in 
are those like the former, which are unable to inform long-term choice. This of course 
provokes the question of where the line can be drawn between ideals that can inform 
long-term choice and ideals that cannot. This concern though, along with the questions 
                                                 
26 Recall from the previous chapter that incremental ideals of justice are those where each increase in a 
given metric improves the justness of society. For example, an incremental strict egalitarian ideal would 
entail that society would become more just with every step towards equality. See Chapter, Section 7. 
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regarding authorial intent, is bracketed in order to bring into relief the essential 
characteristics of feasible and infeasible ideals of justice. These still partially abstract 
conceptions of both types of ideals are better suited to our discussion of their relative, 
and possibly also competing, merits. Having clarified this point we can now turn to 
our discussion of infeasible ideals.  
 
III. Infeasible Ideal Theory and Its Critics 
As we saw in the previous chapter, for certain theorists, some ideals ought not to be 
judged by their capacity to inform just choice but rather by how they contribute to our 
understanding of a particular concept.27 We considered the example of G.A. Cohen, 
who claims that certain ideals of justice can tell us what a pure notion of justice is, 
independent of that ideal’s possibility, probability or stability.28 Let us call this 
approach, ‘infeasible ideal theory’, to contrast it with the ‘feasible ideal theory’ 
discussed above.  
The need to discuss the former approach may seem surprising. The previous section 
explained that it is feasible ideals that we require if we wish to inform long-term just 
choice. We also know that the third Key Objective of this thesis is to show the viability 
of such long-term approaches, and that I generally want to emphasise the special 
political urgency of long-term choice over short-term choice.29 One may ask then, why 
I am dedicating discussion to ideals that I have shown are unable to inform long-term 
choice.  
Infeasible ideals merit serious consideration for two reasons. First, infeasible ideals 
are viable independently of their relationship with feasible ideals and moreover have 
worth not only in improving our understanding of abstract concepts but also, as we 
shall see, as normative ideals for informing short-term choice. Should other claims 
about the superiority of long-term choice over short-term choice cease to hold, it is 
                                                 
27 Adam Swift distinguishes between these approaches, categorising the former as ‘practical’ and the 
latter as ‘epistemological’. See Adam Swift, ‘The Value of Philosophy in Nonideal Circumstances’ 
Social Theory and Practice Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 363-387 (2008), p. 366. 
28 G.A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, p. 270. 
29 See Chapter 1, Section IV.  
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important that we have a full understanding of the latter. Second, for some, such as 
David Miller, infeasible ideal theory constitutes a threat to feasible ideal theory and 
normative theories of justice in general. In this section I want to show that we need not 
choose between these two forms of ideal theorising, and that feasible ideal theory is 
not weakened by the existence of infeasible ideal theory. In considering infeasible 
ideals then, I help meet both the second and third Key Objectives of this thesis by 
establishing the conditions ideals have to meet in order to inform short-term choice, 
and by further buttressing long-term choice, respectively. 
In this section I will first outline the conceptual coherence of infeasible ideal 
theorising. In doing this I will show that justice can be a non-normative concept. I will 
also demonstrate that justice is independent of feasibility conditions, and that it is 
therefore logical to discuss any of these categories without reference to the rest. The 
final conceptual point I will make is that infeasible justice does not undermine the 
concept of justice more broadly. I will then turn to consider the practical objection that 
infeasible ideal theory challenges feasible ideal theory, showing that this is not the 
case.   
Infeasible ideal theory rests on the basic analytical assumption that an improved or 
unique understanding of a given concept can be attained by removing it from its 
particular context or conceptual system. In the case of justice it means making a 
distinction between justice in itself and justice as a practical, normative concept 
connected to possibility, probability, and stability. Free from these other categories 
one can understand what justice is, and what it demands, in a purer sense, 
independently of potentially complicating factors. 
One of the claims this approach rests on is that there is no conceptually necessary link 
between ethical concepts and feasibility categories. Andrew Mason, for example, in 
responding to what may be termed the ‘realist’ political thought of scholars such as 
John Dunn, claims that it is not conceptually incoherent to discuss justice 
independently of questions of possibility, sufficient probability, and stability.30  
                                                 
30 Andrew Mason, ‘Just Constraints’ British Journal of Political Science Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 251-268 
(2004), p. 253. 
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This point is disputed by Colin Farrelly who suggests that Mason’s claim is 
conceptually incoherent to a degree. For Farrelly, ‘a theory of social justice, and the 
principles of justice it endorses, must function as an adequate guide for our collective 
action.’ When ‘the collective aspiration to implement the conclusions of a theory 
would not result in any noticeable increase in the justness of one’s society, then it fails 
as a normative theory.’31 The problem with Farrelly’s claim is that it assumes that 
justice can only be a normative concept. Yet the raison d’etre of infeasible ideal 
theorising is to think not how ideals of justice can inform our action but rather how 
they can improve our understanding. Crucially, infeasible ideal theorising is premised 
on producing conclusions that may not be practicable, or at least that it is ambivalent 
to the practicability of. As Laura Valentini notes, infeasible ideal theorists ‘do not 
consider a capacity for guidance as a necessary condition for the validity of a 
conception of justice’.32 
Mason’s claim then cannot be conceptually incoherent on the grounds that infeasible 
ideals fail as normative ideals, because infeasible ideals do not aspire to be normative 
in the first place. What then of other challenges to the conceptual coherence of his 
claim? It seems intuitively plausible to say that we can ask logically sound questions 
about justice without evoking possibility, sufficient probability, and stability. It is for 
instance sensible to ask ‘What would be the most just social system?’ without factoring 
in whether that system is possible or stable. Indeed it may be that the answer is a 
society where people are kinder and more altruistic, but that such a society would not 
be stable. Perhaps increased kindness and altruism is anathema to the protection of a 
state’s borders, and soldiers from less warm-hearted countries would easily overcome 
their defences.  
Those sceptical of the conceptual independence of justice may be persuaded by 
considering a question about one of the other categories in this particular conceptual 
group, for example, ‘What would be the most stable social system?’ In responding to 
this I believe most people would not intuitively factor in questions about the justness 
of the stable system, nor necessarily the possibility or probability of it being realised. 
                                                 
31 Colin Farrelly, ‘Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation’ Political Studies Vol. 55, pp. 844-864 (2007), 
p. 845.  
32 Valentini, ‘On the Apparent Paradox of Ideal Theory’, p. 337. 
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Similarly if they were asked, ‘Given present conditions, what social system is most 
probable?’ then they would similarly have no qualms in answering this question 
without reference to other categories; and would likely respond with a social system 
that is similar, if not identical, to contemporary society and therefore one that is far 
from meeting their standards of justice.33 In short, it seems there are strong reasons to 
accept Mason’s claim that the various categories we are concerned with in this chapter 
are logically independent from each other. From this we can accept that we may have 
ideals of justice that are, to a greater or lesser extent, infeasible. 
A potentially more significant challenge to infeasible ideals of justice is that such 
ideals risk making the whole concept of justice meaningless. Justice is in some ways 
a concept defined by limitations; it is not simply about how to determine the rules that 
govern the parameters of acceptable legislation, but rather how to do this in conditions 
of ‘moderate scarcity’ and ‘limited altruism’. Justice is premised on the assumption 
that societies lack the material abundance to allow everyone to have whatever they 
want without depriving others and that there are limits on people’s willingness to assist 
others and engage in cooperative schemes. Together these conditions comprise the 
‘circumstances of justice’.34  
Pursuing justice thus means acknowledging the existence of a problem, and 
acknowledging that its answer will not lead to the supersession of that problem. Put 
slightly differently, justice is a necessarily palliative concept, rather than a curative 
concept. A society of material abundance and inexhaustible altruism is fundamentally 
not a just society nor an unjust society, it is rather a society that has superseded justice 
altogether.35  
The concern indicated above that stems from this understanding of justice is that 
without feasibility conditions to meet, ideals of justice will cease to be conceptions of 
                                                 
33 The following chapter will also raise questions about the stability of contemporary, capitalist societies.  
34 This is a concept of David Hume’s adopted by Rawls. For a discussion of the ‘circumstances of 
justice’ see Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Ch. 3, § 22. 
35 Somebody like Marx might argue that the solution to injustice is not to try to make society adhere to 
an ideal of justice but rather to move beyond the need for justice altogether. This solution would be 
evident in a communist society where the objective and subjective conditions are beyond the 
circumstances of justice. For a further discussion of communism as a solution to both injustice and 
justice see Allen E. Buchanan, Marx and Justice: The Radical Critique of Liberalism (London: 
Methuen, 1982), pp. 50-52. 
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justice at all, being instead conceptions of the most desirable or most morally right 
society. However this conclusion would be too hasty. Infeasible ideals of justice can, 
and must, still be constrained by the inherent limitations of justice indicated above. To 
illustrate, there are many ideals that fall within the circumstances of justice, that is that 
assume moderate scarcity and limited altruism, but that are impossible, insufficiently 
probable, or unstable. Indeed if the fears of the sceptics of the Entitlement Ideal 
discussed above are well-founded then a society governed by it would be within the 
circumstances of justice but unstable (as well as perhaps also being insufficiently 
probable). Conversely we may find in the future that there are societies that are outside 
the circumstances of justice but that are possible, sufficiently probable, and stable. In 
sum, accepting that justice is logically independent of possibility, probability, and 
stability need not lead to its conflation with other concepts such as desirability and 
moral rightness. Infeasible ideals can still fall within the circumstances of justice.  
In sum, infeasible ideals of justice are not necessarily conceptually incoherent. We 
have good reasons to think that it is perfectly logical to discuss justice independently 
of other categories, including those connected to feasibility. Moreover we need not 
think that doing so undermines the concept of justice, as there are numerous ideals that 
will be both within the circumstances of justice while also being infeasible: an ideal 
being infeasible does not automatically entail that it is irrelevant to, or unconcerned 
with, justice.  
A more serious challenge to infeasible ideals may accept that such ideals are not 
necessarily conceptually incoherent nor illogical but that they still possess other 
shortcomings including some that pose a range of possible threats to feasible ideal 
theorising. It is to these lines of criticism we now turn. 
David Miller identifies what he terms a ‘neo-Augustinian’ tendency in infeasible ideal 
theories of justice; a reference to St. Augustine’s distinction between the limited, 
imperfect justice to be found on Earth and the true justice that can only be found in 
heaven. In formulating ideals of justice that can never be realised, contemporary, 
secular, infeasible ideal theories of justice take the same approach. For Miller this leads 
to ‘philosoph[ies] of lamentation’ where one focuses on the perfect ideal that is always 
beyond one’s grasp at the expense of theorising meaningful, but imperfect, change that 
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can actually be achieved.36 As such the entire project of political theory as a normative 
pursuit is undermined. For Miller, political theory ought to be concerned with 
determining principles that are able to guide political action and infeasible ideal theory 
is problematic for failing to do so.    
We have already seen that infeasible ideals do not aspire to guide action. However is 
it the case that such theories of justice undermine the feasible theories of justice that 
do? I believe this concern can be challenged in two ways. First, the effects of the 
criticism are lessened by the fact that we do not have to choose between feasible ideal 
theorising and infeasible ideal theorising.37 There is no reason that we, either as 
individual political theorists or as the aggregate field as a whole, cannot do both, 
without either field suffering a problematic labour shortage. This criticism would only 
have traction if there were a chronic political theorist deficit. In these circumstances, 
questions about which fields of study were most deserving of our time may become 
pertinent. On the face of it though this political theorist deficit does not hold at present, 
and is thus not a concern. 
Second, and related to the previous point, this criticism may rest on the uncharitable 
assumption that political theorists are unable to hold two different types of ideal at the 
same time.38 If political theorists could only hold either feasible or infeasible ideals 
then we may worry that those in the latter camp would be trapped in their philosophy 
of lamentation, unable to contribute to practical normative discussions about nonideal 
choices. However as this is not the case we need not worry about this concern, and can 
assume that people who concern themselves, at least in part, with infeasible justice, 
can still also have a separate ideal of feasible justice that they can rely on for making 
long-term just choices.39 The only philosophers who risk losing themselves in 
                                                 
36 Miller, p. 230. For Augustine’s original discussion of justice and the ‘two cities’ see Augustine of 
Hippo, ‘City of God’ in Readings in Political Thought: Essential Texts Since Plato, ed. by Mitchell 
Cohen and Nicole Fermon (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 143. 
37 One version of what might be termed the ‘time management’ criticism is suggested by Carole Pateman 
and Charles W. Mills. See Contract and Domination (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), p. 118. 
38 A related concern pertaining to conceptions of rights is raised by Katherine Eddy in ‘Against Ideal 
Rights’ Social Theory and Practice Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 463-481 (2008). For a discussion of this see 
Chapter 5, Section 2.  
39 Andrew Mason for example, as well as defending the importance of infeasible ideal theory, also 
argues for the need for more thorough, concrete, nonideal theorising. See Andrew Mason, ‘Rawlsian 




lamentation are those who are peculiarly unable to retain conceptions of the same 
concept at different levels of abstraction; a type of philosopher who ought to be quite 
rare given the fundamental methodological demands of the discipline.40  
Miller’s practicality criticisms could thus only apply if: infeasible ideal theorising 
aimed to provide ideals that informed long-term just choice, if emphasis on infeasible 
ideal theory led to a problematic fall in numbers working in feasible ideal theory, or if 
philosophers were only able to work on either feasible ideal theory or infeasible ideal 
theory. We can accept the importance of theorising independently of certain conditions 
while still accepting that practical ideals of justice ought to be constrained by these 
conditions.41  
 
IV. Infeasible Ideals and Just Choice 
As these conditions do not hold it is thus safe to say that infeasible ideal theorising 
does not pose any necessary threat to feasible ideal theorising. However, as I 
mentioned above, I would like to go further than this and suggest that infeasible ideals 
may actually be of benefit to those wishing to make just choices. Thus far this chapter 
has assumed that the purpose of these ideals is to allow one to better understand 
particular concepts in themselves. The section though will consider whether infeasible 
ideals may also have practical benefits. I want to show that ideals of this type can be 
both ‘attitude guiding’, that is, they can help us better understand a given concept, but 
also, to some extent, ‘action-guiding’, that is, they can perform a normative function 
in informing just choice.42  
                                                 
40 This line of argument is well summarised by Mason in his response to John Dunn (and critics of 
infeasible ideal theory more generally) in the following remarks: ‘Of course, those who deny that 
political theory must be directly relevant to politics are not thereby committed to denying that political 
theory can contribute to the important and valuable task of identifying and evaluating feasible 
alternatives. The point is merely that its remit is broader than this.’ Mason, ‘Just Constraints’, p. 253 
(my emphasis). 
41 A similar point is made by David Wiens. See David Weins, ‘“Going Evaluative” to Save Justice from 
Feasibility – A Pyrrhic Victory’ The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 64, No. 255, pp. 301-307, pp. 306-
307. 
42 See Brennan, pp. 317-318. 
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In what follows I use the example of communism to show how infeasible ideals can 
still be able to inform short-term just choice. Moreover I will also demonstrate how 
infeasible ideals can be practically useful even when they cannot support legislative or 
institutional changes. I conclude this section with some considerations on the more 
fundamental connections between infeasible ideals and feasible ideals.  
It might be that even though an ideal of justice posited by a given theory is infeasible, 
that ideal not only tells us something about a shortcoming of the society we live in but 
that in doing this it may allow us to make some improvements to existing conditions. 
A good illustration of this is given by Zofia Stemplowska’s example of Marxist 
theories of alienation and communism. Let us take ‘alienation’ to refer to an effect that 
capitalist relations of production have on participants in such relationships, particularly 
workers, whereby they are prevented from flourishing as individuals or as 
communities. This is due in part to the lack of autonomy caused by the limited control 
workers have over the process and product of production.43 As, through significant 
increases in workplace democracy, work in a communist society would be 
significantly more autonomous, communism could be viewed as a solution to the 
problem of alienation.44 
Let us now assume that Marx was (a) completely correct about the existence and moral 
wrongness of alienation in capitalist societies and (b) completely wrong in believing 
communism to be feasible.45 Even if these conditions hold we might find that 
communism would still be useful as a way of helping diagnose some of the problems 
of capitalist society as well as guiding attempts to reform it, even if communism itself 
                                                 
43 This is an intentional simplification of what is a complex and multifaceted concept but this is 
sufficient for a discussion that is primarily about feasible ideals and infeasible ideals, rather than 
alienation. For Marx’s original, and most comprehensive, discussion of alienation see Karl Marx, 
‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’ Karl Marx: Early Texts ed. by David McLellan (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1844/1971), pp. 133-145, esp. pp. 139-141. For commentaries on alienation see, e.g. 
Sean Sayers, Marx & Alienation: Essays on Hegelian Themes (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 
and Bertell Ollman, Alienation: Marx’s Conception of Man in Capitalist Society (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1971). 
44 See Marx, ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, pp. 147-148. 
45 We touched on the feasibility concerns some may have about communism above. As well as Cohen’s 
worry about the feasibility of an economy premised on generosity (see footnote 11 above), there is the 
claim that planned economies lead to totalitarian government, see F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 
(London: Routledge Classics, 1944/2001) and Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1962/1982), Ch. 1. 
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could never be realised.46 Perhaps communism as an ideal could inform legislation that 
would allow for greater employee influence on decision making or to provide better 
and more comprehensive schooling to ensure individuals had the broadest possible 
range of career paths. Even if communism could never be realised, society could 
perhaps be improved by trying to make its institutions more similar to communist ones. 
In sum, communism then may be useful as a palliative, short-term choice informing 
ideal even if it turns out to be useless as a curative, long-term choice informing ideal.47 
This position challenges Luca Jacobi Uberti’s claim that ‘an ultimately unrealisable 
goal [cannot] (or at least should not) serve as a driver of justice-oriented reform.’48 
Rather, such ideals may still be helpful in informing short-term reform even when they 
are unable to inform long-term choice. 
It might also be the case that an unrealisable ideal continues to be beneficial even when 
it ceases to be able to inform institutional and legislative improvement. We can 
imagine a society where laws that decrease alienation are effectively impossible; 
where institutional structures are so robustly alienating that they cannot be improved. 
In this situation we may be able, in virtue of our possessing an understanding of 
communism, to orient our own actions to providing support to help mitigate the 
negative effects of alienation. Perhaps this knowledge makes us kinder or more 
understanding and supportive towards people, even if the level of alienation remains 
the same. Again, while we may accept that we cannot hope to realise communism in 
full, its model citizen may provide a standard for us to strive for in our interpersonal 
relations. 
Communism then may still be of practical value as a just choice informing ideal not 
only when it cannot inform long-term choice but also when it is unable to help us 
reform legal and institutional structures. We can see then that the ideal of communism 
as a solution to alienation would only cease to be of practical value if Marx’s theory 
                                                 
46 Stemplowska, ‘What’s Ideal about Ideal Theory?’, p. 334. 
47 Marx himself may have been doubtful that such a reduction was feasible, given his tendency to discuss 
alienation and non-alienation in categorical rather than incremental terms. This perspective is evident 
in his remarks that improving wages within the capitalist system would only be ‘better payment for the 
slave, and would not win either for the worker or for his labour their human status and dignity.’ See 
Marx, ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, p. 143. 
48 Luca Jacobi Uberti, ‘Good and Bad Idealisations in Political Theory’ Theoria Vol. 80, pp. 205-231 
(2014), p. 210. 
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of human nature was sufficiently mistaken, for example if it were to turn out that what 
human beings actually find most enjoyable, life-affirming, morally-rewarding and so 
on is engaging in alienating labour, where they have no control over their work and 
where they are in intense competition with their fellow citizens. Providing this is not 
the case and that the assumptions we fixed at the start for the purpose of this discussion 
are true, namely that alienation is undesirable and communism cannot be achieved, 
then communism will be, at least to some extent, a practically useful ideal. It would be 
useful then not in the sense of setting an ideal to realise in full but rather as a way of 
aligning attitudes, reforming institutions, and generally contributing to smaller scale 
improvements, perhaps even exclusively at the individual level.  
This example thus helps us to respond more fully to Miller’s criticism of infeasible 
ideals. He notes that their capacity to improve our knowledge of the world around us 
is inherently useful and that ‘we have an interest in not being deceived about the 
character of the societies we are living in.’ However he is concerned that the value of 
such an ideal conception of justice is diminished ‘once we no longer expect such truth 
to guide practice to any significant extent.’49 
Our earlier response to Miller already takes some of the sting out of his criticism: we 
have seen that there is no reason to expect an infeasible ideal to operate alone and that 
one can use such an ideal to improve understanding while also employing a feasible 
ideal on which to inform long-term choice. However we can now add to this the fact 
that all but the most bizarre ideals are likely to be able to inform short-term choice and 
help us plan immediate improvements to current injustices.    
By the same token we have a response to Joseph Carens’s claim that an ideal that can 
never be achieved ‘loses a good deal of its attraction.’50 This point may rest on a 
category mistake in assuming that an infeasible ideal need be desirable or ‘attractive’ 
in order to be of value to the pursuit of justice. Rather, for an ideal to inform short-
term choice it need only be able to demonstrate a contrast with a shortcoming in society 
at present, and promote thought and action directed at improving this. In summary 
                                                 
49 Miller, Justice for Earthlings, p. 233. 
50 Joseph H. Carens, ‘Compensatory Justice and Social Institutions’ Economics and Philosophy Vol. 1, 
No. 1, pp. 39-67 (1985), p. 64. 
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then, for ideals to inform short-term choice they need not satisfy feasibility 
conditions.51  
Before proceeding to the final section it is worth stressing that there is also a more 
fundamental discussion to be had about the role of infeasible ideal theory in relation 
to feasible ideal theory. One may want to claim that in order to possess feasible ideals 
we also need to possess infeasible ideals, or if not this then at least the slightly weaker 
claim that we would be able to deduce the latter from the former. The argument may 
be that knowing what justice demands under feasible conditions means we ought to be 
able to know what it might demand if those conditions did not hold.52  
This is a deep and complex argument but it is not wholly pertinent to the discussion at 
hand. As we are primarily interested in defending the validity of ideal theory 
approaches to just choice the question of whether or not these necessarily rely in turn 
on holding fully abstract conceptions of justice is not one that necessarily needs to be 
answered here. It would likely pose a problem if I wanted to claim that a significant 
incompatibility marked the relationship between feasible ideals and infeasible ideals, 
or if I wanted to make any other major criticisms of infeasible ideal theory. As I wish 
to do neither this is not the case. Indeed I am inclined to think that not only are there 
both the inherent and practical values in infeasible ideals that I have discussed, but that 
possessing a feasible ideal of justice likely does mean that one either does possess or 
could logically derive an infeasible ideal from this.53 
Two final points ought to be considered in order to justify my decision to set aside any 
discussion dedicated exclusively to infeasible ideals for the remainder of this thesis. 
First, feasible ideals are significantly different from infeasible ideals, as qualifying for 
the former category likely requires meeting extensive conditions determined by 
                                                 
51 This similarly responds to Allen Buchanan’s claim that it is characteristic of ‘good theory’ that there 
is a ‘practicable route from where we are now to at least a reasonable approximation of the state of 
affairs that satisfies its principle’. Instead I believe this chapter demonstrates the various ways that ideals 
can be practically valuable even when they cannot be realised. See Allen E. Buchanan, Justice, 
Legitimacy, and Self Determination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 61. 
52 There is a parallel here with the structure of the ‘weak necessity argument’. See Ch. 2, § II.  
53 This position is related to Cohen’s claims about the role of fact-insensitive principles in grounding 
fact-sensitive principles. See Rescuing Justice and Equality, Ch. 6. For a critical discussion of this 
argument see Andrew Mason, ‘What is the Point of Justice?’ Utilitas Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 525-547 (2012) 
and Justin P. Holt, ‘The Limits of an Egalitarian Ethos: G.A. Cohen’s Critique of Rawlsian Liberalism’ 
Science and Society Vol. 75, No. 2, pp. 236-261 (2011), esp. pp. 255-257. 
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various real world factors. As a result we need not assume that the former and the latter 
will bear a great deal in common and that a discussion of the former should necessarily 
entail discussion of the latter. By the same token the process of formulating these 
different types of ideals will itself be very different, with feasible ideals requiring 
reference to a far more extensive range of explanatory social theories. Second, due to 
the complexity of the above-mentioned conditions, much more can be said about what 
these conditions are and therefore the project of defining feasible ideals is not a simple 
one that can also comfortably accommodate a very different discussion about a 
different and more abstract set of methods and processes. In short, irrespective of their 
logical and conceptual connections, feasible ideals and infeasible ideals display 
significant differences that place further discussion of both beyond the capacity of this 
thesis. 
 
V. Long-Term Just Choice and the Uncertainty Gambit 
Let us recap the discussion thus far. In Section II I claimed that for ideals to inform 
long-term choice they generally have to be feasible, which entails meeting conditions 
of possibility, sufficient probability, and stability. Section III then showed how 
infeasible ideals are not inherently problematic, nor do they necessarily undermine 
feasible ideals or long-term choice. Section IV then went further in showing that 
infeasible ideals could also be practically valuable in informing short-term choice.  
Having now discussed infeasible ideals we can return to the challenge noted at the end 
of Section II. Recall that I mentioned there that the claim that only feasible ideals ought 
to inform long-term choice can be challenged from the perspective of infeasible ideal 
theory. In particular I want to consider, but ultimately reject, the claim that in 
conditions of uncertainty about how to understand feasibility categories it is better to 
work without them. This challenge rests on the claim that if we cannot say with 
certainty which ideals are probable or stable we ought to set these categories aside and 
instead theorise the ideals that are to inform long-term choice with far less concern, if 
not no concern, for these conditions. While our ideals perhaps ought to take into 
account logical consistency and the laws of the universe, we ought not to consider any 
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limitations stemming from concerns about probability or stability. In short, without 
certainty about how to define and measure feasibility categories we cannot be certain 
which ideals are feasible and which ideals are infeasible. As noted at the start of this 
chapter we can term this challenge, ‘the uncertainty gambit’. I am particularly 
interested in how certain fundamental aspects of Marxist theory might be mobilised in 
support of this gambit, but before turning to this I would like to expand on the general 
character of this argument.  
One response to this position may stress that it places unachievable epistemic burdens 
on ideals. As nothing can be known for certain, certainty is not a standard we should 
strive for. Instead it is sufficient to aim for something weaker, some kind of informed 
plausibility, which we can use to determine when we can reasonably assume that we 
are right to think that a given ideal would or would not meet possibility, sufficient 
probability, or stability conditions. This position thus acknowledges uncertainty but 
seeks a practical response that strives to still arrive at judgements about feasibility, 
albeit imperfect ones.  
Sceptics though might respond that even this less ambitious standard may be too 
speculative. They might note how popular perceptions of what is probable and stable 
can shift massively over time or point to the occurrence of political and social changes 
that can often seem to happen without any warning.54 In a world where our notions 
about the limits of probability and stability can be so easily challenged it is a significant 
risk to place our faith in imperfect and fixed conceptions of these categories. 
Doing this may mean that we strive for something far less desirable than what we may 
have achieved, or worse, that in setting our sights too low we fail to realise what we 
could have achieved had we worked towards a goal that we might have believed failed 
to meet feasibility conditions. Even if this does not happen it may be that pursuing a 
less desirable ideal causes issues of path dependence when we realise that a more 
desirable ideal is in fact achievable; that is, it may be difficult to ‘change track’ to 
focus on realising the more desirable ideal. This concern is of course compounded by 
                                                 
54 In recent years the revolutions of the Arab Spring as well as the success of Donald Trump’s 
Republican Primary campaign and the UK’s vote to leave the European Union, are all examples of 
events that were unexpected by many. More generally, political revolutions provide particularly stark 
examples of challenges to received wisdom about what is feasible.  
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the fact that we are dealing with ideals that may be being worked towards over many 
years. This point is well made by Mason who claims that ‘fallibility and the limits on 
what we can reliably predict’ mean that we ought not to limit our theorising to what 
we understand to be feasible. Instead ‘[w]e need to explore ideals in a way that is not 
too tightly constrained by what we judge to be possible, in order to prevent thinking 
from being rendered irrelevant by changes we did not, or could not, foresee.’55  
There are various arguments we can derive from Marxist theory that appear to support 
the uncertainty gambit. This is largely due to a number of fundamental aspects of 
Marxist theory that relate to the concept of ‘denaturalisation’. By denaturalisation I 
mean the process of showing how facts that are generally perceived to be necessary or 
fixed are actually historically contingent. This takes several forms that I will consider 
in this section, namely: the essentially historical character of human nature; the 
significant potential of technological and productive development; and the increased 
risk of misunderstandings about the proper limits of feasibility conditions due to 
ideological pressures. For various reasons then, Marxists may want to argue that limits 
that are often treated as fixed are actually of a historical and contestable nature.  
Human nature is often presented, both by philosophers and non-philosophers, as 
something that does not change.56 For Marx though, human nature is the ‘ensemble of 
social relations’ and rather than remaining constant is largely a product of the 
characteristics of particular societal formations.57 This is not to say that Marx has no 
formal notion of human nature and that there are no limits to the form that human 
nature takes. Indeed he conceives of human nature as centred round production, with 
individuals and societies striving to satisfy various material and non-material needs 
                                                 
55 See Mason, ‘Just Constraints’, pp. 254-255. 
56 Examples of apparently more ‘fixed’ conceptions of human nature include the egoistic, rational 
conception of human beings offered by Thomas Hobbes, see On the Citizen ed. by Richard Tuck & 
Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1651/1998), p. 6. This can be 
contrasted with John Locke’s more positive conception of humans as possessing a natural notion of 
moral rights and duties, see John Locke, Two Treatises on Government ed. by Peter Laslett (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1690/1960), Ch. 2, § 6. Adam Smith’s conception of humans as 
‘predispos[ed] to truck, barter, and exchange’ also offers a conception of human nature that is perhaps 
especially at odds with that of Marx, see Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (London: Methuen & Co., 
1776/1904), Bk. 1, Ch. 2. 
57See Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1845/1969), 7th thesis. 
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and in doing this creating new needs.58 However what those needs are and whether 
they can or cannot be satisfied by society are historical questions and as such the 
content of human nature shifts markedly in different societies.59  
The relevance of this conceptualisation of human nature is that it can act as a critical 
tool for understanding how capitalist social relations may encourage self-interest and 
undermine community.60 For Marx this happens due to the character of social relations 
in capitalist societies where capitalists use workers instrumentally in order to gain 
profit, while workers use capitalists instrumentally to gain wages. At the same time 
workers compete with each other for limited jobs in a finite labour market and 
capitalists compete with each other for sales of goods and services in a finite 
commodity market.61 Rather than seeing these characteristics as something that all 
future societies will have to accommodate, one can argue that, as they are connected 
to a specific set of social relations, a change in social relations, for example towards 
communism, may lead to a change in these characteristics.62 According to Marx, 
humans in the cooperative productive systems of communism understand their 
essential character not only in individual terms but also in terms of their membership 
of the community and in part perhaps because of this are far more willing to make 
                                                 
58 By ‘non-material’ needs I refer to a broad category encompassing goods such as the development of 
moral and artistic sensibilities, friendship, notions of community etc. 
59 For Marx’s account of human need as it relates to human nature see Marx, ‘Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts’, and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, ‘The German Ideology’ in The 
German Ideology Part One, With Selections from Parts Two and Three, together with Marx’s 
‘Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy ed. by C.J. Arthur (New York: International Publishers, 
1845/1970), pp. 48-49. Norman Geras offers a succinct summary of the formal aspect of Marx’s theory 
of human nature. Noting that, ‘if diversity in the character of human beings is in large measure set down 
by Marx to historical variation in their social relations of production, the very fact that they entertain 
these sorts of relations, the fact that they produce and they have a history, he explains in turn by some 
of their general and constant, intrinsic, constitutional characteristics; in short by their human nature.’ 
See Norman Geras, Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend (London: Verso: 1983), pp. 67-
68.    
60 Marx stresses this point, noting that ‘economics rigidifies the alienated form of social intercourse, as 
the essential, original form that corresponds to man’s nature.’ See Marx, ‘On James Mill’ in Karl Marx: 
Early Texts, ed. by David McLellan (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1844/1971), p. 194. C.B. Macpherson’s 
‘possessive individualism thesis’ also offers an account of how liberal theorists from the 17 th century 
onwards have allegedly portrayed a conception of human nature that is specific to capitalism as one that 
is universal. See C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962) and C.B. Macpherson, ‘Market Concepts in Political Theory’ The 
Canadian Journal of Political Science Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 490-497 (1961).  
61 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Manifesto of the Communist Party (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1848/1969), pp. 18-19.  
62 This point will be considered in more detail in the following chapter. See Chapter 4, Section III. 
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contributions to assist fellow citizens who may be unable to provide for themselves.63 
This shift from an ethos of competition to one of cooperation is, as we saw in Section 
II, embodied in the Communist Ideal.  
If Marx’s prediction about communist society is correct then it will be necessary to 
revise how sufficient probability and stability are conceptualised. If human nature can 
allow for societies that are as generally altruistic and honest as Marx’s communism 
then it would be a mistake to treat such ideals as unable to inform long-term choice. 
Moreover, and perhaps more significantly, even if Marx was wrong about the 
particular development of human nature projected in his ideal of communism, if he is 
right about its essentially historical and malleable character then sufficient probability 
and stability will still need to be revised. If human nature is an essentially historical 
phenomenon then we risk losing out on desirable ideals by only permitting those ideals 
that adhere to contemporary conceptions of human nature to meet sufficient 
probability and stability conditions and thus inform long-term choice.  
If we are uncertain about the possible range of subjective characteristics in future 
societies, i.e. what people will essentially be like, then we might also stress our 
uncertainty about the objective conditions of future societies, i.e. the range of 
productive and technological capacities. Future technological developments may make 
it far easier to satisfy human material needs. Meeting consumer demand may also 
become far less labour intensive and may free up significant time to be spent outside 
of labour oriented towards the production of physiologically necessary goods and 
engaging instead in more expressive work or in leisure activities.64  
Once again, if we are unable to properly forecast technological developments then it 
may be a mistake to assume that we can say with any confidence what the limits of 
sufficient probability and stability are. Indeed one might push this criticism even 
further. If these claims about human nature in communism and material abundance are 
legitimate then it brings into question the relevance of the circumstances of justice 
                                                 
63 See Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, p. 11. 
64 See Karl Marx, Capital, A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. III, ed. (posthumously) by Friedrich 
Engels (New York: International Publishers, 1894/1959), Ch. 48, § 3; We can also assume that these 
innovations may be combined with the harnessing of entirely clean energy that would thus avoid the 
dangerous ecological costs of material production. 
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presented above. If we are unable to know the limits of subjective and objective 
conditions then should we be focusing our normative efforts on ideals of justice as 
opposed to ideals of desirable societies more generally? 
In the face of these challenges I would like to defend feasible ideals, that is, ideals that 
employ reasonably strict conceptualisations of possibility, sufficient probability, and 
stability. In doing this I am not criticising the Marxist theory itself. Indeed the 
following chapter will consider how aspects of this theoretical approach can be used 
to make the ideals that are to inform long-term choice a more, rather than less, 
exclusive category. They can do this by helping place stringent demands on the 
conditions ideals have to meet in order to perform this function. Rather then, I want to 
show why this interpretation of this theory in mistaken.  
There are various counters that can be made to the above claims regarding the 
historical character of human nature. An obvious reply is to deny that human nature is 
historical. However I do not want to take this position. Although this thesis can be 
agnostic about whether human nature is ‘fixed’ or not, historical conceptions of human 
nature of the type favoured by Marx seem intuitively more plausible and allow us to 
make better sense of the broad range of different moral, legal, and cultural practices 
throughout human history.  
A sharper response, which does not challenge the historical conception of human 
nature in itself, is to suggest that the historical conception may almost prove too much 
here. If human nature is a product of historical factors then it may be difficult to plan 
any kind of long term political change as we may be unable to predict how human 
nature will be shaped by interim social and political structures. It may be that the 
changes necessary en route to realising a particular ideal lead to changes in human 
nature that cannot be accounted for at the ideal theorising stage but that make full 
realisation of the ideal difficult. For instance, even if Marx was correct about the 
character of human nature in communism, it may be that he was wrong about human 
nature in socialism and that the latter form of human nature becomes an obstacle to 
realising communism. Concerns of this sort challenge ambitious, ideal projects that 
span several forms of human nature, suggesting that the unpredictability of these 
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calculations make it prudent to adopt a more conservative approach that works with 
human beings largely as they are at present. 
This position is further supported by the risk of path dependency that comes with the 
above approach, as it may be that pursuing more speculative and distant long-term 
ideals causes more realisable long-term ideals to fail. For example, while socialism 
may be achievable, communism may prove not to be, and it may be that treating the 
former simply as a stepping stone to the latter promotes political practice that makes 
the former less likely.65 More problematically it may be that we miss altogether, or see 
but dismiss, an achievable shorter term ideal on the basis of a speculative long-term 
ideal.  
The same logic can be used to respond to uncertainty about technological 
development. We ought not to work towards a society that will be made feasible on 
the basis of advanced technologies we cannot know will exist. Should it be the case 
that such technologies are not possible or not practical then political resources will 
have been wasted and the chance to achieve more immediate gains will have been at 
best postponed and at worst lost. Underpinning these claims about path dependency is 
a form of cautious conservatism that suggests that it may be better, all other things 
being equal, to risk losing out on gains due to employing an overly stringent modelling 
of feasibility conditions than an overly permissive one. This is due to the problems of 
path dependency rising in correlation with increases in the distance between reality 
and realising a given ideal. Put simply, there will be fewer opportunities to miss if one 
commits to a more gradual ideal theory, premised on more demonstrably feasible 
ideals.  
All in all then I believe that uncertainty about future subjective and objective 
conditions lends itself to making decisions that are more, rather than less, ‘feasible’. It 
is more prudent to work towards what is best for people as they exist at present rather 
than what is the best society imaginable, given that understandings of what is best are 
likely to change in unpredictable ways. A similar point is made by Andrew Collier 
                                                 
65 Persistent examples of this problem can be found in debates about means and ends in socialism. As 
Steven Lukes notes in his discussion of these debates, ‘the question of means and ends has pervaded the 
entire history of Marxism, and more generally socialism, in [the twentieth] century.’ See Steven Lukes, 
Marxism and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 102.  
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who doubts that we can presume to know the questions that will be prompted and need 
to be answered in future societies. He claims that Marx’s problem was not, as it is often 
said, that the latter said too little about societies after capitalism but that he said too 
much. Marx’s discussion of a radically different, far more generous, human nature in 
communism makes it a more speculative and less practical ideal to premise long-term 
choice on. For Collier, one of the greatest strengths of Marx’s socialism is that it does 
not make excessive demands of human nature. Rather he thinks that socialism, for 
Marx, is, or at least ultimately will be, sufficiently appealing to people in the world at 
present, responding as it does to problems generated by contradictions inherent within 
capitalism.66 For the same reasons I believe it is an appropriate ideal with which to 
inform long-term choice. Indeed the synergy between socialism and present day 
society makes it optimally positioned as an ideal for contemporary political action to 
adopt.67  
To bring this back to the more general point about justice: we do not want to risk losing 
the opportunity to create a more just society in order to create a society that is beyond 
justice. In Marxist terms, socialism is a response to the problems of capitalist society, 
that, in terms of justice, refers to the ability of socialism to more justly and rationally 
organise the production and distribution of goods within society. Communism on the 
other hand is a response to the problems of socialism. However it is hard to be sure 
what these problems will be as we move further and further away from present day 
society. As such, gambling on having a sufficient understanding of these problems 
may be imprudent.68 
Accepting that ideals at present ought to work within, rather than beyond, the 
constraints of the circumstances of justice in order to inform long-term choice need 
not entail any permanent position. It may be that in the future ideals that move beyond 
justice, including Marx’s Communist Ideal, meet feasibility conditions and can inform 
                                                 
66 Andrew Collier, Socialist Reasoning: An Inquiry into the Political Philosophy of Scientific Socialism 
(London: Pluto Press, 1990), p. 16. 
67 This point will be discussed further in the following chapter. See Chapter 4, Section III.  
68 Rawls does well to capture the difficulty of predicting the problems of future societies and future 
agents. In discussing the post-justice world of Marxian communism he notes that its inhabitants are 
‘strange to us’, and it being ‘hard to describe them.’ John, Rawls, ‘Marx III - His Ideal: A Society of 
Freely Associated Producers’ in Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, ed. by Samuel Freeman 
(London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 371. 
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‘most desirable society realising’ choice.69 At present however such ideals are too 
speculative and high-risk. Similarly, we should not mistake epistemic limitations, 
which entail that lack of knowledge causes some ideals to fail to meet feasibility 
conditions for ontic limitations, which entail that the ideals fail to meet feasibility 
conditions due to their inherent impossibility, improbability, or instability. While some 
ideals will be inherently infeasible, either at present or permanently, others are 
infeasible because we lack the knowledge or the means to assess their feasibility, either 
at present or permanently.  
The two arguments we have looked at thus far have stressed the changing natures of 
human beings and productive technology, arguing, I have suggested wrongly, that we 
should doubt the validity of more conservative conceptions of the limits of probability 
and stability. Another factor that Marxists may claim ought to prompt us to question 
how feasibility conditions are conceptualised is the risk that these are affected by 
ideological factors. By ideologies I mean beliefs that are (a) false and (b) necessary for 
the maintenance of certain systems of social relations.70 What is thought to be true, 
either universally or otherwise, may be a falsehood that fulfils a functional role in 
contemporary society but would cease to be required in other societies. Assuming 
‘ideology’ is a viable concept we might think that ideals will be especially prone to 
negative influence from such ideologies. Ideologies, either through conscious or 
subconscious processes, serve to protect given social systems as they are, while, at 
least some, ideals aim to change systems. As such it would be reasonable to assume 
that the systemic self-defence mechanisms of contemporary society would place 
unduly stringent limits on what qualifies as possible, sufficiently probable, and stable. 
If this was so then what we understand to be reliable conceptualisations of these 
categories may not be reliable and may instead be placing needless constraints on our 
ideals of justice. 
In response I would point to the critical character of Marxist ideology critique. The 
benefit of this theory is not just in observing that such ideological beliefs exist but in 
                                                 
69 My position here is in sharp contrast to Lukes who presents a far more pessimistic account of the 
future of ideals. He notes that it will likely be impossible to escape ‘the circumstances of justice’ as 
‘scarcity, limited altruism, conflicting moralities, and limits upon knowledge and understanding [are] 
here to stay’. See Lukes, Marxism and Morality, p. 94. 
70 See Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, pp. 64-65. 
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identifying what they are and in explaining how they are ideological and what a non-
ideological conception of the same concept or phenomenon would look like. In short, 
ideologies exist but so do analytical tools that can greatly assist one in discerning 
between, and making sense of, true and false assertions and theories.71 Ideology-
critique then is actually a valuable tool in helping to establish appropriate standards of 
possibility, probability, and stability. Rather than assuming that the existence of 
ideologies should lead us to ignore these categories altogether, or at least to a 
significant extent, we should use ideology critique to better understand these categories 
in order to ensure that we avoid placing needless constraints on our long-term ideals, 




In this chapter I have looked to develop a more concrete understanding of ideals of 
justice. I have done this by examining the distinction between feasible and infeasible 
ideals. I began by considering the three feasibility conditions that ideals have to meet 
if they are to inform long-term choice, namely possibility, sufficient probability, and 
stability. I then showed that while infeasible ideals are unable to inform long-term 
choice, there is no reason they cannot inform short-term choice. In defending these 
two positions I met the second Key Objective of this thesis, that being to identify the 
different conditions ideals have to satisfy in order to inform each type of just choice. 
I also sought to defend a conceptualisation of infeasible ideal theory and feasible ideal 
theory that sees the relationship between them as at worst benign and at best beneficial. 
I looked to show that as well as being valuable in of itself, the former poses no 
challenge to the latter. In doing this I helped buttress feasible ideal theory, and by 
extension long-term just choice, by demonstrating that it is unthreatened by 
developments in infeasible ideal theory.  
                                                 
71 Marx’s theory of ideology has been systematically developed through the critical realist method of 
‘explanatory critique’, see Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, pp. 62-63, and Roy Bhaskar, 
Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy (London: Verso, 1989), p. 87.  
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In this sense this chapter anticipates meeting the third Key Objective in Chapter 4. 
Further ground work for this was provided in Section V where I responded to various 
challenges to the claim that long-term choice can only be informed by feasible ideals. 
Notable among these challenges were those derived from Marxist theory. While these 
appeared to be superficially plausible I looked to show that they pulled long-term 
choice in the wrong direction. Ideals ought to work, at least for the foreseeable future, 
within the circumstances of justice and with a strong conception of feasibility. To 
ignore these conditions risks wasting scarce political resources on ideals that we cannot 
know are achievable.  
The following chapter will build on this, showing how an alternative interpretation of 
Marxist theory provides a rich and compelling basis on which to model feasibility. In 
doing this it can help us identify conditions within which it is defensible to pursue 
long-term choice over short-term choice. As we shall see, Marxist theory allows us to 
do this as it provides both a stringent and exclusive account of feasibility that admits 
few ideals, along with sound reasons to doubt the efficacy of attempts to reform 




4. Defensible Long-Term Choice 
In the previous chapter I argued that any ideal that is to inform long-term just choice 
has to meet feasibility conditions. I defended the intuitive claim that as long-term 
choice aims towards the full realisation of given ideals of justice, then any ideal that 
cannot possibly be achieved is clearly unable to perform this function. Similarly, ideals 
that are possible but insufficiently probable represent a poor investment of limited 
political resources. As, finally, are any ideals that are unstable, i.e. that we cannot 
expect to endure over time. 
In making this claim about the conditions ideals have to meet in order to inform long-
term choice, as well as a further claim about the conditions ideals have to meet in order 
to inform short-term choice, Chapter 3 built on the abstract conception of ideals 
employed in Chapter 2. However, as making these claims rested in part on contrasting 
feasible ideal theory and infeasible ideal theory, more concrete facets of the character 
of ideals were, for the sake of clarity and simplicity, still omitted. Doing this allowed 
me to bring out the tensions found when comparing and contrasting feasible ideals and 
infeasible ideals, and then to defend feasible ideal theory in the face of the uncertainty 
gambit. More fundamentally it also allowed me to meet the second Key Objective of 
the thesis in outlining the conditions that ideals have to satisfy in order to inform either 
form of just choice.  
Having defended this more general point I can now engage directly with the third Key 
Objective of this thesis. Recall that this seeks to show that it can be defensible to favour 
long-term choice over short-term choice. We saw in Chapter 1 that long-term choice 
is intuitively appealing, with its promise of greater gains, full justice, and the 
possibility of more radical forms of political change. However we also saw that this is 
offered at the cost of relatively greater risks than we would expect to accompany short-
term choices.1 My aim in this chapter is to show that with the correct conception of 
feasibility we can retain the high gains of long-term choice, while lowering the risks 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 1; esp. Section I.  
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associated with it, and as such make it to defensible to favour long-term choice over 
short-term choice.   
My concern with questions of feasibility mirrors John Rawls’s framing of political 
theory as a ‘realistically utopian’ enterprise.2 Realistically utopian ideals are those that 
can be achieved in ‘favourable but still possible’ conditions and are ‘allowed by the 
laws and tendencies of the social world.’3 However I will argue in this chapter that if 
we take feasibility seriously we may find that liberal egalitarian ideals such as Rawls’s, 
as well as liberal ideals more generally,4 may fail to meet feasibility conditions. This 
claim rests on a Marxist conception of feasibility that suggests that capitalist 
economies tend towards inequality and are inherently unstable. Moreover, the 
structure of power in capitalist societies may make attempts to counter these tendencies 
through reforms prohibitively difficult.5 If this is the case then Rawls’s own ideal of 
justice would be simply utopian rather than realistically utopian, as it would not be 
‘allowed by the laws and tendencies of the social world’.  
The benefit of the Marxist approach is that it offers a notably stringent set of feasibility 
conditions that, if applied, would decrease the chance of long-term choices being 
informed by infeasible ideals that waste political resources. In this sense it would lower 
the relative risk involved in favouring long-term choice over short-term choice. 
Moreover, the Marxist conception of feasibility also undermines the defensibility of 
short-term choice by suggesting that attempts to increase the immediate justness of 
                                                 
2 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, p. 6, and Samuel Freeman, Rawls (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 
480. Rawls sees his realistic utopianism as starting from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s claim that philosophy 
ought to take ‘men as they are and laws as they might be.’ See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social 
Contract (London: Penguin Books - Great Ideas Series, 1762/2004), p. 1, and Rawls, The Law of 
Peoples, p. 7. 
3 John Rawls, ‘Introduction: Remarks on Political Philosophy’ in Lectures on the History of Political 
Philosophy, ed. by Samuel Freeman (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 
pp. 10-11; see also, Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 4. 
4 By ‘liberal’ ideals I specifically mean ideals that advocate capitalist economic systems, with ‘liberal 
egalitarian’ ideals being a subsection of these that additionally advocate principles of redistributive 
justice.  
5 Alex Callinicos states that ‘the great weakness of egalitarian liberalism’ is its belief that its ideals of 
justice are realisable within ‘a capitalist market economy.’ He claims that in order to realise the ideals 
of liberal egalitarianism we have to move away from the system as it is today as ‘egalitarian justice can 




society may be fettered by structural tendencies in capitalism that generally make 
successful progressive change less probable and, when it is achieved, less stable.   
In arguing in favour of a particular conception of feasibility this chapter departs from 
the more formal level of abstraction that this thesis has adopted until this point. In 
previous chapters I have almost exclusively made claims that apply to all ideals. In 
this chapter however, I offer an account of feasibility that will actively exclude a wide 
range of ideals from consideration for long-term choice informing roles. The merits of 
the Marxist approach aside, it is necessary to make this departure from formalness in 
order to meet the third Key Objective, which as we saw in Chapter 1, is important for 
both theoretical and political reasons. My discussion here however, will not be 
exclusively at this more concrete level. In order to advance the Marxist argument it is 
necessary to expand on the general theory of feasibility introduced in the previous 
chapter, as this provides a conceptual framework in which to situate my Marxist 
conception of feasibility. The claims made in the first half of this chapter then ought 
to be as comprehensively applicable as those made in Chapters 2 and 3, and as my 
subsequent discussion in Chapter 5 will be.  
I begin this chapter by expanding on the conceptualisation of feasibility presented in 
Chapter 3, introducing the notion of ‘obstacles’ that prospective long-term ideals must 
show they can either avoid or remove if they are to satisfy feasibility conditions (§ I). 
Having provided a general definition of obstacles to feasibility conditions I then 
proceed to consider how to conceptualise and assess obstacles in the three feasibility 
categories of possibility, sufficient probability, and stability (§ II). Following this I 
offer a Marxist approach to conceptualising feasibility. A particularly helpful 
contribution Marxism can make to feasibility assessments is in identifying those 
obstacles to feasibility that are necessary features of capitalist society and thus unable 
to overcome without replacing capitalism. This perspective establishes a range of 
significant obstacles that may cast doubt on the feasibility of many ideals of justice, 
notably those that advocate the combination of capitalist economies alongside more 
egalitarian distributions of wealth, and indeed those that simply advocate capitalism 
(§ III). The final section will respond to and refute a significant criticism of the Marxist 
approach. Namely that it conceptualises feasibility in such stringent terms that it either 
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excludes all ideals or, more fundamentally, rejects the need for ideals and ideal theory 
altogether. I will show firstly that socialist ideals can meet Marxist feasibility 
conditions and secondly that Marxist models of feasibility, when applied to real world 
circumstances, still require ideals and ideal theory (§ IV).  
 
I. Feasibility Obstacles 
One way of understanding how feasibility functions is to imagine that a given ideal 
has three paths ahead of it, marked ‘possible’, ‘sufficiently probable’, and ‘stable’. In 
order to qualify as feasible, ideals have to reach the end of each path. However, 
standing between ideals and their meeting each feasibility condition are a range of 
obstacles.6 This section will expand on what I mean by obstacles, but let us briefly 
consider a simple example in order to outline the general character of these concepts. 
We saw in the last chapter that for an ideal to be possible it cannot violate laws of 
nature, for example by advocating a society where people did not require sustenance 
in order to survive. It is probably safe to assume that any ideal aspiring to meet 
feasibility conditions would not advocate a sustenance-free society, however if such 
an ideal existed it would find its attempt to meet these conditions blocked by the human 
necessity for sustenance. Alternatively, all of those more reasonable ideals that did not 
have this impossible aspiration would proceed unimpeded by the obstacle.  
We can think of the paths as each containing numerous obstacles, most of which a 
given ideal will be able to avoid. However, should an ideal be permanently blocked by 
even one obstacle on any of the paths then it will not satisfy feasibility conditions. In 
being infeasible it will then of course also, by extension, be unable to inform long-
term just choice. Ideal theorists who wish to arrive at ideals for informing long-term 
choice thus have to do two things. First, they must ensure that they have a robust and 
sufficiently stringent conception of feasibility obstacles in order to prevent 
mischaracterisation of infeasible ideals as feasible ideals. Second, they must show that 
their own ideals are not impeded by obstacles and thus rendered infeasible.  
                                                 
6 The term ‘obstacles’ is used in a similar fashion by both Simmons and Mills. See Simmons, p. 16, and 
Mills, p. 181.  
90 
 
Obstacles to feasibility can be divided into two main categories. On the one hand there 
are those that we can expect to be permanent features of their respective paths, call 
these ‘fixed’. In contrast to these are the ‘contingent’ obstacles that are regarded as 
non-permanent features of given paths. While these obstacles prevent an ideal from 
being immediately feasible, it may be viable to subsequently remove them through 
nonideal enterprise.7 Whether or not an ideal can be considered infeasible in the face 
of a contingent obstacle, depends on the perceived likelihood that the obstacle will be 
removed in the future. While by definition it is possible to remove all contingent 
obstacles, only in the case of some will it be sufficiently probable that they will be 
removed.  
To clarify this distinction, consider the difference between the above noted human 
need for sustenance and historical opposition to marriage equality. It would likely be 
a grave error to place our faith in the human need for sustenance ever disappearing. 
However it would seem an almost equally grave error to treat a matter of public opinion 
as no more malleable than the necessity of sustenance. Indeed, we have seen huge 
attitudinal shifts in views on marriage equality in recent years,8 which do well to 
illustrate how some obstacles can be removed, and are thus not prohibitive barriers to 
an ideal’s meeting feasibility conditions. While in the past, an ideal that required 
marriage equality might have seemed farfetched, in many societies today the same 
ideal would be broadly popular.  
This difference is an important one because ideal theorists aiming to inform long-term 
choice will have to ensure that their ideals are not obstructed by fixed obstacles but 
will likely accept that their ideals will be obstructed by at least some contingent 
obstacles. Ideal theorists can have confidence that certain types of contingent 
obstacles, such as those pertaining to attitudes to marriage equality, can be removed. 
                                                 
7 Gilabert and Lawford-Smith draw a similar distinction, referring to ‘hard constraints’ and ‘soft 
constraints’. See Gilabert and Lawford Smith, p. 814. 
8 This trend in evidenced in the increasing number of states that offer some form of legal same-sex 
marriage, in referenda results such as the Republic of Ireland’s 62% vote in favour of marriage equality 
in 2015, and in polling figures that often show a remarkable turnaround in public opinion on this issue. 
As an example of such polling data see the increase in support for marriage equality in the USA from 
27% in 1996 to 61% in 2016. See Gallup Inc., ‘Marriage’ (2016). 
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In what follows I will outline different types of obstacles and how these map onto the 
three feasibility conditions discussed above and in the previous chapter.  
As we have seen, fixed obstacles can relate to laws of nature and prevent any ideals 
that may violate these from meeting feasibility conditions. As well as obstacles that 
safeguard laws of nature, there are parallel obstacles that perform the same function 
for laws of formal logic. The example from the previous chapter of an ideal that 
requires that laws have to both maximise utility and ensure equal provision of the 
greatest range of individual rights would evidently confront a fixed obstacle on the 
possibility path that states that for an ideal to be feasible it cannot require the aims of 
governance to be contradictory.9  
Fixed obstacles thus relate invariably to the possibility condition. By virtue of the fact 
that they conceptualise obstacles that cannot be removed, we can infer that it will be 
impossible to achieve an ideal that runs counter to such an obstacle. For this reason, 
fixed obstacles are generally the simplest obstacles to theorise and to make 
assessments with.  
Moving away from fixed obstacles, consider an ideal of justice that, in order to be 
realised, requires a society to implement a top band income tax rate of 85%.10 The 
implementation of this ideal, unlike say the sustenance-free ideal, is clearly possible. 
Not only does the high tax ideal not seem to violate any law of nature or logic, but we 
also know that various states have imposed even higher rates of income tax in the 
past.11 There is thus no fixed obstacle standing between this ideal and satisfaction of 
feasibility conditions. However this ideal may still be classified as infeasible. The 
feasibility of the ideal rests on whether we expect that it is sufficiently likely that the 
conditional obstacle to this ideal will be overcome.  
                                                 
9 See Chapter 2, Section, III. 
10 Note that the demand for this particular rate of taxation need not be an explicit requirement of the 
ideal. As we saw earlier, ideals of justice are generally pitched at a much more abstract level than this, 
see Chapter 2, Section V. However we can imagine that in order for a given ideal to be realised any 
concrete application of it would require a rate of taxation of approximately this level. 
11 For periods between the end of World War II and the start of the premierships of Margaret Thatcher 
in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the USA, both countries had top band income tax rates of over 90%.   
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To clarify this point let us consider two forms of conditional obstacle that may confront 
our high tax ideal. One class of objections to this ideal might argue that while high 
rates of income tax were common in the past, economic theory and political culture 
have progressed and as such it is now much less likely that an ideal that is reliant on 
high rates of tax could be implemented at present. Sceptics may point to the apparent 
media consensus in favour of low taxation as an example of how enshrined this attitude 
has become. An argument of this sort can be understood as a contingent obstacle on 
the probability path. Although we would not want to say that it is impossible that such 
an ideal could be achieved, we might feel that it is not sufficiently probable that it 
could be achieved. As has been stated elsewhere, an ideal that is not sufficiently 
probable would sensibly be considered a poor investment of political resources.12   
Another form of conditional obstacle that might confront this ideal would relate to its 
stability.13 It may be a concern for instance that high earners would flee the country or 
avoid or evade paying taxes at the new rate of taxation. If this happened there may be 
shortfalls in government budgets that the state might not be able to recover from.14 If 
it is predicted that a government could not continue to implement this ideal-satisfying 
rate of tax over time then the ideal would not be stable and thus it would not meet 
feasibility conditions.15  
These particular claims about the feasibility of high rates of income tax are not 
considered because they necessarily capture worrying truths about taxation, but due to 
the fact that they bring into relief more general features of feasibility obstacles. First, 
this example allows us to firmly establish the distinction between fixed and conditional 
obstacles. While it is always necessary to ensure that the ideals that inform long-term 
choice avoid fixed obstacles, the question of avoiding contingent obstacles is far more 
open. As Gilabert and Lawford-Smith observe, making this distinction helps us to 
avoid two pitfalls when theorising justice. If we only acknowledge fixed obstacles then 
                                                 
12 See Chapter 3, Section V.  
13 For definitions of both stability and probability see Chapter 3, Section II. 
14 For a discussion of these phenomena see for example Sunil Gulati, ‘Capital Flight: Causes, 
Consequences, and Cures’ Journal of International Affairs Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 165-185 (1988). 
15 Note that there is no reason why a given ideal could not be blocked by only one feasibility condition, 
e.g. while an ideal is probable it would not be stable in practice, or vice versa. Similarly it may be 
blocked by both of these feasibility conditions, i.e. even if the ideal was not insufficiently probable it 
would still be unstable in practice. 
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we risk a ‘hopeless idealism’ where we treat any possible ideal as feasible.16 Without 
a sense that contingent obstacles can constitute serious obstacles to an ideal being 
sufficiently probable or stable then we risk pursuing strategies that, more often than 
not, will lead to the political resource wastage cautioned against above. Alternatively, 
if we treat contingent obstacles as being no different to fixed obstacles then we fall 
into the trap of ‘cynical realism’, where no meaningful change ought to be pursued as 
no obstacle to realising a given ideal can be removed.17  
Second, the example allows us to think about how we approach contingent obstacles. 
Following on from the previous point, we may have good reasons to imagine that the 
challenges involved in removing some contingent obstacles are too great to merit 
confronting them and that as such it is better to simply avoid these altogether. However 
it may be that we have confidence that an obstacle can indeed be removed with the 
proper nonideal efforts and as such it is better to retain our ideal on the assumption 
that this can be done. In terms of the above example of the high rate of income tax, 
this is the difference between abandoning this ideal in favour of one that will not be 
obstructed by these obstacles, and retaining this ideal on the expectation that these 
obstacles can be overcome. For instance, we may believe that both the sufficient 
probability obstacle and the stability obstacle to higher tax rates hold at present but 
that with the appropriate political work they could be removed. One might think that 
objective factors such as rising inequality along with strong counter-narratives 
extolling the virtues of more egalitarian distributions can help us change attitudes and 
thus remove these obstacles in order for the redistributive ideal to become sufficiently 
probable and stable.  
Third, the example allows us to make a further distinction between sufficient 
probability obstacles and stability obstacles, and see how these may each block ideals 
in different ways. Aside from the distinct character of the obstacles that confront ideals 
in each category, there will also be very different nonideal perspectives on whether to 
attempt to remove these and how we would best do so. A course of action that is an 
excellent nonideal solution to a sufficient probability obstacle may be a poor response 
                                                 




to a stability obstacle and vice versa. A perspective that focuses simply on contingent 
obstacles in general will not be able to account for these distinctions.  
The concept of ‘obstacles’ is a useful way of understanding ideals and whether or not 
they satisfy feasibility conditions. As it stands though this model is still incomplete. 
Note that thus far no explicit mention has been made of either the agents who are 
expected to implement given ideals, or the particular nonideal conditions within which 
they will do this. For this reason two important additional questions, raised by Gilabert 
and Lawford-Smith, ought to be asked when making feasibility assessments: ‘Feasible 
for whom?’ and ‘Feasible when and where?’18 
The first question acknowledges the important fact that in order for an ideal to be 
feasible it has to be able to be put into practice, and that it will often be the case that 
only specific actors and institutions are able to do this. If an ideal relies on certain 
actors and institutions implementing it for it to be realised then it may meet obstacles 
that it would not were that ideal to rely instead on other actors and institutions. For 
example, a given ideal may require parliamentary endorsement but the structure of a 
given parliamentary system may make the achievement of this improbable. Perhaps 
parliament has constitutional safeguards to prevent such changes, or is simply 
populated by politicians who are overwhelmingly against such ideals in principle. In 
short then, assessing the feasibility of an ideal requires that we ask questions about the 
actors and institutions that are required to realise that ideal, and how best to respond 
to the obstacles that may be peculiar to them.  
The second question, ‘feasibility when and where’, has already been discussed 
implicitly. Contingent obstacles will often display a high-degree of historical 
specificity. We saw this with the examples of both same-sex marriage and high top 
rates of income tax. In both cases attitudes and legislation relating to these phenomena 
have shifted dramatically over recent decades. We can also see that the obstacles that 
confront ideals are geographically particular as well. For example, the trend of rising 
support for marriage equality noted above does not hold for the many countries that 
continue to oppose marriage equality or where opposition to marriage equality has 
                                                 
18 Ibid., p. 812. 
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actually increased in recent years.19 In short, many contingent obstacles are products 
of a particular time and place, and what may be an irremovable obstacle in one context 
may not be in another. This perspective thus shows us that ideals may not necessarily 
satisfy feasibility conditions at all times and in all societies. At least some of the 
probability and stability obstacles that may confront an ideal are contingent to 
particular times and places. 
To summarise then, obstacles to feasibility conditions take various forms. They can be 
fixed, referring to an obstacle that will hold in all circumstances, or contingent, 
referring to an obstacle that need not necessarily hold in all circumstances. Whether or 
not a contingent obstacle is a genuine feasibility constraint depends on whether or not 
it is sufficiently probable that we would be able to remove this obstacle through 
nonideal enterprise. It is the nature of long-term choice that it will have to navigate 
through various impediments that prevent an ideal from being realised immediately. 
However in some cases we will confront impediments that, while not absolutely fixed, 
are sufficiently stubborn as to be contingent obstacles that thus make an ideal 
infeasible: it would simply be a waste of political resources to attempt to remove it. 
These obstacles, fixed or contingent, can block the ideal itself or block a certain actor, 
institution, or group of actors or institutions from achieving the ideal. Finally they can 
prevent an ideal from satisfying any of the three feasibility conditions of possibility, 
sufficient probability, and stability.   
 
II. Conceptualising and Assessing Feasibility 
This discussion of obstacles should go some way towards concretising our previously 
abstract conceptualisation of ideals and feasibility conditions. The obstacle framework 
provides us with a model that allows us to better understand assessments of feasibility. 
However at present this is still only a formal account of feasibility. To further shore 
up this inquiry let us consider the methodological expertise demanded by different 
feasibility assessments. Doing this will give a sense of the interdisciplinary nature of 
                                                 
19 Russia provides a clear example of the latter phenomenon with opposition to same-sex marriage 
increasing from 59% in 2005 to 86% in 2013. See VTsIOM, ‘Law Banning Gay Propaganda’. 
96 
 
feasibility assessments while also clarifying how sensitive to nonideal factors ideal 
theory has to be if it is to produce ideals that can inform long-term just choice.  
We noted in the previous section that possibility encompasses the twin concepts of 
logical possibility and natural possibility. We also saw that the obstacles to meeting 
possibility conditions are fixed, with the above issues of physical and logical necessity 
clearly lending themselves to unchanging principles. These are not examples of 
contingent obstacles that it would be possible to overcome either now or in the future.  
How then do we assess the possibility of ideals? As possibility deals with categorical 
judgements on issues of logic and natural laws, assessments of an ideal’s possibility is 
predominantly an exercise in philosophical analysis and natural scientific analysis. The 
former discipline should primarily look to establish whether or not a given ideal is 
logically coherent, something that philosophy is clearly methodologically well-suited 
to, while the latter discipline can establish whether it adheres to natural laws.  
It might be assumed that this will require cross-disciplinary collaboration with natural 
scientists but this will generally not be the case. In most circumstances it is likely that 
political theorists can make judgements on the possibility of ideals without importing 
expertise from the natural sciences. This is because the obstacles that confront 
impossible ideals will generally be intuitive, requiring little expert knowledge. 
Providing their ideals are also logically possible, this will allow political theorists to 
quickly proceed to the much fuzzier domains of probability and stability.   
Despite this, it is certainly conceivable that assessments of natural possibility will be 
more complex in the future. Recall first the position I defended in the previous chapter. 
I made the claim that questions about the compatibility of the Communist Ideal with 
human nature were issues of probability rather than possibility.20 The rationale behind 
this claim was that as we appear to know that humans are definitely capable of the 
requisite altruism and honesty, the question becomes whether or not it is sufficiently 
probable that some future society may be able to motivate enough people to display 
these qualities as to make the Communist Ideal feasible. Despite this position though, 
it may also be the case that future advances in neuroscience will allow us to pinpoint 
                                                 
20 See Chapter 3, Section II. 
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physiological processes that place hard limits on what human beings are capable of in 
terms of altruism, honesty and so on. Such research might be able to tell us whether 
some people are hardwired to be more altruistic and honest than others are. If we knew 
this then we may be able to quantifiably assess whether a sufficiently high enough 
proportion of people meet the standards of altruism and honesty required for a 
functioning communist society. Thus, we can see how, with sufficient data, such a 
discovery would move some questions about the limits of human attributes from the 
domain of probability to the domain of natural possibility. All of this would present 
fertile ground for cross-disciplinary work between political theorists and natural 
scientists.  
Until such advances are made however it is likely best to conceptualise possibility 
assessments as a largely philosophical, and relatively intuitive, process. So while one 
cannot rule out complexities in these assessments, at present it seems likely that 
determining the possibility of a given ideal ought to be the most straightforward 
condition to assess and for that reason we will have reasonably little to say about 
possibility assessments. Sufficient probability and stability on the other hand evince 
no such simplicity or uni-disciplinarity and it is to the assessment of these conditions 
that we now turn. As we shall see below, understanding each category requires a range 
of social-scientific and historiographical tools, as well as contributions from 
explanatory social theories.   
As we have already seen above, the binary nature of possibility makes it far too 
permissive a category to employ on its own, due to the undoubtedly large number of 
ideals that are possible but highly improbable. Informing long-term choice with ideals 
that are unlikely to be achieved wastes political resources and may lead to missed 
opportunities to pursue and achieve ideals that can be realised.21  For this fundamental 
reason, ideals that are to inform long-term choice ought to be sufficiently probable. 
While questions of possibility look to philosophical analysis and natural scientific 
analysis, probability assessments are more dependent on social scientific analysis and 
historical analysis. Determining the probability of an ideal requires extensive 
                                                 




engagement with explanatory social theories that can inform our understanding of the 
range of options available at a given time. This is to say that probability assessments 
take for granted the possibility of ideals and look instead to how likely they are to be 
realised. Social and historical theories provide accounts of the different types of 
contingent obstacles that exist and the extent to which they can likely be removed.  
Let us turn now to stability. We saw in the previous chapter that for an ideal to be 
stable, a society that is governed by it has to be able to return to an ‘equilibrium state’ 
following any deviations from stability. We also noted that we were concerned with a 
particular type of stability, namely a ceteris paribus stability, whereby the causes of 
instability and the forces that return the society to an equilibrium state ought to be 
internal to the ideal in question. By this I mean that an ideal is not stable if it requires 
external forces, such as chance foreign investment or international military support, to 
return it to an equilibrium state. Nor by the same token is an ideal unstable if the 
instability is caused by similarly external forces, such as economic downturns and 
ecological disasters, providing these are not necessary products of applying the ideal.  
Last chapter I considered two possible forms of instability. The first is a relatively 
simple and intuitive type of instability produced by an ideal being over-demanding and 
preventing sufficient compliance from citizens. In this instance obstacles present 
themselves when ideals require citizens to tolerate a particular law with fixed costs 
over a period of time, when citizens would not be sufficiently capable of tolerating that 
law. The second type of stability obstacle arises when it is expected that the ideal itself 
will generate additional or greater costs overtime. Note that this means that an ideal 
may be tolerable at first but due to tendencies within the implementation of the ideal, 
that ideal becomes less tolerable over time.22   
In the previous chapter I noted that each stability test required different forms of 
analysis. Note that in the first instance testing ought to be simpler, we are primarily 
checking our ideal against our conception of levels of tolerance of costs, and asking if 
it is the case that we can expect people to accept the costs associated with this ideal. 
Answering this question requires philosophical analysis as well as input from social 
                                                 
22 For fuller accounts of definitions of the basic concepts of sufficient probability and stability see 
Chapter 3, Section I.  
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scientific disciplines. Our philosophical conception of what costs people will tolerate 
will likely be strengthened if it is informed by insights from social policy, psychology, 
and so on.  
As the second stability test is similarly concerned with the costs individuals will 
tolerate, it requires the same social scientific inputs to model the appropriate level of 
the tolerance of costs. However, given that we are interested in the effects that ideals 
generate over time, we will also need to consider explanatory theories that model the 
long-term effects of particular laws. Thus in the example from the previous chapter I 
speculated that adherence to Robert Nozick’s ‘Entitlement Ideal’ may lead to a 
concentration of wealth that would be unstable and that a limited state would be unable 
to recover from. Deciding whether or not this is the case would require analysis of 
social, historical, and economic theories that look at the long-term effects of free-
market economic policies. In this sense then, it is reliant on many of the same processes 
and methods that are used when assessing probability.   
Thus far I have discussed the different types of obstacles that ideal theorists are 
required to show that their ideals can either avoid or remove if they are to meet the 
feasibility conditions required to inform long-term choice. We have also looked at how 
feasibility assessments are made in each category, stressing the additional extra-
philosophical disciplinary expertise required of probability and stability assessments 
in particular. This discussion has aimed to achieve two things. First, to provide a 
general account of feasibility that ought to be instructive to feasible ideal theorising 
generally. Second, to establish a framework that can be populated by a specific 
conceptualisation of feasibility, in order to show that it can be defensible to favour 
long-term choice over short-term choice. In the following section I thus set aside more 
general concerns and focus on how one might use Marxist theory to arrive at a robust 
conception of feasibility for assessing prospective long-term choice informing ideals.  
 
III. A Marxist Conception of Feasibility 
In this section I want to outline how Marxist theory can conceptualise feasibility 
conditions and the different obstacles inherent within them. This should not be read as 
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an exhaustive account of feasibility. For one it focuses largely on sociological, 
political, and economic factors, and does not consider other important fields such as 
psychology. It is thus to an extent an indicative modelling of Marxist feasibility. 
Nevertheless I believe it successfully demonstrates how beneficial this approach can 
be, leading as it does to a set of markedly stringent feasibility conditions.  
As we shall see, this stringency is a product of Marxism’s emphasis on a range of 
structurally necessary obstacles that stress the instability of capitalist economies and 
the incompatibility of egalitarian redistribution with capitalist systems of production. 
In theorising just choice within capitalism accordingly, the Marxist conception of 
feasibility proves itself to be particularly exclusive, rejecting liberal ideals as a whole 
on the grounds that they are premised on capitalist economies. The Marxist conception 
of feasibility thus provides a significant endorsement of the long-term approach to just 
choice, as its stringency and exclusivity ought to give ideal theorists who adhere to it 
a greater confidence in the feasibility of their ideals. Conversely, an approach to 
feasibility that is too inclusive due to failing to anticipate the full range of obstacles to 
ideal realisation may lead to one wasting limited political resources on ideals that later 
turn out to be infeasible.  
The Marxist conception of feasibility, moreover, casts doubt on the validity of short-
term choice in contemporary societies. It states that capitalism’s resistance to reform 
makes it difficult to implement progressive changes within market systems in the first 
place, while also making it hard to retain those changes that are made. While this is 
not a logically necessary criticism of short-term choice, it is a serious practical 
challenge to it within capitalist societies. Given that it is these societies that we inhabit 
and that contemporary political theory aims to improve, this is a significant criticism. 
In both strengthening long-term choice and raising serious questions about short-term 
choice, the Marxist approach to feasibility allows me to meet the third Key Objective 
of this thesis, in showing the conditions in which it is defensible to favour long-term 
choice over short-term choice.   
In explicating this Marxist approach to feasibility I will look at four main points. I will 
first consider the claim that social relations in capitalist societies logically lead to an 
increasing concentration of wealth in fewer hands, causing progressively less-
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egalitarian distributions of wealth. Moreover, I will show that by going unchecked this 
increasing wealth inequality can lead to cyclical economic crises. This constitutes two 
significant contingent obstacles confronting those ideals that look to work within 
capitalism. (a) It reduces the probability of successful progressive reforms of capitalist 
societies, as more egalitarian, patterned redistributions of wealth will be undermined 
by the tendency for distributions to become less egalitarian. In this sense it thus 
challenges ideals that aim to combine market economies with egalitarian distributive 
principles. (b) The crisis-prone character of capitalist economies undermines liberal, 
capitalist-based ideals more generally, due to the inherent instability of such systems.   
The second point will look at the structure of social power in capitalist societies and 
how this may make it difficult to regulate wealth distribution within them. If this 
second point holds then this will amplify the effect of both obstacles noted in the 
previous paragraph; in making it harder still to enforce redistributive principles of 
justice, or to regulate the economy to prevent recurring crises. The third point will 
address the ‘feasible when and where?’ question, by stressing how the structure of 
social power noted above means that it is largely material forces, rather than moral 
force, which leads to ideals being realised. As such, for ideals to be feasible they ought 
to have strong synergy with the structures of the society they look to emerge from. My 
fourth and final point in this section further solidifies the obstacles noted above by 
stressing their historically necessary character. The central idea here is the fact that 
while these obstacles are contingent they are also necessary products of capitalism 
itself, and thus they can only be overcome by overcoming capitalism.  
(1) I want to premise my Marxist conception of feasibility on Marx’s model of the 
general logic of capitalist development. We can illustrate how this logic functions with 
a hypothetical example. To begin, imagine a factory that produces a particular 
commodity, let us say shoes. The factory is owned and managed by a well-meaning 
capitalist who pays his employees a high wage and affords them generous working 
conditions, long paid-holidays, weekends off, and so on. Perhaps on top of this, each 
employee makes and assembles each pair of shoes in its entirety, from sole to laces. 
Now imagine that another shoe factory opens across the road from the first one. This 
firm is owned and managed by a mean-spirited capitalist who pays her employees 
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considerably lower wages, grants them fewer holidays, and generally treats them 
poorly. Moreover she also employs a highly rationalised technical division of labour, 
with one group of employees making soles, another group of employees making 
uppers, another group attaching uppers to soles and so on.  
For various reasons we can imagine that life in the first factory would be more 
enjoyable than life in the second factory. Pay, terms and conditions, and quality of 
work are all better in the former than they are in the latter. However in market terms 
we can also imagine that the shoes made in the second factory would be lower priced 
than those from the first factory as production in the second factory is more efficient, 
and less money is tied up in wages. It would seem probable that over time, market 
forces would lead to the mean-spirited capitalist gaining a larger and larger share of 
the market, as more and more customers purchased her cheaper shoes. Without any 
changes in the production processes in either factory this trend would likely continue 
until the first factory went out of business altogether. The well-meaning capitalist 
would thus have the choice to either allow his business to go under or to compete with 
his mean-spirited rival. If he chose to compete then he would have to make shoes that 
were priced at least as competitively as those of his rival. In order to do this he would 
have to decrease employee pay, and introduce a more rational technical division of 
labour in his factory in place of the previous system that was more rewarding for his 
employees. 
One of the important points that comes across in this example is that any decision to 
compete that is made by the well-meaning capitalist need not be a product of pure self-
interest, nor of any other form of morally dubious reasoning. Indeed, our well-meaning 
capitalist seems to have little choice but to adopt the cutthroat measures of his mean-
spirited rival. If he fails to do this then his factory will go out of business, his 
employees will lose their jobs, and he will lose ownership of the means of production 
that allow him to be a capitalist with a, relatively, greater degree of autonomy, rather 
than a worker who has no meaningful choice but to sell his labour power. Thus, while 
distinguishing between a ‘mean-spirited’ capitalist and a ‘well-meaning’ capitalist 
simplifies our example and furnishes us with helpful names for the central characters, 
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one of the strengths of Marx’s approach is that it emphasises the structural pressures 
inherent to the system itself, rather than ethical categories such as blame.23 
Let us return to our example. Assuming that the well-meaning capitalist has decided 
that he will try to compete with his rival, what would happen next? Each capitalist 
would probably attempt to gain a market-advantage over the other by selling their 
shoes at the lowest price. As stated above this would be achieved through decreasing 
employee pay, and increasing productivity, perhaps by replacing employees with 
cheaper and more efficient, automated processes. In these circumstances, rising 
unemployment and depressed rates of pay would lead to a fall in effective demand as 
people were less able to purchase commodities, including shoes. This in turn would 
lead to a ‘crisis of overproduction’ where supply outstripped effective demand, and as 
a result of this one of the factories would perhaps have to close down, leading to further 
unemployment, as it failed to generate the capital necessary to continue producing and 
trading goods. In these circumstances the surviving factory might be able to buy up 
part or all of the productive means of the failed factory, thus expanding their business 
and gaining a greater share of the market.24  
The central point to take from this example is that the drive for profit is a necessary 
product of the structure of capitalist societies, rather than a choice made at the 
discretion of individual capitalists, as capitalists who fail to compete will see their 
businesses collapse. As this process is structurally necessary, these crises are 
unavoidable and will continue to happen as the share of a given market will 
progressively be held by fewer and fewer businesses. From this it follows that crises 
of overproduction ought to become more marked and have graver consequences over 
                                                 
23 This is not to suggest that Marx’s approach excludes moral commentary altogether but it does appear 
that this is not to the main focus of this aspect of his analysis. This is evident in his remarks that in his 
model of capitalism’s logic, he ‘[does not] by any means depict the capitalist and the landowner in rosy 
colours. But individuals are dealt with […] only in so far as they are the personifications of economic 
categories, the bearers of particular class-relations and interests.’ He goes on to contrast this with a 
perspective that seeks to make ‘the individual responsible for relations whose creature he remains’. See 
Karl Marx, ‘Preface to the First Edition’ in Capital, Vol. I, p. 91. For discussion of Marx’s emphasis on 
structural forces over ethical responsibility see Richard Nordahl, ‘Marx on Moral Commentary: 
Ideology and Science’ in Karl Marx’s Social and Political Thought: Critical Assessments – Second 
Series ed. by Bob Jessop and Russell Wheatley (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 416; and Bill Martin, 
Ethical Marxism: The Categorical Imperative of Liberation (Chicago: Open Court, 2008), p. 39. 
24 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 175. For a concise summary of Marx’s theory of the logic of capitalism 
see Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, 
Durkheim, and Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 52-55.  
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time as the businesses involved will be larger with each passing crisis and as such the 
consequences of their collapsing will be more severe.25  
If this model is accurate then it suggests that liberal ideals of justice, i.e. those premised 
on capitalism, are confronted by two potentially significant contingent obstacles. The 
first is the fact that wealth in capitalist economies becomes concentrated over time, as 
competition between capitalists leads to falling wages, unemployment, and 
increasingly small numbers of businesses controlling given markets. This may be an 
obstacle to liberal egalitarian ideals that wish to combine capitalist markets with 
egalitarian distributions of wealth. It essentially suggests that the probability of 
achieving such an ideal is diminished due to capitalism’s natural logic moving society 
towards inegalitarianism. In the language of the framework established in the previous 
two sections, this constitutes an obstacle on the sufficient probability path that would 
prevent liberal egalitarian ideals from meeting feasibility conditions.  
The second obstacle is perhaps more significant as it affects all liberal ideals. This 
suggests that capitalism is necessarily unstable due to the fact that it naturally 
experiences increasingly severe periodic economic crises. During these crises we 
would expect to see falling living standards and high levels of unemployment, both of 
which would generally get worse with each new crisis. We can imagine that these costs 
would be too great to bear. As such, any ideal premised on capitalism would meet an 
obstacle on the stability path that would prevent it from meeting feasibility conditions.   
Before reaching this conclusion though an important objection has to be considered. 
The above example implies that customers are hyper-rational actors making 
purchasing decisions purely based on price. Yet this clearly overlooks numerous 
aspects of consumer identity. It fails to account for important variables such as the 
status that is associated with particular brands as well as the ethical appeal of some 
purchases over others. In the case of the latter point, some customers may opt to pay 
more for a product that is made in a factory where the owner treats her employees more 
justly or only uses fairly sourced materials. These counterpoints suggest that the well-
meaning factory owner may be able to continue successfully producing his more 
                                                 
25 Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, p. 17.  
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expensive yet also more ethically appealing or fashionable shoes, rather than being 
forced into competition with the mean-spirited capitalist.  
One response to these points is to stress that while these factors are relevant they will 
be significantly more relevant in some markets than others. Being in a position to 
choose to pay more for a product solely on the grounds of its ethical appeal or status 
prestige is a luxury that those with very limited resources will not enjoy. Similarly, 
just as there are external factors that discourage the logic illustrated in the above model 
there are also external factors that encourage it. The shareholder system, for example, 
compels managers to optimise production in order to maximise profits and, in turn, 
dividend payments.  
Despite the validity of these responses to the customer conceptualisation criticism, 
these challenges also highlight a more general issue here. The responses themselves 
demonstrate how many relevant factors are omitted from the Marxist model. Consider 
for instance the role that states play in saving failing business, or using anti-
monopolisation legislation to prevent individual businesses gaining too large a share 
of the market. We also know that in many states employers are not free to arbitrarily 
change the pay and conditions of their employees, nor to sack them, given that the 
bargaining position of trade unions as well as employee protection laws often prevent 
this. Moreover, for each of these phenomena that act to prevent the Marxist logic of 
capitalism from unfolding, there are counter-forces that act to support it.  
In short it seems that the above model is a non-representative conceptualisation of 
capitalism that overlooks state and legal oversight of the economy, as well as the multi-
faceted nature of consumers, employers, and workers. There is a range of political 
processes, as well as legal, cultural, and ideational ones, that may prevent capitalism 
from developing according to the logic suggested above.  
A Marxist response to this is to stress that the above model does not actually intend to 
capture how actual capitalist systems function. The variables that determine how 
economies function are almost certainly too numerous to model with any confidence 
and for this reason it is necessary when studying economics, as with most fields of 
scientific or social scientific inquiry, to analyse particular processes in abstraction 
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from their actual context.26  We can call such models abstracting idealisations.27 There 
is a parallel with the use of laboratory conditions in experiments in the natural sciences, 
where, by removing variables from the study of a given phenomenon, one can identify 
how laws of nature operate unimpeded by these external factors. 
Just as these natural laws will not function in natural conditions in the same way as 
they will in laboratory conditions, so these Marxist predictions about economic 
processes will be altered when considered in the real world, rather than in artificial, 
abstract conditions. Laws of capitalist society then, which describe the necessary way 
in which a social process develops are only actually certain in abstraction. In real 
conditions, the necessary logic of the economy confronts a range of political, cultural, 
legal, and environmental factors that change the course of this development. When 
applying our abstract models of capitalist development to real world conditions, laws 
of capitalism become mere ‘tendencies’. Predictive certainty about how capitalist 
systems function is replaced by predictive uncertainty about the precise development 
of these processes.28  
As we saw above, the Marxist conception of feasibility suggests two obstacles that, if 
accurate, pose a serious threat to liberal ideals of justice. However we may feel 
unpersuaded as to why we should take these obstacles seriously. I have considered a 
response to the claim that the Marxist model is unrealistic. However this response 
seemed to concede too much, stressing that the logic it identifies only fully holds in 
abstraction, and not in real world conditions. In order for the above obstacles to pose 
a serious challenge to liberal ideals, the Marxist approach has to show why its logic of 
capitalism remains pertinent to real societies. This response has to explain why the 
tendency of capitalist economies to lead to concentrations of wealth and instability is 
                                                 
26 Marx discusses the process of abstraction in Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of 
Political Economy (Rough Draft) (London: Penguin in Association with New Left Review, 1858/1973), 
pp. 100-101. Bertell Ollman offers one of the most extensive treatments of this aspect of Marx’s method. 
See for example Bertell Ollman, Dance of the Dialectic: Steps in Marx’s Method (Chicago: University 
of Illinois Press, 2003), Ch. 5, and Bertell Ollman, ‘Critical Realism in the Light of Marx’s Process of 
Abstraction’ in After Postmodernism: An Introduction to Critical Realism ed. by José Lopéz & Garry 
Potter (London: The Athlone Press, 2001), pp. 290-291.  
27 The following chapter engages extensively with the concept of idealisation, with abstracting 
idealisations discussed at length. See Chapter 5, Section I.  
28 For a discussion of how laws formulated in abstract, ‘closed systems’ translate into ‘tendencies’ in 
‘open’, real world, systems, see Andrew Collier, Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s 
Philosophy (London: Verso, 1994), pp. 58-59. 
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still problematic for liberal ideals, when intuitively one might assume that capitalism’s 
instabilities and its inequalities can be corrected by well-intentioned state intervention 
in line with a given liberal ideal of justice.  
(2) The response to this concern can be found in Marxist conceptualisations of the 
relationship between society’s economic level and its other constituent levels. The 
metaphor of society consisting of an economic ‘structure’, or more commonly ‘base’, 
and a legal, political, and ideational ‘superstructure’ illustrates the general character of 
these models. For Marxists, the latter is seen as rising from the former, with the 
character taken by the former thus, to a greater or lesser degree, shaping the character 
of the latter.29  
The specifics of the relationship between base and superstructure can be fleshed out in 
different ways. Some, such as G.A. Cohen and William H. Shaw see it in technological 
terms, identifying how changes in the technologies used to produce goods determine 
the character of relations of production, which in turn determines the character of 
superstructural levels.30 For example, the invention of new, specialised, and large-
scale, factory-based machinery, might be argued to have been the cause of feudal 
society being replaced by capitalist society. This interpretation may focus on how 
factory technologies rendered pre-industrial productive technologies obsolete. With 
the advent of modern machinery, goods could no longer be competitively produced 
with traditional manual tools. As such, many who lived in smaller rural communities 
would have been forced to migrate to new urban centres of production to find 
employment. Essentially then, changes in productive technologies made old means of 
production obsolete, which in turn made old relations of production obsolete, as the 
new centre of urban productive power, with its system of wage labour, replaced the 
previous, rural, feudal system where peasants were indentured to a ruling aristocrat.31  
                                                 
29 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 
1859/1969), ‘Preface’. 
30 Prominent examples of technological conceptions of the base and superstructure metaphor include, 
William H. Shaw, ‘“The Handmill Gives You the Feudal Lord”: Marx’s Technological Determinism’ 
History and Theory Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 155-176, (1979), and G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of 
History: A Defence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). 
31 The primacy of technological change may be inferred from Marx and Engels’s comment that ‘the 
bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby 
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From these economic changes then came changes to the legal constitution of society, 
as these forms of indentured servitude were replaced by a system where all individuals 
have formal legal equality and are free to buy and sell labour-power.32 More generally, 
the ideational superstructure changed to reflect the new base of economic power, with 
cultural and political systems reflecting the interests of the now dominant capitalist 
class. Applying this perspective to capitalism today suggests that those wishing to 
understand how a society’s legal and political systems operate ought to analyse the 
power dynamics within that society’s economic base. In sum, it is an approach that 
assumes that the interests of dominant economic powers shape the form of society’s 
superstructure.     
This relatively structured reading of the base and superstructure metaphor is not 
endorsed by all Marxist theorists, with others, for example Friedrich Engels and Louis 
Althusser, seeking to characterise the relationship in less technologically centric terms. 
One way of doing this is to stress the ‘relative autonomy’ of society’s constituent 
levels, by arguing that economics does not always determine the form that other levels 
take but only does so ‘in the last instance.’33 If this is correct then developments in 
politics or law may largely function independently of economic factors. For example, 
it may be that the constituent levels of the superstructure are only determined by 
economic processes and interests during particularly acute periods.  
A further, perhaps more intuitive position, also emerges from the metaphor of base 
and superstructure. It is generally the case that wealth correlates strongly with social 
power.34 Consider the relative opportunities available to the wealthy compared with 
the poor. In capitalist society the main source of significant wealth is through 
                                                 
the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society.’ See Marx and Engels, The 
Manifesto of the Communist Party, p. 16. 
32 Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy (Marxist Internet Archive, 1847/1999), p. 49.  
33 Engels is famous for using the expression ‘in the last instance’ to refer to the relationship between 
society’s economic base and the component parts of the superstructure. In a reasonably extensive 
discussion of this he rejects any idea that economic factors are ‘the sole determining factor’ in causing 
historical change as ‘meaningless, abstract, and absurd’. See Friedrich Engels, ‘Engels in London to J. 
Bloch in Berlin, Written 21st September, 1890’ Marxists.org (1890/1943). The idea of economic factors 
only affecting the direction of the other autonomous levels of society in ‘the last instance’ forms one of 
the bases of Louis Althusser’s structural Marxism. See Louis Althusser, For Marx (London: Verso, 
1996), pp. 111-113. 
34 For some of Marx’s comments on the social power that comes with money, see Marx, ‘Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts’, pp. 180-181.  
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successful capitalist enterprises. Therefore, if those with social power are those who 
benefit from the current system then we can expect them to use their power to advance 
claims that reinforce and justify this system and their own role within it.  
Irrespective of the particular aspects of the base and superstructure metaphor that are 
emphasised by different theorists, we can identify two important points that emerge 
from this model. The first is that purely superstructural changes may be unlikely to 
succeed and even less likely to affect permanent change unless there are corresponding 
changes in the economic base of society. This is because superstructural levels are, to 
some extent, a product of more fundamental economic forces. What this entails is that 
the distribution of wealth and the stability of the economy should not be seen as 
phenomena that are separate from more basic economic facts about society, but rather 
as epiphenomena of the economic base. That capitalism tends towards inegalitarian 
distributions of wealth, and instability does not happen by chance but because of the 
necessary, competitive and profit-based structure of capitalist economies outlined 
above. This is what Marx is referring to when he stresses that the distribution of ‘the 
means of consumption’, i.e. wealth and property, is a product of the ‘distribution of 
the means of production’, that is the system of private property and capital.35  
The second point is that ideological forces play a prominent role in maintaining the 
status quo in any society. Recall from the previous chapter that ideologies are false 
beliefs that reflect the interests of the ruling class and help sustain social structures that 
benefit that class. In the case of capitalist societies this means that ideologies will 
support the profit-based interests of capitalists, through manipulation of media, 
culture, and so on. Ideologies are thus a product of economic interests, and reflect the 
distribution of power within society. It is likely these will primarily act to reinforce the 
necessary processes noted in the previous point.   
                                                 
35 Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, pp. 11-12. This point is made elsewhere by Marx when he 
states that, ‘Distribution is itself a product of production, not only in its object, in that only the results 
of production can be distributed, but also its form, in that the specific kind of participation in production 
determines the specific forms of distribution, i.e. the pattern of participation in distribution.’ See Marx, 
Grundrisse, p. 95. Also see his remarks that attempts to combat private property through ‘confiscation 
or a progressive tax […] ends necessarily with the restoration of […] private property and all the 
elements of civil society’. See Karl Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question’ in Karl Marx: Early Texts, ed. by 
David McLellan (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1843 /1971), p. 96. 
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For these reasons then, attempts to use state intervention to correct capitalism’s 
tendencies towards inequality and instability will meet strong resistance. This 
resistance is in part a product of vested interests possessing a disproportionate amount 
of control over key political, legal, cultural, and ideational structures. More 
fundamentally though, these obstacles are products inherent to capitalism itself, which 
are further entrenched by the unequal distribution of social power noted above. For 
Marxists, distributive injustices then are not a chance feature of capitalist societies but 
rather a necessary one. They are the product of a stubborn social structure whereby 
social power correlates with economic power. Unless we alter the system of economic 
production that leads to this imbalance of power then we will always face an uphill 
struggle to make any distributive or regulatory improvements.36  
What does this mean for the two obstacles identified in the previous section? In the 
case of the stability obstacle confronting liberal ideals, we will find that attempts to 
regulate the economy to prevent crises may often confront powerful economic 
interests. For example it is unlikely that market-leading businesses will want to see 
their profits cut by regulations, even if those regulations are necessary to prevent future 
crises of overproduction. Through direct and indirect political and ideational 
interventions they will often be able to prevent regulatory legislation from passing or 
ensure that it passes on better terms for themselves. Much the same logic applies to 
the probability obstacle confronting liberal egalitarianism. Again, attempts to 
redistribute wealth will often be confronted by hostility. Those with more to lose but 
greater social power will use similar political and ideational mechanisms to try to 
undermine these policies. The base and superstructure metaphor thus suggests that 
solutions premised on state intervention that aim to overcome these obstacles will be 
unlikely to succeed. As these obstacles are a necessary product of capitalism they can 
only be removed by replacing, rather than reforming, capitalism. The Marxist 
conception of feasibility thus casts serious doubt on the feasibility of liberal ideals, or 
any other ideals, which aim to work within capitalist society.  
(3) Marxism also provides a response to the ‘Feasible when and where?’ question, by 
claiming that it is material forces, rather than superstructural forces, that are the 
                                                 
36 This point is also highlighted by Callinicos. See Callinicos, Equality, p. 29.  
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primary drivers of social change. It claims that for the most part new societies are not 
achieved through the strength of a given ideal’s moral convincingness but rather 
because economic forces have reached a certain point of development where social 
change becomes inevitable. This is the process we saw in the above example of the 
change from feudalism to capitalism, where economic developments led to political 
developments.37  
We have seen from points (1) and (2) above that Marxism postulates particular 
tendencies in the development of capitalism. These tendencies indicate that certain 
circumstances, namely cyclical crises of capitalism, will emerge and that these may, 
over time, become increasingly likely to lead to significant social change. As such, 
ideals that do not have strong synergy with these structurally necessary economic 
conditions may face a sufficient probability obstacle, as they will lack the motivational 
force that comes with this synergy and thus be unable to generate the support required 
for an ideal to be realised. If this Marxist modelling of capitalist crises is correct then 
liberal ideals, which rely on an unstable market system, may be blocked by this 
stability obstacle. If capitalism tends towards inequalities and crisis then ideals that are 
premised on capitalism ought to become increasingly unlikely to motivate support as 
these problems become more marked.  
(4) As a final point I would like to stress a general characteristic of the Marxist 
conception of feasibility that has been implicit in the three points discussed above. 
Recall the key distinction that was made between the fixed obstacles that generally 
populate the possibility path, and conditional obstacles that generally populate the 
probability and stability paths. We saw how, where the former have to be avoided, the 
latter can, at least potentially and with the correct nonideal labour, be removed. What 
is notable about the contingent obstacles that can be derived from Marxist theory is 
that they are necessary features of capitalist societies.  
There are three important obstacles that the above Marxist account of feasibility 
identifies. The first relates to the logic of capitalist development and the fact that it 
tends towards inegalitarian distributions of wealth. The second relates to the same 
                                                 
37 Marx, A Contribution to the Critique, ‘Preface’. 
112 
 
logic leading to cyclical economic crises. The third is that for ideals to be feasible it is 
not sufficient for them to be morally persuasive, they also have to have synergy with 
society’s structural tendencies. All of these obstacles are entrenched by the dominant 
role that economic forces play in society. We have seen that these may be prominent 
obstacles in the way of two types of ideal. First, liberal ideals in general face the 
stability obstacle produced by the crisis-prone character of the capitalist economic 
system. Second, liberal egalitarian ideals in particular will face the sufficient 
probability obstacle of trying to reform incorrigible capitalist institutions. In both cases 
these obstacles are compounded by the concern that liberal ideals may lack the 
necessary synergy with social conditions required in order to be feasible. Moreover, 
the contingent obstacles that they confront, are necessary products of capitalist 
economic processes, and thus only removable by removing capitalism. What this 
means is that according to the Marxist conception of feasibility, liberal ideals are 
infeasible.  
 
IV. Challenges to the Marxist Approach 
However there may yet be problems with the Marxist approach. Chief among these is 
the concern that the Marxist model is simply too stringent. In this section I will address 
two criticisms that stem from this concern. Firstly I will consider whether it is the case 
that no ideal will be able to satisfy Marxist feasibility conditions. In response I will 
show that some forms of socialism are clearly able to avoid the contingent feasibility 
obstacles that obstruct liberal ideals. Secondly I will consider the more serious 
challenge that the Marxist approach rules out ideals as a whole as it theorises social 
change in purely structural terms. If this is the case then ideal theory and just choice 
will be lost to economic determinism. I will show that this second criticism also fails 
as we should understand the set of processes identified in the base and superstructure 
metaphor as only one, albeit important, driver of change in capitalist societies.   
While it is not within this thesis’s remit to offer any particular ideal theory, it is 
necessary to indicate how this model of feasibility does not exclude all ideals. Notably, 
socialism should be able to avoid the obstacles that the Marxist conception of 
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feasibility places in the path of liberal ideals. The fundamental reason why socialist 
ideals meet Marxist conditions of feasibility is because it rejects the system of private 
property in the means of production, the system that underpins liberalism’s inability 
to avoid these obstacles. In having an economic base premised on democratic control 
over production, rather than competitive market mechanisms, there will not be the 
same profit driven logic that undermines attempts to distribute wealth in a more just 
manner within capitalism. As Cohen stresses, ‘so demanding an equality’ as is 
favoured by egalitarians cannot be achieved within capitalist societies.38 However it 
can be achieved within a socialist society. 
Socialist ideals will also not be affected by capitalist ideologies in the same way. While 
it is undoubtedly the case that capitalist ideological forces will be, in general, 
significantly more hostile to socialist ideals than they will be to liberal egalitarian ones, 
if the ideal was achieved then ideology would cease to be a relevant factor. A major 
problem for liberal egalitarianism is not only that it may be difficult to realise just 
distributions of wealth in the face of capitalist ideology, essentially the same problem 
that socialism faces, but that in aiming to work within the confines of market systems, 
if the distribution is achieved it is likely to be continuously undermined by ideological 
forces until it is destabilised. While socialism may in some senses be harder to realise 
in the first place, in replacing market mechanisms, the ideological forces that 
necessarily undermine liberal egalitarianism both en route to the ideal and once the 
ideal has been achieved, will cease to be a factor.39  
Socialism also avoids the synergy obstacle that suggests that liberal ideals will be 
unable to motivate support due to their reliance on capitalism. Firstly, the institutional 
character of socialism is a direct response to the failings of capitalism. It suggests that 
common, democratic ownership over society’s productive means will yield a fairer, 
more rational, system of production than one that is controlled by market forces and 
                                                 
38 Cohen, ‘Is Socialism Inseparable from Common Ownership?’, pp. 1-2.  
39 I do not intend to give the impression that any road to socialism is a simple or easy one, nor that 
socialism in practice would be unproblematic. These are major issues that constitute huge research 
projects in themselves. However as I stated earlier, my objective in this chapter is to show how long-
term just choice can be pursued ahead of short-term just choice, and the important role Marxism can 
play in doing this. More generally, as noted above, the role of this thesis is primarily to underlabour for 
ideal theory, not to present an ideal theory itself.    
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where need is only recognised in the form of effective demand. Secondly, support for 
socialism is tied to crises of capitalism. As capitalism experiences more crises of 
increasing severity, more people will see that socialism provides this fairer, more 
rational system of production.40  
An interesting point emerges from our comparison of the relative feasibilities of liberal 
and socialist ideals when measured against Marxist conceptualisations of feasibility. 
According to these standards, the former will likely be infeasible while the latter will 
be feasible. However, what is interesting is that liberal ideals, including liberal 
egalitarian ones, are far more similar to contemporary society than socialist ideals are. 
Despite this fact though, it is socialist ideals that meet these standards of feasibility 
and as such society is infinitely closer to a stable socialist ideal than it is to a stable 
liberal ideal.41  
So socialist ideals are able to avoid the feasibility obstacles that obstruct liberal ideals. 
However there is also a more pertinent criticism, which suggests that the Marxist 
conception of feasibility does not require any ideals at all, socialist or otherwise, as 
economic processes are the only meaningful drivers of social change. If it is economic 
processes rather than moral arguments that determine the success or failure of a 
political project, then what space is left for ideals and ideal theorising? Indeed in such 
conditions it would appear that it may make more sense to shift intellectual resources 
towards predicting, rather than prescribing, future societies. If this concern is proven 
correct then both ideal theory and just choice would be lost to economic determinism. 
In essence, the Marxist conception of feasibility would have proven too much, in not 
only ruling out infeasible ideals but all ideals.  
Fortunately we can show that this concern does not hold and that the Marxist 
conception of feasibility is in fact compatible with ideal theory and just choice. Most 
                                                 
40 Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, p. 19. See also, Friedrich Engels, Socialism: 
Utopian and Scientific (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1880/1970), especially Chapter 3.  
41 Recall that when measuring the distance between contemporary nonideal conditions and ideals we 
can either refer to ‘similarity’ or ‘closeness’. Where similarity refers to how approximately a given 
nonideal situation corresponds to an ideal, closeness refers to the ‘nonideal distance’ which exists 
between contemporary conditions and realising the ideal in full. See Chapter 2. Section VI. Also, it is 
worth noting that whether or not one accepts this modelling of feasibility or the particular claims made 
in this section, the broader point, i.e. that greater similarity does not necessarily equate to greater 
closeness, is of useful general application. 
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fundamentally the base and superstructure model, like the model of the logic of 
capitalism discussed before it, should be understood as an abstracting idealisation. We 
saw earlier that such an approach is necessary in order to comprehend complex real 
world phenomena, as it allows us to isolate and understand key processes within these 
phenomena. In the case of the base and superstructure metaphor this allows us to see 
how economic factors may be particularly significant in shaping the overall character 
of society.   
However by virtue of the fact that this knowledge pertains to an abstract conception of 
society it will not be fully applicable to actual societies. Laws derived in these 
circumstances, can only be tendencies in real world conditions where they have to 
interact with numerous other processes and variables. One such variable is the role of 
ideals in guiding political action. In real societies people have to be persuaded to 
undertake certain courses of action over others and moral reasoning can play a 
significant role in this. Moreover, major social changes do not only occur during 
structurally sensitive periods but at other times as well. Again, ideals can help create 
or support these changes.  
How then are we best to strike a balance between the abstract model of the base and 
superstructure metaphor and real societies where moral reasoning, and thus just choice, 
are significant factors? There is no definite answer to this, however it would be unwise 
to reject the importance of either. Perhaps it is best to see ideals and just choices as 
being constrained by these more structural factors. This corresponds with Marx’s 
famous remark that, ‘[m]en make their own history, but they do not make it as they 
please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances 
existing already’.42 Ideals may be seen as an important part of this process of making 
history, an aspect of the attempts by individuals to shape the world around them. 
However the success of these attempts, and of ideals and just choices, will be tied up 
with other factors, which are outside the control of individuals.  
While we may thus never rule out a particular ideal in an absolute sense, the structure 
of capitalist society will make some ideals more likely to be feasible than others. Thus 
                                                 




we can accept that ideals have an important role to play in political change without 
rejecting the claim that ideals do not operate alone in this process and that those that 
have strong synergy with society’s structural tendencies may be more likely to be 
feasible.  
This Marxist account of feasibility thus raises some important questions about the 
feasibility of liberal ideals while also suggesting how socialist ideals may be able to 
avoid these obstacles. More than this though, I believe it makes a compelling case in 
favour of long-term choice. Recall that I want to show that it can be defensible to 
favour long-term choice over short-term choice. The Marxist model of feasibility 
responds to this in two significant ways. First it conceptualises a stringent and 
exclusive model of feasibility that admits relatively few ideals. While this is not in 
itself proof of the validity of a feasibility model, if this model is indeed valid then this 
exclusivity will allow us to proceed to long-term choice with more confidence, buoyed 
by the knowledge that the ideal we use has met stringent feasibility conditions.  
Moreover, this model of feasibility also raises questions about the efficacy of short-
term choice. Short-term choice aims to make society more similar to a given ideal, 
however if the assumptions on which the Marxist account of feasibility rest are 
accurate then we can be doubtful that any changes to reform capitalism will be easily 
achieved and that those that are achieved will not be stable. In order to make stable 
changes it may be necessary to move beyond capitalism in a fashion that only long-
term choice can do.  
Finally, if the Marxist conception of feasibility is valid then it raises questions about 
the dominant approach to feasibility offered by John Rawls’s conception of ‘realistic 
utopianism’. By the conditions identified in this chapter, liberal egalitarian ideals such 
as Rawls, premised as they are on reforming capitalist economies, would be both 
insufficiently probable and unstable. As such they would be unrealistic, or 
alternatively, ‘utopian’ rather than ‘realistically utopian’.43  
                                                 
43 Ann Phillips notes how failure to see the necessary relationship between production and distribution 
will lead to the incorrect assumption that one can ‘pick out the “good” elements of a market society 
while discarding or modifying the “bad”.’ See Ann Phillips, ‘Egalitarians and the Market: Dangerous 
Minds’ Social Theory and Practice Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 439-462 (2008), p. 458. 
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Before concluding this chapter I would like to consider one final challenge to the 
Marxist conception of feasibility. It might be suggested that a problem with Marxist 
feasibility is that its stringency permits too few ideals. One might accept that long-
term choice requires a degree of exclusivity but in rejecting all liberal ideals, Marxism 
pushes this too far. The problem here though is not with the Marxist conception of 
feasibility but rather with the reality of capitalist societies that it identifies. It is the 
latter, not the former, that makes liberal ideals infeasible. Providing that this 
characterisation of capitalist societies is correct we cannot object to the feasibility 
conditions that emerge from it. We want feasibility to be robust in order to ensure that 
the ideals that inform long-term choice can realistically be achieved. However, should 
it be the case that this is not an accurate conceptualisation of capitalist society then we 
would require a better model of capitalism and in turn a conceptualisation of feasibility 
within capitalism that more accurately captured this reality. In this case it may be that 
a more permissive conception of feasibility would best perform this function. In either 
case, how permissive a set of feasibility conditions is should be determined by social 
reality, not by the desire for a broader range of ideals. 
 
V. Conclusion 
I began this chapter by offering a formal account of feasibility, focusing on the two 
classes of ‘obstacles’ - fixed and contingent - and the different methods involved in 
assessing each of the three feasibility conditions: possibility, probability, and stability. 
From here I looked to populate this account by drawing on Marxist theory. In doing 
this we saw the particular obstacles that might be seen to obstruct liberal ideals, due to 
capitalism’s tendencies to lead to inegalitarian distributions of wealth and to periodic, 
destabilising economic crises. These concerns were compounded by more 
fundamental Marxist theories about base and superstructure from which we derived 
the claim that attempts to regulate capitalist market-forces in order to secure more just 
patterns of distribution or to prevent economic crises may be significantly undermined 
unless we also alter the economic processes that these phenomena proceed from, i.e. 
by replacing capitalism itself. In replacing competitive capitalist social relations with 
democratic public ownership, it was suggested why socialism might be able to meet 
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Marxism’s feasibility conditions where liberalism cannot. As noted above, this may 
lead one to conclude that Rawls’s ideal of justice, along with other liberal egalitarian 
ideals, may fail to meet the feasibility conditions required by realistic utopianism. 
This discussion allowed me to meet the third Key Objective of this thesis. Recall that 
I wanted to show that it can be defensible to favour long-term choice over short-term 
choice, despite the relatively greater risks that one might assume accompany the 
former approach. The Marxist conception of feasibility does this in one sense by 
providing a stringent and exclusive conception of feasibility, which, all other things 
being equal, decreases the chances of political resources being wasted on ideals that 
more permissive conceptions of feasibility might admit. It meets the third Key 
Objective in a further sense by stating that short-term choice may struggle to advance 
meaningful reforms given the structurally necessary incorrigibility of capitalism that 
makes prospective progressive change less probable, and successful progressive 
change less stable. The same obstacles that prevent liberal ideals from satisfying long-
term feasibility conditions undermine the viability of short-term reforms of capitalism. 
While this is thus not a definitive criticism of short-term choice in essence, it does raise 
serious questions about its viability in practical terms, by doubting its capacity to 
support significant reform within capitalist societies. 
We saw in Chapter 1 that one can formally distinguish ideal theory and nonideal theory 
quite easily: the former generates ideals of justice, while the latter puts these ideals to 
use in either short-term or long-term just choices. However what has been shown both 
here and in the preceding chapter is that this formal relationship fails to capture the 
necessary complexities of the real relationship between the two constituent enterprises 
of theories of justice. Underpinning this is the clear fact that should we wish to make 
long-term just choices it is necessary to have much more of a dialogue between ideal 
theory and nonideal theory. While it is not necessary for ideal theory to be informed 
by normative nonideal theory per se, the former certainly has to be aware of a broad 
range of nonideal factors if the ideals it arrives at are to meet feasibility conditions. As 
Brian E. Hendrix remarks, ‘[i]f we do not know how to predict where social change is 
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possible, then it seems unwise to begin planning strongly for […] social reforms 
toward a goal that may not be socially possible under any conditions.’44 
For this reason it is prudent that to say while ideal theory retains logical priority, 
nonideal considerations often ought to have temporal priority.45 This means that while 
nonideal theory as an exercise in plotting a course to ideal realisation through just 
choices is still reliant on having an ideal to work towards, it is necessary that in 
determining our ideals we have a keen understanding of feasibility conditions and the 
various obstacles that they may create that will prevent certain ideals from being 
feasible. Failure to do this will likely lead to wasting political resources on ideals that 
we may later discover are not feasible.  
Having now discussed feasibility in some detail, the following chapter will turn to a 
very different aspect of ideal theory methodology. Where the previous two chapters 
have sought to understand the necessary connection between ideals and nonideal, ‘real 
world’, factors, Chapter 5 will consider ‘idealisation’, that is the intentional use of 
conceptions of real world phenomena that are not accurate representations of those 
phenomena. In doing this we will see whether there is a necessary tension between 
these two aspects of feasible ideal theory methodology, and by extension if a long-
term approach to just choice can still be viable.  
 
                                                 
44 Burke A. Hendrix, ‘Where Should We Expect Change in Non-Ideal Theory?’ Political Theory Vol. 
41, No. 1, Pp. 116-143 (2013), p. 133. 




5. Idealisation and Just Choice 
Thus far this discussion has focused on the product of ideal theories of justice, i.e. 
ideals themselves. In Chapter 2 I defended the ‘ideal claim’, that ideals are necessary 
to inform just choice and in Chapters 3 and 4 I sought to show the conditions ideals 
have to meet if they are to perform this choice informing role. In focusing on ideals in 
this manner I have not offered any significant discussion on the process of ideal 
theories of justice; by which I mean the way that one formulates the actual ideals of 
justice themselves. To put the same point slightly differently, though the bulk of this 
discussion has very much been on the subject of ideal theory methodology it has said 
little about the actual methods inherent to this process. It is to this issue that we turn in 
this chapter.  
The method that is at the centre of the process of theorising ideals of justice is 
idealisation. Idealisation refers to the intentional use of non-representative 
conceptualisations of real world phenomena that, in bracketing certain real world 
concerns and facts, allow one to pursue theoretical inquiries one would not logically 
be able to.1 
In this chapter I want to defend three key functions that are performed by idealisation. 
Of particular significance is the normative function that, by ‘assuming away’ real 
world compliance issues and unfavourable objective conditions, generates ideals of 
justice not constrained by contemporary society’s limitations. It is thus necessary for 
normatively accurate ideals of justice. 
In making this claim I anticipate two significant, closely connected challenges. First 
there is the concern that the necessity of idealisation conflicts with the necessity of 
feasibility assessments. The previous two chapters have sought to show why the ideals 
that inform long-term choice have to be extremely sensitive to non-ideal conditions. 
Idealisation on the other hand is concerned with bracketing these conditions. This 
                                                 
1 ‘Idealisation’ can be used to refer both to the method and the assumptions it employs. These 
assumptions can also be referred to as ‘idealised premises’ or ‘idealised assumptions’. 
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appears to suggest at the very least a tension between two major aspects of feasible 
ideal theorising, if not indeed an impasse. The second concern is that even if we accept 
that idealisations are necessary if we wish to generate the theoretical distance required 
to arrive at normatively accurate ideals of justice, we may worry that the ideals that 
emerge from this will be too distant to inform just choice. This is what Laura Valentini 
refers to as ‘the paradox of ideal theory’.2 
The threat posed by these challenges is significant. If these concerns hold then long-
term choice may cease to be a viable approach. If in turn, my concerns from the 
previous chapter about the viability of short-term choice in capitalist societies also 
hold, then the entire enterprise of just choice will be in jeopardy. Fortunately I believe 
that I can respond to these two challenges. First I will show that certain functions 
played by idealisations, far from conflicting with feasibility assessments, are actually 
necessary in order to perform thorough and robust feasibility assessments. Second I 
will show that there is no reason idealisations themselves cannot also be constrained 
by feasibility conditions, and if we do this then we can insure that the ideals we derive 
from these idealisations will be able to inform long-term choice.  
In making these claims then I look to meet the fourth Key Objective of this thesis, by 
showing that one can arrive at feasible ideals while employing idealisations, and thus 
that just choice informing ideals do not rely on contradictory methods. I also look to 
buttress the third Key Objective by demonstrating that the challenges to long-term 
choice that are presented in this chapter do not hold and that it thus remains a viable 
approach to just choice. 
The following section begins by defining the three key functions performed by 
idealisations, namely abstraction, simplification, and normativity. I look to show that 
these functions are necessary for a range of fundamental philosophical arguments (§ 
I). Following this I focus on the normative function in particular, addressing the 
paradox of ideal theory, and the three versions of the ‘informing critique’ that motivate 
it (§ II). I then look to respond to the most telling version of this critique, showing that 
idealisations, when properly conceptualised, can generate normatively accurate ideals 
                                                 
2 Valentini, ‘On the Apparent Paradox of Ideal Theory’, p. 333. 
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that are also feasible (§ III). I then consider and dismiss the claim that idealisations are 
naturally ideological (§ IV), before ending the chapter with some reflections on 
methodological perspectives more generally (§ V).  
 
I. Idealisations and their Functions 
As noted above, ‘idealisations’ refer to a particular type of assumption used in 
theorising. Specifically, idealisations are assumptions that conceptualise a given 
phenomenon, or set of phenomena, in a way that does not accurately represent the ‘real 
world’ form of the phenomenon or phenomena in question.3 To borrow Ingrid Robeyns 
helpful and succinct definition, idealisations are ‘assumptions that describe certain 
aspects of a theory differently from how they are in reality.’4 As noted above, it is the 
aim of this chapter to defend the use of idealisations in theories of justice. While I want 
to show that idealisations have many benefits and perform at least three important and 
necessary functions, what underpins all of these claims is the wider claim that 
idealisations are both useful and necessary because they help create theoretical spaces 
that allow one to pursue lines of inquiry one would not otherwise be able to.   
While I want to defend idealisations in general, this chapter will give special attention 
to two idealisations, namely ‘strict compliance’ and ‘favourable conditions’. As we 
shall see in this section, these assumptions, theorised by John Rawls, are of particular 
importance to theories of justice. Strict compliance is the assumption that all people 
‘act justly’ and contribute to ‘upholding just institutions.’5 It assumes that irrespective 
                                                 
3 Idealisations are frequently described as ‘false’, see for example Onora O’Neill, Towards Justice and 
Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 40, and Valentini, ‘On the Apparent Paradox 
of Ideal Theory’, p. 352. However I believe this term to be problematic for two reasons. The first is that 
it may be open to misinterpretation: ‘false’ can have connotations of both dishonesty and incompetence. 
Secondly, and more importantly, idealisations intentionally construct artificial conditions, and it seems 
potentially misleading to describe these conditions as ‘false’ for the same reason that it seems incorrect 
to describe (intentional) works of fiction as ‘false’. 
4 Ingrid Robeyns, ‘Ideal Theory in Theory and Practice’ Social Theory and Practice Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 
341-362 (2008), p. 352.  
5 In the past the part of ideal theory concerned with strict compliance, i.e. ‘strict compliance theory’, 
has been used to refer to the enterprise as a whole. Michael Phillips for example, asserted that ‘what 
Rawls means by Ideal Theory is clear. Ideal Theory is what he calls “full compliance theory”. See 
Michael Phillips, ‘Reflections on the Transition from Ideal to Non-Ideal Theory’ Nous, Vol. 19, No. 4, 
pp. 551-570 (1985), p. 553. This assumption is unsurprising given that Rawls himself refers to ‘ideal, 
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of how compliant people in contemporary society might actually be to laws that adhere 
to a given ideal of justice, for the purpose of a particular theoretical endeavour one 
assumes them to be fully compliant. Strict compliance is thus evidently an idealisation, 
given its clearly non-representative conceptualisation of real world levels of 
compliance.   
The second idealisation I wish to defend is the assumption of ‘favourable conditions’.6 
This implies that irrespective of the actual condition of any particular society’s 
economic and institutional structures the model employed by the ideal theorist is of a 
society that has a sufficiently wealthy economy and sufficiently robust institutional 
structures as to be able to achieve and maintain ideals of justice. This is also an 
idealised assumption given the prevalence in the contemporary world of societies with 
unstable economies, high levels of poverty, or inefficient or corrupt social institutions 
that would prevent them from adhering to many conceptions of justice given the 
material prerequisites of those ideals.   
While Rawls uses these idealisations to justify a liberal egalitarian ideal of justice I 
believe that these idealisations, or as we shall see in Section IV, at the very least 
variations of these idealisations, are necessary for the formulation of any ideal of 
justice.7 In what follows I want to define three important functions that idealisations 
perform, doing so with reference to the role of the strict compliance assumption and 
the favourable conditions assumption in ideal theories of justice.  
Throughout this chapter I will also offer some discussion of a further group of idealised 
assumptions, namely those that make up Rawls’s original position argument. These 
are almost certainly the most widely discussed idealisations Rawls uses, and the 
original position argument has been the subject of extensive debate.8 However this 
                                                 
or strict compliance theory’. See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 13. For more on Rawls’s reduction 
of ideal theory to strict compliance theory see Stemplowska and Swift, p. 2.  
6 See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 47. See also Simmons, p. 7. 
7 For a summary of Rawls’s ideal conception of justice see Chapter 2, Section I, with a more detailed 
summary of the Difference Principle aspect of Rawls’s ideal discussed in Chapter 3, Section I. Recall 
also that the previous chapter suggested that Rawls’s ideal of justice, as with liberal ideals more 
generally, would fail to meet Marxist derived standards of feasibility (see Chapter 4, Section IV).  
8 For a broad overview of the literature on this subject see, Samuel, Freeman, ‘Original Position’ The 
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta (2014). For a notable commentary on 
the original position argument see Ronald Dworkin, ‘The Original Position’ in John Rawls: Critical 
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discussion will remain largely focused on strict compliance and favourable conditions. 
As stated above, I intend to show why these assumptions are prerequisites for arriving 
at any ideals of justice. They are assumptions we have to make in order to proceed to 
the actual process of arriving at particular ideals. In other words they make ideal theory 
possible. The argument from the original position on the other hand is an example of 
ideal theory itself, i.e. the processes whereby we arrive at particular ideals. Thus while 
I want to say that all ideal theories have to work with idealised conceptions of 
compliance and objective conditions, I do not want to claim that all ideal theories must 
adhere to the specific methods of Rawls’s original position. When the original position 
is discussed it is to illustrate certain more general claims about ideal theory, not 
necessarily as a defence of this particular method. 
As we shall see, I believe that two of the functions that will be considered, namely the 
abstracting function and the simplifying function, are uncontroversial and ought to be 
accepted by all philosophers. In making this claim I want to show why any wholesale 
rejection of idealisations ought to be dismissed. In sharp contrast we shall see that the 
normative function is contentious. The remainder of the chapter will then focus on 
responding to various criticisms of normative idealisations and subsequent discussion 
will focus largely on ensuring that such idealisations can respond to the various serious 
criticisms that are levelled at them.  
(1) The first function of idealisation I would like to consider is the abstracting 
function. I use ‘abstracting’ here to refer to the removal of a given thing from a 
particular context in order to assess and improve our understanding of that thing. To 
illustrate how this process works consider the Entitlement Ideal discussed in Chapter 
3. Recall that this ideal states that a distribution of material goods and wealth is just 
providing it is arrived at through exclusively voluntary transactions and that, 
conversely, a distribution of material goods and wealth is unjust if it is arrived at 
through non-voluntary and coercive transactions. I suggested earlier that as state 
intervention in wealth distribution would be prohibited by this ideal, there may be valid 
                                                 
Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers, Vol. 1: Foundations and Methods, ed. by Chandran 
Kukathas (London: Routledge, 2003). 
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arguments that suggest that it would result in social problems that would make it 
unstable in practice.9  
Another, possibly more immediate, argument against the Entitlement Ideal though is 
that its realisation is highly improbable. One can certainly claim that the emergence of 
any state that adhered to this ideal would be dramatically at odds with all current and 
historical states, none of which have adhered to its principles of formal liberty. The 
absence of such states may be attributed to one or more of the following, essentially 
compliance-based,10 reasons: that there is pressure exerted on government to provide 
material support to citizens; that those with political or economic power can influence 
legislation in their own favour; and that political actors tend to attempt to gain, rather 
than cede, power.11 Whether or not one finds these arguments convincing let us assume 
for the sake of this discussion that there does exist at least one valid argument that 
should lead us to accept that the Entitlement Ideal is improbable.  
In an important sense then, the analysis of the stability of a society that adheres to the 
Entitlement Ideal is ‘trumped’ by our analysis of such a society’s probability. By this 
I mean that as our prospective society is deemed highly improbable, it is pointless to 
ask questions relating to the working of such a society in practice. Despite this, we 
may still wish to assess the stability of this ideal, or indeed we may wish to assess the 
ideal according to standards established by a further category, such as desirability. 
Those more concerned with infeasible theories of justice for instance might want to 
know how desirable a given ideal is irrespective of its probability. However there are 
also sound reasons for wishing to make such assessments that are consistent with the 
feasible ideal theory approach that this thesis is more concerned with. Importantly such 
analyses provide a chance to make our assessments of ideals, ‘contingency-proof’, for 
example by knowing whether an ideal is worth pursuing if it emerges that our original 
                                                 
9 See Chapter 3, Section II. 
10 They are ‘compliance-based reasons’ in the sense that in each case the obstacle that they identify as 
preventing the realisation of the Entitlement Ideal consists of people being insufficiently compliant.  
11 The purpose of this list is not to provide an exhaustive account of arguments against the probability 
of the Entitlement Ideal, nor even to provide a single convincing argument against it. Rather the goal 
here is to show how analysis in one category, in this case probability, may trump our analysis in another 
category, in this case stability. 
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probability assessment was incorrect. There are certainly plenty of ideals that, while 
improbable, are desirable or stable and so on.12 
Irrespective of the rationale underpinning this though, we will not be able to logically 
pursue these lines of inquiry without first abstracting from the issue of compliance. It 
is only by consciously bracketing compliance problems, such as those listed above, 
that we are able to assess how an ideal performs in respect to other categories. The 
same rationale applies to idealised assumptions about objective conditions in society. 
It may be the case that we believe that the conditions required by a particular ideal of 
justice may be too difficult to achieve. However by bracketing this concern we are 
once again able to turn to other questions about the ideal.  
What we see in both cases though is how the abstracting function of idealisations 
allows us to bracket certain obstacles to ideal realisation in order to create a theoretical 
space where other questions can be logically posed. I believe it is uncontroversial to 
say that idealisations of this sort are necessary for some of the most fundamental forms 
of philosophical argument. Without abstracting idealisations we are unable to make 
claims of the type, ‘Even if C were not X it would still be Y’; where a particular claim, 
C, is X, and where both X and Y are things that a claim ought not to be. For example, 
‘Even if the Entitlement Ideal were not improbable it would still be unstable.’ 
Arguments of this sort are only logically possible if we make abstracting idealised 
assumptions. 
The broader repercussions of this are worth noting. We noted in the introduction to 
this chapter that there can appear to be a tension between the factual and non-ideal 
basis of feasibility conditions and the non-factual basis of idealisation. Indeed one may 
assume that they are antitheses of each other, with the former concerned with 
introducing nonideal obstacles into ideal theory, and the latter concerned with 
bracketing those same phenomena. While, as we shall see below, this remains the case 
to an extent, we can see from the case of the abstraction function that idealisations are 
also necessary if one wants to conduct thorough and comprehensive feasibility 
                                                 
12 For a discussion of the claim that that ideals can be desirable or stable or probable, without being 
either of the other two things (or indeed anything else) see Chapter 3, Section III. The more particular 
claim that such ideals exist is exemplified, depending on one’s political and ethical values, by either the 
Communist Ideal, (again, see Chapter 3, Section II) or the Entitlement Ideal itself.  
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assessments. It is only when we are able to bracket certain real world feasibility issues 
that we are, in turn, able to assess others. For example, by setting aside concerns about 
probability we can ask questions about stability.  
In attributing such importance to the abstracting function it may seem that I am 
suggesting that without conscious acts of abstracting idealisation, one will be unable 
to make the various types of argument discussed above. I do not want to make this 
strong claim. Rather, the above arguments are so intuitive in their essential form and 
so fundamental to philosophical discussion that such idealisations will be performed 
in a far less conscious fashion. If they are used subconsciously this is in no way 
problematic. The purpose of illustrating the necessity of such idealisations for many 
philosophical arguments is to show that even those who are extremely critical of 
idealisation based approaches will, I think, almost invariably use abstracting 
idealisations in their arguments.  
Before moving on to the second function of idealisation I would like to consider a 
significant potential criticism of abstracting idealisations.  Some may object to the 
terminology I employ, arguing that it conflates two distinct concepts, namely 
‘abstraction’ and ‘idealisation’, and reduces the former to a mere sub-category of the 
latter. Certainly there are good reasons for accepting that a conceptual distinction 
exists between abstractions and idealisations. Onora O’Neill for instance distinguishes 
between the two concepts, noting that where abstraction, involves ‘bracketing’ certain 
factors, idealisation involves ‘falsifying’ certain factors. In the case of abstraction we 
simply omit certain inputs from our theorising while with idealisation we knowingly 
misrepresent (at least some of) the inputs we use in our theorising. O’Neill goes on to 
use this distinction to try to argue in favour of the former method and against the latter 
one.13  
                                                 
13 See Onora O’Neill. Toward Justice and Virtue, pp. 40-41, and Onora O’Neill ‘Abstraction, 
Idealisation, and Ideology in Ethics’ Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series Vol. 22, pp. 55-69 
(1987). For a discussion of O’Neill’s modelling of abstraction and idealisation, see for example, Lisa 
H. Schwartzman, ‘Abstraction, Idealisation, and Oppression’ Metaphilosophy Vol. 37, No. 5, pp. 565-
588 (2006) and Lisa H. Schwartzman, ‘Non-Ideal Theorising, Social Groups, and Knowledge of 
Oppression: A Response’ Hypatia Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 177-188 (2009). 
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However, while I believe that this is a conceptually sound distinction to make it may 
be one that is difficult to sustain in many practical contexts.14 Much of this scepticism 
hangs on the fact that it seems that even in merely bracketing particular variables from 
our theory we still create models of phenomena that are in an important sense ‘false’.15  
The Marxist model of capitalism that we discussed in the previous chapter gives us a 
good example of this definitional difficulty and how apparent abstractions may be 
forms of idealisations. On one hand Marx’s model of capitalism can be understood as 
an abstraction, merely bracketing certain variables from economic theory, for example 
in excluding such factors as the roles of the state, ideologies, legal systems, cultural 
practices, and so on.16 However on the other hand one may suggest that this is 
necessarily an idealisation, as in removing these things the overall phenomena it aims 
to model, i.e. the trajectory of capitalist economies, is unquestionably an artificial and 
inaccurate representation of the phenomena as it functions in reality.17  
The same appears to hold for abstractions used more directly in normative fields such 
as justice. Consider the examples above. Imagine that we reframe our assumption not 
as say ‘strict compliance’ but rather as the removal of compliance considerations 
altogether, thus making the method superficially more one of abstraction rather than 
idealisation. However the outcome is still the same, namely a social world that does 
not represent the one we actually live in. 
This is not to suggest that genuine abstractions may not exist in other practical 
contexts. It may be the case that they hold in certain experiments in the natural 
sciences. However, irrespective of this, it seems that when employed in the fields of 
philosophy and social sciences that we are interested in, they are more accurately 
                                                 
14 This point is well made by Lawford-Smith when she states that ‘the distance between abstraction and 
idealisation seems flimsy at best.’ See Holly Lawford-Smith, ‘Debate: Ideal Theory – A Reply to 
Valentini’ The Journal of Political Philosophy Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 357-368 (2010), p. 366.  Hamlin and 
Stemplowska also stress the difficulty in distinguishing between idealisation and abstraction, see 
Hamlin and Stemplowska, pp. 50-51. 
15 This same point is made by Stemplowska who says that abstractions are false inasmuch as they are 
mere ‘approximations’ of reality. See Stemplowska, p. 327 
16 See Chapter 4, Section 3. Note that most of the main proponents of approaches to Marxism that 
emphasise this method, for example, Ollman, Althusser, and Bhaskar, use the term ‘abstraction’ without 
any mention of idealisation.  
17 As noted in the previous chapter this is by no means necessarily a criticism of either the Marxist 
model of capitalism, nor abstracting idealisations more generally.  
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defined as a form of idealisation. An outcome of this way of conceptualising 
abstractions is that it also highlights a fundamental similarity in the broad type of 
assumptions used in the explanatory theorising of Marxism and normative theorising 
about justice.18 
(2) Having clarified this point on terminology we can turn now to consider a second 
function of idealisation, the normative function, which is related to, but distinct from, 
the abstracting function. Like abstracting idealisations, normative idealisations involve 
the bracketing of certain real world issues in order to ask questions we would not 
otherwise be able to. However where abstracting idealisation uses these theoretical 
conditions to make assessments of ideals, normative idealisations are necessary for 
actually generating the ideals themselves. The term ‘normative function’ is thus used 
as it is because of this function that we are able to produce normative theories of justice 
at all.  
To illustrate why this is so consider the following case. Imagine an egalitarian 
philosopher who believes that justice will likely require an extensive redistribution of 
wealth. In order to arrive at a settled ideal of justice she looks to test what levels of 
redistribution might be demanded by her just society. Here she has two choices, she 
can either premise her theorising on non-idealised representations of compliance and 
objective conditions or on idealised representations of compliance and objective 
conditions. What happens if she chooses the former? If she does this then she confronts 
various real world obstacles to redistribution. On the objective condition-related side 
it may be that the society in question lacks the institutional structure required to enforce 
redistributive policies. On the compliance-related side it may be that attempts to 
increase taxation will lead to widespread tax evasion, tax avoidance, and capital flight, 
as the wealthy do whatever they can to avoid seeing their wealth depleted. If we want 
an ideal to be achievable and we use non-idealised conceptions of these categories then 
we would likely have to accept relatively low levels of redistribution, as this would 
reflect the ideal that contemporary society would be able to immediately support.  
                                                 
18 I do not intend to overstate the similarity here. Each approach is still asking very different questions, 
i.e. the former being concerned with explanatory and predictive models and the latter concerned with 
normative models. However the similarity is still worth stressing, particularly as a response to 
representations of Marxism as forming an entirely concrete, ideal-free method.  
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It is likely however that many would feel dissatisfied with this result. One might think 
that such an ideal would be, as Zofia Stemplowska says, ‘normatively inaccurate’. It 
is an ideal that underpins laws that people will adhere to anyway, rather than laws that 
they ought to adhere to, but at present may not.19 Intuitively, our conception of what a 
just society looks like ought to be more ambitious than this, not least because we can 
be confident that a proportion of the contemporary obstacles to more just societies, 
such as low levels of compliance and underdeveloped economic and institutional 
conditions, are ones that can be overcome. As Simmons rightly states we require 
idealisations because ‘the current state of our institutions […] is so distant from what 
we can realistically hope to achieve.’20 It is for this reason that the second choice is 
preferable. In working from idealised assumptions instead we can generate ideals that 
are not constrained by contemporary obstacles, and are thus appropriately ambitious 
and normatively accurate.  
(3) While the abstracting function is necessary for thorough assessments of ideals and 
the normative function is necessary for the generation of those ideals, both are 
dependent on a third, arguably more fundamental, function, namely the simplifying 
function.21 This is the function that allows us to set aside complex, accurate 
representations of real world phenomena and instead employ simplified idealised 
representations of these phenomena. To illustrate why this is necessary, let us ask what 
would happen were we to reject the idealised version of strict compliance we 
advocated for use in abstracting idealisations and work instead with a non-idealised 
representation of compliance as it actually exists in the real world. In these 
circumstances we would have to consider a range of complex calculations about the 
different forms of noncompliance and the extent to which these different forms affect 
policy making across a wide range of variables. For example, we would need to 
determine the various ways in which different social groups might fail to comply with 
pieces of legislation. The exact same repercussions would occur if we decided to 
                                                 
19 Stemplowska, p. 333 
20 Simmons, pp. 31-32. Similarly, Hertzberg claims that ‘the ability to imagine politics functioning other 
than it currently does is foundational to the generation of new and the refinement of old political ideals’. 
See Benjamin R. Hertzberg, ‘Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory in Elizabeth Anderson’s The Imperative of 
Integration’ Political Studies Review Vol. 12, No. 12, pp. 369-375 (2014), p. 372. 
21 For further discussion of the simplifying function of idealisation, see Simmons, pp. 8-9. 
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replace an idealised assumption of favourable conditions with a non-idealising model 
of actual conditions. Again we would have to fully model the complex reality and 
minutiae of economic and institutional conditions in a given society. 
There are intuitive and compelling reasons to avoid using complex, rather than simple, 
representations of relevant phenomena when theorising ideals of justice. First there is 
the simple matter of time allocation. It is almost certainly the case that were we to try 
to understand a given process in its full complexity we would be unable to ever actually 
proceed to the question of ideals, as we would be trapped trying to arrive at a 
representation of a complex, real world process. For this reason, at least some form of 
simplification is required.  
Second there is the issue of expertise. While philosophers qua philosophers are well 
suited to the analysis of abstract concepts and categories, they likely lack the training 
to engage with complex real world phenomena. The skills required to model such 
phenomena are more likely in the domain of the social and natural sciences as well as 
more concrete forms of explanatory or predictive social theory. Again, philosophers 
can avoid this if they are engaging with simplified, rather than complex, models.  
Third there is the issue of the level of specificity of our ideals. Complex representations 
of reality necessarily have to be representations of actually existing, specific 
phenomena. By definition, any attempt to generalise these phenomena across time or 
space would be to simplify them. Even if we set aside the first and second concerns 
noted immediately above and assume that it would be feasible to create a fully non-
idealised representation of a given society’s actual levels of compliance and objective 
economic and institutional conditions, we would be doing this at the expense of any 
kind of generality. The ideals that would follow from such assumptions would be 
peculiar to the social and historical context of the case at hand, and likely not 
extendable to other societies and other times.22  
                                                 
22 I do not wish to claim that ideals should be completely universal in their application. As I argued in 
the previous chapter, for ideals to meet feasibility conditions they ought to have strong synergy with 
particular social and historical contexts. However, an ideal that is completely wedded to a particular 
social and historical context, to the extent that it is only applicable at a precise time in a precise place is 
almost certainly too contextual. 
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Idealised assumptions on the other hand allow us to side step these concerns. First, in 
bracketing certain complex issues at the outset, ideal theorists need not get trapped in 
a potentially endless quest for a fully accurate representation of a given phenomenon. 
Second, this in turn means philosophers can be allowed to, for the most part, focus on 
abstract, conceptual analysis, rather than almost exclusively non-philosophical 
analysis. Third, in setting off from a non-socially and historically specific position the 
ideals generated would not be inextricably connected to a single society’s levels of 
compliance or economic and institutional development from the outset.  
Fundamentally, the simplifying function underpins the distinction between ideal 
theory and nonideal theory. Where nonideal theory is generally concerned with 
understanding the complexities of real world phenomena and injustices, ideal theory 
uses abstract concepts in order to arrive at normative ideals. In maintaining the division 
between ideal theory and nonideal theory, there is also a clearer division of labour 
between the different enterprises, and this should help ensure that better use is made 
of different expertise.23   
Simplifying idealisations are used as prerequisites for other types of idealisations. If 
idealisations were not simplified then they could not in turn be abstracting or 
normative, as these latter functions are themselves extensions of simplifications; which 
is to say that abstract and normative idealisations have to also be simplified if they are 
to perform these functions. Moreover, as we have seen, even if we were to set this 
concern to the side, ideal theory without simplification would likely be caught up in a 
series of endless inquiries into diverse, complex real world phenomena. In sum then 
we can think of simplifying idealisations as being a necessary facilitator of other 
functions of idealisations.  
                                                 
23 Two points from this paragraph ought to be made clear. First, I am not suggesting that nonideal theory 
never uses simplifying idealisations; as I mentioned above, the pursuit of fully concrete representations 
of phenomena will often be prohibitively difficult and time consuming. However nonideal theory should 
use fewer and less extensive simplifications than ideal theory does. Second, I am not suggesting that 
ideal theory and nonideal theory exist completely independently from each other, with the former simply 
issuing ideals for the latter to try to put into practice. As we saw in the previous chapter that is 
categorically not the approach I take, rather I believe that ideal theory has to be informed by explanatory 
models and theories from the nonideal domain to ensure that ideals meet feasibility conditions. My point 
here then is that irrespective of the important contributions that nonideal considerations have to make 
to ideal theorising, the latter enterprise and its distinctive, abstract methods remain vital to the overall 
project of normative theories of justice. 
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Before concluding this section I would like to consider a possible fourth function that 
idealisations may perform that can be inferred from Ingrid Robeyns work on this 
subject. Robeyns suggests that idealisations can also be used to bracket things, which 
from an ethical perspective ‘should simply not occur.’24 As an example she uses the 
cases of slavery and prejudice, suggesting that as we possess fundamental ethical 
arguments for why a just society should not premise institutions on either of these 
phenomena, we can exclude them from our ideal theorising. We can do this by working 
from the idealised assumption that slavery and prejudice simply do not exist.25 Let us 
call this the ethical function of idealisation.  
While I wholeheartedly concur with Robeyn’s claim that slavery and prejudice would 
not be a feature of just societies, I do not believe we should use idealisation to enforce 
this position. For one there seems no reason that a given ideal theory cannot engage 
with these issues directly, as opposed to bracketing them and excluding them from 
consideration. Rawls’s argument from the original position provides a clear illustration 
of what I mean. Rawls asks us to imagine an environment populated by individuals; 
who are behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ that makes them ignorant of their natural and 
social characteristics and abilities; who largely think and act in their own rational self-
interest; and who have a full understanding of sociological, political, legal, and 
psychological processes. He claims that were we to ask these individuals to arrive at 
an ideal of justice they would include within that ideal a principle that ensured the 
maximum allocation of rights and liberties for each citizen, compatible with the same 
rights and liberties being enjoyed by other citizens. Rawls’s rationale is that as the 
individuals do not know their natural and social characteristics and abilities they would 
not select any ideal that might allow the rights of some to be reduced, such as those 
ideals that permit slavery or prejudice, lest they themselves, on having the veil of 
ignorance lifted, found themselves to be in a group that would be prone to enslavement 
or prejudicial treatment.26 Whether or not one finds this particular argument 
convincing it does illustrate how the ideal theory process itself can generate arguments 
                                                 
24 Robeyns, p. 354.  
25 Ibid.  
26 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Ch. 3.  
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that reject injustices such as slavery and prejudice. It is thus not necessary to exclude 
them from consideration.  
For this reason it seems unnecessary to use idealisations to deal with substantive 
ethical issues such as the excluding of particular injustices. Compelling ideal theories 
need to be able to do this through their own internal mechanisms and a failure to do so 
should raise serious questions about the validity of an ideal theory of justice. 
Idealisations should therefore be used primarily as methodological, rather than 
substantive, tools in order to create theoretical spaces where we are logically able to 
answer questions that, were we to work on real world, nonideal assumptions, we would 
otherwise not be able to. 
The three functions I outlined above, namely those of abstraction, normativity, and 
simplification, are such methodological tools. In different ways they help create 
important, and sometimes necessary, theoretical spaces. However the functions they 
perform are also distinct from each other and achieve quite separate aims. Normative 
idealisations are assumptions we have to make in order to arrive at any normatively 
accurate ideals of justice. Without this function, we would have to premise ideals on 
contemporary nonideal standards. Abstracting idealisations on the other hand are not 
strictly necessary in order to generate ideals of justice, however, as we have seen, they 
are required if we wish to thoroughly assess given ideals according to standards 
derived from different categories. In essence then, where normative idealisations help 
us formulate ideals, abstracting idealisations help us assess ideals. 
The simplifying function differs in type from the other two functions. Simplifying 
idealisations are used as prerequisites for other types of idealisations. For example, in 
employing a particular normative or abstracting idealised conception of compliance 
we also necessarily simplify. If a given idealisation did not perform a simplifying 
function it would not also be able to perform an abstracting or normative function. 
Simplifying idealisations thus help facilitate other idealisations.  
We also saw how these three functions performed by idealisations can be embodied in 
the assumptions of both strict compliance and favourable conditions. As mentioned 
above I believe that idealised conceptualisations of compliance and objective 
135 
 
conditions are necessary in order to arrive at ideals of justice; a point that will be 
assessed at length in the following section. Given (a) the substantive criticisms of 
Rawlsian and liberal ideals that I offer in the previous chapter and (b) my interest in 
ideal theory as it pertains to Marxism and socialism, one may ask why I defend these 
assumptions. I believe the above discussion of the functions of idealisation goes some 
way to show why they are required for any ideal conception of justice. Without 
idealisations we will be unable to employ the simplified conceptions of real world 
phenomena that we need in order to engage in philosophical analysis, nor will we be 
able to make normative arguments as the assumptions from which our ideals are 
derived will be constrained by contemporary nonideal standards of compliance and 
objective conditions. Moreover, without the abstracting function of idealisations we 
will be unable to rigorously assess ideals from the perspective of various different 
categories.  
As suggested above, the abstracting and simplifying functions of idealisations ought 
to be uncontroversial. Simplifying idealisations are a basic component of virtually all 
forms of analysis and certainly all forms of philosophical analysis. Similarly, 
abstracting idealisations are necessary for some of the most fundamental forms of 
philosophical argument. Importantly this includes any comprehensive approach to 
assessing the feasibility of ideals of justice. In discussing these I have intended to 
provide a more comprehensive account of the different functions that idealisations 
perform in theories of justice and their necessity for basic forms of philosophical 
analysis in general. From this latter point follows the fact that any attempts to criticise 
idealisation in general will surely fail. 
Normative idealisations however are not similarly uncontroversial and serious 
questions can be asked about their validity. As noted above, normative idealisations 
are necessary if we wish to arrive at normatively accurate ideals to inform just choice. 
For this reason, any challenge to normative idealisations ought to be taken seriously. 
In particular I want to consider criticisms that threaten normatively idealised 
conceptions of compliance and objective conditions. However as we shall see, while I 
generally defend Rawls’s idealisations I will also argue why his conceptualisation of 
compliance and objective conditions ought to be altered in order to satisfy feasibility 
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conditions, and in turn ensure that the ideals they lead to are able to inform long-term 
choice.  
 
II. Normative Idealisations and the Informing Critique 
The position then is as follows. Ideals are generally required to inform just choice, but 
we cannot formulate ideals without employing normative idealisations. The concern 
thus is that we may be unable to derive feasible ideals from idealisations because they 
are, by definition, not representative of the real world. Valentini refers to this 
conundrum as ‘the paradox of ideal theory’.27 If this line of criticism is proven to be 
valid then not only will the method of idealisation be undermined but the ideals they 
lead to will be invalidated, and thus they will be unable to inform long-term just choice. 
For this reason, let us call this challenge the ‘informing critique’.28  
In order to assess the validity of the informing critique I would like to consider three 
variations of it, noted by Valentini. The three candidate versions of the informing 
critique provide a helpful structure for assessing the strength of several major 
objections to the normative function of idealisation. As we shall see, two of these 
versions can be responded to without significant difficulty, however the third version 
poses a more serious challenge and we will see that in responding to this it is necessary 
to reassess the kinds of idealisations we use when looking to generate feasible ideals.    
(1) The first version of the informing critique is the claim that ideals ‘fail to motivate 
existing agents’ and therefore cannot inform just choice. Earlier we considered it a 
benefit of the normative function that it provided us with assumptions that were able 
to generate more normatively accurate ideals. This is to say that it is a strength of 
assumptions such as strict compliance and favourable conditions that they make 
extensive demands, which people may not be able to adhere to straight away. The 
concern embodied in this criticism however is that these idealisations, and indeed 
others, may lead to ideals that are simply too distant from the world as it is at present 
                                                 
27 Laura Valentini, ‘On the Apparent Paradox of Ideal Theory’, p. 333. 
28 Valentini uses the term ‘guidance critique’, however I have substituted this for ‘informing critique’ 
for the sake of terminological consistency with the rest of this thesis.  
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and that as such people may not feel any attachment to these ideals, nor be compelled 
to act in accordance with them.  
A similar concern is raised by Katherine Eddy in her discussion of ideal conceptions 
of rights produced through idealised assumptions. She worries that in deriving rights 
from ideal assumptions we inevitably have rights for just societies that again may seem 
distant and beyond our reach. Once again, the worry here is that the motivational force 
of rights may be lost, and that the notion of ‘rights as urgent and pre-emptive moral 
claims [is] compromised.’29  
However, I believe that neither of these criticisms ultimately hold. First, in response 
to Eddy, we can stress that we need not operate with monolithic concepts of rights. 
Rather we can use a range of different types of rights at different levels of abstraction, 
some may impose duties that only hold in the immediate term, while others may 
stipulate duties that would only hold in ideal conditions. In short, having a conception 
of the rights we would expect to be enforced in ideal conditions need not mean we 
have to use this conception of rights in all of our nonideal decisions and practices en 
route to realising these ideal conditions.  
It is likely also the case that there would be, and in some circumstances should be, a 
separation in the terminological frameworks employed by philosophers on the one 
hand and political actors on the other hand. The language of actual politics need not 
reflect the rarefied terminology employed by philosophers. Where philosophers may 
want to identify subtle conceptual distinctions between different categories of rights, 
rights as a rhetorical tool of politics can be couched in language that ensures that these 
rights always remain urgent.30   
Addressing the motivational concern more broadly, we ought to side with Valentini in 
rejecting this argument for the reasons we touched on in Section I. It is a strength of 
ideal theory that it generally formulates ideals that make demands that are not 
                                                 
29 Eddy, ‘Against Ideal Rights’, p. 475. 
30 This distinction partially maps on to the ideal theory and nonideal theory distinction inasmuch as 
ideal theory will generally have more concern for identifying truths and nonideal theory will have more 
concern with representations. For an interesting discussion of when political theorists have a duty to tell 
lies, see Robert Jubb and A. Faik Kurtulmus, ‘No Country for Honest Men: Political Philosophers and 
Real Politics’ Political Studies Vol. 60, pp. 539-556 (2012). 
138 
 
necessarily acceptable to all immediately. This ties in to the core normative function 
of idealisations. If we did not bracket questions of compliance then we would be 
unable to arrive at any ideals that were not immediately acceptable. The price we pay 
for having normatively correct ideals is accepting that in the short term we may not 
have high levels of compliance to these ideals.31  
Criticisms of this sort also make the common mistake of conflating ideal theory and 
nonideal theory. While ideal theory ought to generate ideals that meet feasibility 
conditions, these ideals need not meet these conditions immediately. Rather, it is the 
task of nonideal theory to implement ideals, and this is in part achieved by working to 
make people increasingly compliant to, and motivated by, the ideal in question.32    
(2) The second version of the informing critique is that ideals produced by idealisation 
are flawed on the grounds that ‘they are not immediately applicable to day-to-day 
political decisions.’33 The thrust of this challenge is that ideals that are produced by 
idealisations will necessarily be too abstract or disconnected from reality to inform just 
choice, as we cannot directly put them to use in nonideal circumstances.  
A variant of this criticism is offered by Elizabeth Anderson who claims that the nature 
of idealised assumptions mean that the ideals that they lead to prevent us from 
understanding and addressing nonideal injustices. Discussing race, Anderson 
complains that idealisations on this subject ‘do not define a standpoint from which to 
assess racially unjust societies’ and further, they are unable to provide ‘the conceptual 
framework needed to recognise and understand contemporary racial justice.’34  
On the face of it these appear to be serious challenges, undermining the practical value 
of ideals derived from idealisations. Despite this, as with the first version of the 
informing critique, this line of criticism can also be overcome. First, ideals need not 
be able to engage with nonideal injustices immediately and without any mediating 
                                                 
31 As Valentini notes, ‘the fact of actual non-compliance tells us nothing about the adequacy of the 
theory itself.’ See Valentini, ‘On the Apparent Paradox of Ideal Theory’, p. 340. 
32 The tendency for some critics of ideal theory to criticise it for failing to perform the functions that 
these critics see as in the domain of nonideal theory is noted by Stemplowska and Swift who state that 
‘many realist criticisms of ideal theory simply overlook the distinction between ideal and nonideal 
theory, and end up criticising the former for not being the latter.’ See Stemplowska and Swift, p. 6.  
33 Valentini, ‘On the Apparent Paradox of Ideal Theory’ p. 340. 
34 Anderson in Knight, p. 363. 
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processes. As Robeyns notes, ideals ‘cannot serve as principles for the nonideal world’ 
but rather have to first be ‘adapted or reinterpreted or further developed for the 
nonideal world.’35 Similarly, Valentini argues that part of the necessary process of 
practical political thinking is taking more general ideas and exposing them to the 
relevant facts in order to derive meaningful guidance. It is not a failing of an ideal that 
it does not cover every single conceivable application in meticulous detail.36  
As with the first criticism then, the second criticism also overlooks the division of 
labour between ideal theory and nonideal theory. Once again, it is the role of nonideal 
theory to actually determine what is and what is not a just choice by applying ideals 
mediated by appropriate nonideal categories and theories. Even accepting that long-
term ideals should meet feasibility conditions prior to being considered by nonideal 
theorists, it remains the case that ideals will not, and need not, be immediately 
applicable. We should not expect ideal theory to be a one stop shop for just choice, but 
rather one part of a much larger intellectual endeavour.  
Second, and perhaps more importantly, ideal theory is fundamentally necessary in 
order for this nonideal project to proceed. Ideal theory establishes the ideals that are 
necessary to inform just choice. In order to arrive at ideals that are normatively 
accurate it is necessary to employ idealisations. Responding to Anderson then, it is 
only when we have an ideal conception of justice that we have a vantage point from 
which we can make informed just choices. Normative idealisations allow us to figure 
out, uncontroversially surely, that what justice demands is racial equality, amongst 
many other things, and from here we can set about trying to realise this through 
nonideal theorising. Ideal theory would only be problematic if it made us blind to racial 
injustice at the nonideal level, that is, the level where such injustices take place and 
where they have to be acknowledged, understood, and overcome in order to achieve 
justice.37 Thus while ideal theory may not singlehandedly present us with ‘the 
conceptual framework needed to recognise and understand contemporary racial 
justice’, for this is largely a task of nonideal theory, ideal theory is nonetheless a 
                                                 
35 Valentini, ‘On the Apparent Paradox of Ideal Theory’, p. 355. 
36 Ibid. pp. 342-343. 
37 I will argue against this particular argument in Section IV below.  
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necessary component of this project by virtue of the fact that it does facilitate us with 
a ‘standpoint from which to assess racially unjust societies.’ 
(3) Having shown that the first and second variations of the informing critique can be 
responded to, we can now turn to the more serious challenge posed by the third 
variation. This is the claim that, as the idealised conditions on which ideals are 
premised cannot actually be achieved in the real world, the ideals themselves will by 
extension be inapplicable in the real world. Thus where the second version of the 
criticism suggested that ideals are ‘insufficient’ to inform just choice, as we necessarily 
require input from nonideal theory, this criticism goes further, suggesting that due to 
the idealised premises they are founded on, ideals simply cannot inform just choice. 
As Valentini says, ‘the problem is not that there is a gap to be bridged between ideal 
theory and nonideal circumstances; the problem is that the gap is unbridgeable.’38 
Valentini offers a helpful response to this challenge by seeking to demarcate ‘good 
idealisations’ from ‘bad idealisations’; with the former referring to those that lead to 
ideals that can inform just choice, and the latter leading to ideals that cannot inform 
just choice. ‘Good idealisations’ are those that are simply used to help model the 
proper conditions for determining an ideal of justice and these can be contrasted with 
‘bad idealisations’ that additionally require that the unachievable conditions stipulated 
in the idealisation to be realised.39  
Valentini illustrates this with the example of the idealisations employed in Rawls’s 
original position hypothetical. As we saw in the previous section, Rawls uses the 
original position to ask what kind of ideal of justice would be selected by an individual 
who is defined by various idealised characteristics, namely: full rationality, a 
comprehensive understanding of sociological, economic, political, and psychological 
processes, and being placed behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ that prevents her from 
knowing her natural abilities and characteristics and social position. Rawls believes 
such conditions are appropriate as the veil of ignorance prevents bias from entering 
the process as each individual’s actual self-interest is hidden to them, while their 
                                                 
38 Ibid., p. 342. 
39 Ibid., p. 353. 
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rationality and comprehensive understanding would allow them to arrive at logical 
ideals of justice.40 
Again, whether or not we consider the original position to be a valid method for 
generating ideals of justice I believe it is clear that the idealisations it involves are, by 
Valentini’s standards, ‘good’. The thoroughly idealised conditions of the original 
position exist only to model what are, according to Rawls, the best conditions for 
arriving at ideals of justice. In order to realise any ideal that we think would emerge 
from the conditions of the original position, whether Rawls’s own or otherwise, we 
would never need to actually realise the idealisations it is premised on. In short the 
original position can be used to strengthen claims for particular ideals on the grounds 
that it is what unbiased, rational, and informed individuals would select, without 
claiming that one would have to be an unbiased, rational, and informed individual in 
order to arrive at, or appreciate, such an ideal.41  
Valentini’s ‘good idealisations’ are thus helpful in protecting idealisations that 
exclusively look to model ideal formulating conditions. However there is a concern 
that this model will raise serious questions about the essential idealisations identified 
in Section I, namely strict compliance and favourable conditions. As we have seen, 
these idealisations are used to escape from the confines of contemporary standards of 
compliance and objective conditions. It is only with these idealisations in place that 
we can then derive ideals that, while not holding now, would hold if the conditions 
stipulated in our idealisations held. In order to realise a given ideal then it is necessary 
that we realise the conditions from which that ideal is derived. However what if these 
are ‘bad idealisations’ that cannot be realised? If this was the case then our ideal would 
be infeasible and would be unable to inform long-term choice. The entire approach 
defended in this thesis would be jeopardised.  
Does this criticism apply to the assumption of favourable conditions? On the face of 
it, it appears that it may not, and that favourable conditions might actually constitute 
                                                 
40 Ibid., p. 338.  
41 This point is made well by Lawford-Smith who stresses that ‘asserting the truth of [a] counterfactual 
conditional’ (such as those employed in the original position hypothetical) is not equivalent to saying 
that that counterfactual’s ‘antecedent’ is true, i.e. claiming that people actually are unbiased, informed, 
and rational. See Lawford-Smith, ‘Ideal Theory – A Reply to Valentini’, p. 63. 
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an example of a ‘good idealisation’. Favourable conditions remain conditions for 
societies within the circumstances of justice, and as such they are defined by moderate 
scarcity and imperfect rationality. By the same token, favourable conditions 
conversely cannot assume material abundance nor all-knowing and perfectly efficient 
and rational public institutions. If we made these assumptions we would no longer be 
theorising an ideal of justice but rather an ideal for a society that has transcended 
justice.42 Moreover, favourable conditions currently exist in certain states, in that those 
states have both the requisite level of institutional and economic development required 
to realise, at least some, ideals of justice. 
It is far less clear, however, that this is also the case for strict compliance. Even setting 
aside our assumption that societies in the future can be made, through nonideal 
intervention, more compliant to particular ideals of justice, we may still doubt that we 
can ever achieve strict compliance. As such we might worry that as strict compliance 
may not be realisable, the ideals that are premised on it will be invalid. For this reason 
the following section will mainly focus on strict compliance, though as we shall see, 
the lessons that can be learnt from how we conceptualise compliance in light of the 
informing critique are also pertinent to how we conceptualise objective conditions.  
 
III. Responding to the Informing Critique 
The third version of the informing critique as applied to strict compliance thus 
proceeds as follows. In order to arrive at ideals of justice we have to assume strict 
compliance, because without this normative idealisation our ideals would reflect and 
reify existing standards of compliance and would, in being too permissive and 
unambitious, be normatively incorrect. However it is also very likely that strict 
compliance is infeasible and thus, as we cannot realise the conditions stipulated in the 
normative assumption the ideal is derived from, the ideal will in turn also be 
infeasible.43  
                                                 
42 See Chapter 3, Section III.   
43 The infeasible character of strict compliance is stated in particularly forthright terms by Uberti who 




The particular problem is that if we assume that all people will comply with every law 
that adheres to a given ideal of justice then we will almost certainly be overstating 
what even the most loyal and willing populace might adhere to. As such, ideals that 
are derived from strict compliance may make demands that will be too demanding for 
societies defined by any form of partial compliance. For this reason Schmidtz warns 
against ‘solving an ideal problem rather than a real one’.44  
A second variation of this criticism is presented by Colin Farrelly. Farrelly’s concern 
engages specifically with Rawls’s use of strict compliance though, as we shall see, it 
does have a more general application as well. At the heart of Farrelly’s objection to 
strict compliance is how it necessarily overlooks the material costs of different ideals 
and thus risks advocating ideals that are impracticable for a number of reasons.45 
Farrelly notes how in conditions of strict compliance, so-called ‘negative rights’ such 
as the right to security are cost-free. This is because without people who do not comply 
with laws and violate the rights of others it is unnecessary to provide institutions such 
as police forces and law courts to ensure that people are protected from those who 
violate rights. However in real world conditions of partial compliance this is not the 
case as people do violate these rights and thus it is necessary to provide these 
institutions.  
The costs of negative rights have been convincingly theorised by Henry Shue. Shue 
notes that in order for any right to be ‘socially guaranteed’, that is protected in the face 
of noncompliance, corresponding duties have to be positive as well as negative. In 
other words as not all people will uphold their negative duty not to violate the rights 
of others, the state has to fund and organise institutions, i.e. uphold a positive duty of 
provision, which exists to defend these rights. For example if we wish to protect the 
right to security, then in any conditions of partial compliance, it will not be sufficient 
to only have a negative duty not to deprive others of their right to security, it will also 
be necessary to uphold a positive duty through social institutions that act to minimise 
abrogations of negative duties and to compensate those whose rights are violated. As 
                                                 
44 David Schmidtz, ‘Nonideal Theory: What It is and What It Needs to be’ Ethics Vol. 121, No. 4, pp. 
772-796 (2011), p. 781. 
45 Farrelly, p. 845.  
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such, in order to socially guarantee a right to security the state has the correlative 
positive duty to provide police forces, law courts, prisons and compensatory bodies to 
assist victims; all of which have to be trained and equipped to an appropriate 
standard.46  
One of Farrelly’s main goals is to use the above insights to re-evaluate the validity of 
Rawls’s ‘lexical ordering’ of his principles of justice, along with Rawls’s claim that 
representatives in the original position would select his ideal of justice ahead of 
utilitarianism.47 Given the specificity of this argument though I would like to focus on 
the broader claims being made here, and what this means for strict compliance. The 
Shueian perspective that Farrelly offers seems to bring into relief a significant problem 
with this normative idealisation. Farrelly’s point is not the more obvious concern stated 
above, that ideals derived from strict compliance may be excessively demanding, but 
the more nuanced observation that, beyond this, they may also be impracticable, due 
to strict compliance’s bracketing of costs. Knowing the practicability of an ideal in 
conditions of strict compliance may be unhelpful, and potentially misleading, when 
we look to determine that ideal’s practicability in conditions of partial compliance.  
In order to respond to these serious challenges there have to be changes in the way in 
which compliance idealisations are conceptualised. It is necessary that the assumption 
still performs the normative function while also ensuring that ideals that are derived 
from it are feasible. In order for this to be the case the level of compliance embodied 
in the assumption must be neither an infeasible strict compliance nor a simple 
reflection of current levels of compliance. What is required thus is feasible ideal 
compliance, or for brevity’s sake simply feasible compliance. By this I mean a 
conception of compliance that is not representative of contemporary conditions but is 
                                                 
46 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1980), pp. 51-55.  
47 I am also inclined to think that Farrelly’s criticism of Rawls is ultimately misguided. The essence of 
the former’s criticism is that as the Liberty Principle has to be fully achieved before the second principle 
can be enacted, societies would be forever trying to implement the Liberty Principle, and would never 
proceed to implement the second principle. As such, he claims utilitarianism, with its capacity to weigh 
up the costs and benefits of different options would be better placed to satisfy the maximin criteria. 
However while Rawls does suggest that in ideal conditions the first principle is to take priority over the 
second principle he says that this only holds other things being equal in nonideal circumstances. This is 
to say that he acknowledges that it may be necessary to prioritise some economic development over 
some increases in individual liberty. See, respectively, Farrelly, pp. 849-850, and Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice, p. 217. 
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still feasible. However it is clear that while feasible compliance is to be an achievable 
alternative to strict compliance, it remains an idealised concept by virtue of the fact 
that it does not represent society at present. As such it is able to perform the normative 
function that strict compliance traditionally does, while avoiding the paradox stated 
above.  
Feasible compliance thus avoids the first criticism we saw of strict compliance by 
ensuring that it is an idealisation that can be achieved. Just as long-term choice works 
with ideals as goals, so feasible compliance functions as a goal for nonideal theory to 
work towards as a means to realising the feasible ideal itself. This is to say that it 
presents nonideal theory with a feasible target to work towards, as it attempts to alter 
existing levels of compliance in order to make them conducive to the desired ideal. As 
the idealisation itself is feasible, then the ideals that are derived from it will, all other 
things being equal, be feasible as well.  
Feasible compliance also avoids the second criticism of strict compliance by deriving 
ideals from an improved, but still partial, conceptualisation of compliance. Irrespective 
of the particular levels of compliance assumed by a given conception, anything short 
of strict compliance has to be sensitive to the fact that all ideals will have at least some 
implementation and enforcement costs, for example in the form of the positive duty-
upholding public institutions considered above. One thus cannot simply assume away 
costs, in the fashion that is possible in conditions of strict compliance.  
Feasible compliance brings the feasibility categories discussed in the third and fourth 
chapters to the fore of our conceptualisation of idealisation. In order to determine 
whether a particular idealised conception of compliance is or is not feasible, we will 
have to assess the possibility, probability, and stability of our conception. As with all 
feasibility assessments, determining what feasible compliance amounts to will be a far 
from exact science. However while we cannot expect to know precisely what feasible 
compliance consists of it need not be a purely speculative enterprise. As with other 
feasibility assessments it will be necessary to build on explanatory social and historical 
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approaches as well as social scientific research,48 to help arrive at a conception of 
feasible compliance that we can have some confidence in. 
It has rightly been noted how different ideals will confront different compliance 
problems.49 Each ideal will make unique demands of particular groups of people. 
Libertarian ideals may make greater demands on those with lower capacities for 
earning, while egalitarian ideals will make greater demands on those with higher 
capacities for earning. Despite the truth of this position, I do not believe it is necessary 
for those engaging in ideal theory to formulate unique models of compliance for 
different ideals. Rather, all that is required at the level of ideal theory is that the 
conceptualisation of compliance is feasible in a broad sense. The task of identifying 
the particular compliance issues that will confront nonideal theorists as they attempt 
to achieve this broad level of compliance is a problem for this latter discipline.  
As noted above, the assumption of favourable conditions does not have the inherent 
feasibility issues that are apparent in strict compliance. However the same principles 
that underpin the move from strict compliance to feasible compliance, and in turn 
indicate how we ought to arrive at conceptions of feasible compliance, also apply to 
how we conceptualise objective conditions. We should always aim to ensure that our 
conception of favourable conditions is also feasible. While we have already seen how 
objective conditions are inherently more constrained by the demands of the 
circumstances of justice, it is likely the case that we can imagine objective conditions 
that, while within the circumstances of justice, may be infeasible.  
In arriving at a robust conception of feasible conditions it will be necessary to consider 
some of the same social scientific and theoretical inputs we would when trying to 
determine feasible compliance. However in addition to this, theorising objective 
conditions will likely involve significant input from natural sciences and engineering 
as we determine important considerations relating to pollutants and energy usage. 
These perspectives will also allow us to assess the feasibility of potential technologies 
that may emerge as well as the affects these may have on productivity. Evidently these 
                                                 
48 For a discussion of this see Chapter 4, Sections II and III.   
49 Schmidtz makes this point, noting that the ‘task of choosing a principle we can live with is a task of 
choosing a compliance problem we can live with.’ See Schmidtz, p. 778. 
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factors will have a major impact on whether certain levels of production will be 
ecologically sustainable, and thus in turn stable and probable.  
Before summarising our discussion in this section it is useful to consider the broader 
claims being made about theories of justice here. In particular, reconceptualising the 
normative idealisations of compliance and objective conditions in terms of their 
feasibility has some repercussions for how we think about the relationship between 
ideal theory and nonideal theory. Rawls appears to suggest that ideal theory works 
from assumptions of strict compliance and favourable conditions while nonideal 
theory works from assumptions of partial compliance and nonideal conditions.50 
However we have seen that unless we ensure that these idealisations are also feasible, 
then they will be unable to produce ideals that can inform long-term choice.  
It may be better then to understand the various conceptualisations of compliance and 
objective conditions as resting on respective spectra. For instance in the former case 
we can imagine the formally possible but highly improbable conceptualisations of full 
non-compliance and strict compliance as each resting on one of the poles of the 
spectrum. Somewhere between these points will be attempts to model contemporary 
real world levels of compliance, as well as attempts to model possible future levels of 
compliance. The role of ideal theory, inasmuch as it aims to generate normatively 
accurate and justice informing ideals, is thus not to use strict compliance but rather to 
use a conceptualisation of compliance that is appropriately ambitious while also being 
feasible.51 One of the key roles of nonideal theory on the other hand is to attempt to 
reform actual compliance until it has met the level of feasible compliance employed 
by the ideal theory that is informing just choice.52  
                                                 
50 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 216.   
51 There will of course be some debate about how to settle conflicts between feasibility and desirability. 
For example, should we favour a less feasible but more desirable idealisation, i.e. one that is closer to 
strict compliance, over an idealisation that is more feasible but less desirable? This is a difficult question, 
and while it will be of some benefit to always ensure that standards of reasonable feasibility should be 
met, which will exclude highly desirable but highly infeasible idealisations, disagreements will still 
occur between the merits of feasible options. My own intuitive position on this is that, in keeping with 
the generally conservative position that has been prevalent throughout this thesis, it is better to favour 
the option that is more feasible but less desirable.  
52 In these circumstances we can imagine that we may discover that our earlier modelling of feasible 
compliance was either too optimistic or too pessimistic. In these circumstances the ideal that was 
derived from this idealisation should be re-assessed, and if it proves incompatible with the new level of 
feasible compliance then the ideal should be either altered to fit with this or, in more serious 
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Similarly, conceptions of objective conditions can be placed on a spectrum running 
from completely unfavourable conditions on one hand to perfect conditions on the 
other. The former would refer to a hypothetical world devoid of any resources 
whatsoever and lacking any institutional structure,53 while the latter would have 
limitless resources and perfectly functioning institutions. We can perhaps think of the 
circumstances of justice as falling within this spectrum, though not necessarily being 
close to either pole. Once again, we can make a distinction between sufficiently 
favourable conditions and insufficiently favourable conditions, with ideal theory 
employing the former to arrive at ideals of justice and nonideal theory working within 
the latter to ensure that society moves towards, or remains within, conditions of 
sufficient favourability.  
Compliance and objective conditions are therefore matters of degrees and the focus of 
both ideal theory and nonideal theory will shift with different conceptualisations of 
both idealised and nonideal conceptions of these categories. However this spectrum-
based approach is consistent with a more categorical one as well, and we can retain a 
clear distinction between ideal theory and nonideal theory despite the fact that the 
assumptions used by both enterprises will often shift. It is always the case that ideal 
theory operates with the best available idealisations of feasible compliance and 
feasible conditions while nonideal theory will use less idealised conceptions of 
compliance and objective conditions in order to realise the standards that are used by 
ideal theory.54  
We began this chapter by noting the tension between the factual considerations of 
feasibility conditions and the non-factual considerations involved in idealisations. As 
we have seen here, assumptions can be both feasible and idealised, and thus still able 
to perform the necessary normative functions that allow us to arrive at normatively 
accurate ideals of justice, which are, by extension, able to inform long-term choice. 
Indeed feasibility and idealisation have strong synergy, with the former ensuring that 
                                                 
circumstances, replaced with a new ideal that is derived from the new conception of feasible 
compliance. 
53 Technically, completely unfavourable conditions should perhaps refer to some form of absolute 
nothingness existing outside of time and space.  
54 The spectrum approach is also raised by Hamlin and Stemplowska, although they reject a categorical 
understanding of ideal and nonideal theory. See Hamlin and Stemplowska, p. 50. 
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the latter remains relevant to just choice, and the latter ensuring that ideals remain 
normatively accurate.  
While this section has sought to respond to the informing critique and defend a feasible 
alternative to strict compliance, and to a less urgent degree, favourable conditions, the 
conclusions reached here should not be automatically extended to idealisations more 
generally. While normative idealisations ought to be feasible if we wish to arrive at 
long-term ideals, this is not the case for the abstracting idealisations we discussed in 
Section I. Indeed, as we are not required to actually achieve the conditions stipulated 
in abstracting idealisations, it is simpler to use the infeasible idealisations of strict 
compliance and favourable conditions.  
 
IV. The Ideology Critique 
In the previous section we addressed the concern that in two ways, normative 
idealisations, if not properly constrained, will lead to ideals that are infeasible. One 
aspect of the criticism motivating this challenge was the claim embodied in Anderson’s 
objection that ideals derived from idealisations cannot contribute to our understanding 
of nonideal injustices. My response to this was to argue that idealisations are necessary 
if we are to arrive at the ideals that we require to make judgements about the justness 
of nonideal phenomena.   
There is however a further, related, and somewhat stronger version of this line of 
criticism that I would like to turn to now. This states that idealisations actively detract 
from and damage our understanding of nonideal problems. The most notable 
proponent of this position is Charles W. Mills whose criticism looks at how 
idealisations do not only idealise away from real world injustices, but that in doing this 
they ‘[distort] our perceptions and conceptions of the social order.’ In short, 
idealisations actively harm our conceptualisations of nonideal phenomena, particularly 
in obscuring and misrepresenting the oppression of disempowered groups.55 Given the 
negative impact Mills attributes to idealisation he questions how it can be in ‘the 
                                                 
55 Mills, pp. 168-169. 
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interests of women to ignore female subordination’, or how it can be in the interests of 
the working class, the poor, or non-whites to each ignore the real world forms of 
subordination they are subject to.56 
As noted above, we have already discussed at some length why normative idealisations 
are necessary for those wishing to make just choices in the nonideal world. However 
I would like to set this fact aside temporarily in order to address the distinctive aspect 
of Mills’s criticism, namely that idealisations distort our understanding of the real 
world. This criticism ought to be taken seriously, as it is possible that idealisation could 
be both necessary for the generation of ideals while also necessarily to the detriment 
of our understanding of real world injustices. If this is the case then we may find that 
theories of justice are in a near catch-22 where the only means of arriving at ideals to 
inform just choice is through a method that simultaneously damages our ability to 
make just choices.57 Moreover, the severity of Mills criticism is amplified by the fact 
that it does not only apply to feasible ideals used for long-term choice but also 
infeasible ideals used for short-term choice. This is because his criticism is not 
primarily that the ideals that idealisations lead to are deficient but that the act of 
idealising itself distorts our understanding of the world around us. Thankfully I believe 
that we can show that this claim does not hold.  
Given all of the weaknesses Mills attributes to idealisation, he rejects the idea that 
there could be any benefit in idealised assumptions, and asks why, given its apparently 
evident shortcomings, particularly its disregarding of real world oppression, it is 
deemed by any to be the correct means of conducting philosophical ethics.58 For Mills 
the mainstream status of this method is due to its ‘ideological’ character.59 By 
ideology, Mills means ‘a distortional complex of ideas, values, norms, and beliefs that 
reflects the non-representative interests and experiences of a small minority of the 
                                                 
56 Ibid. p. 172. Ingrid Robeyns makes a related point in her discussion about how idealisations may be 
biased against people with disabilities, overlooking the particular injustices that they suffer. See 
Robeyns, p. 359.  
57 Ryan Gunderson summarises this claim well when he remarks that idealisation ‘make[s] it impossible 
to understand how injustice works in reality, and thus impossible to actually achieve justice.’ See Ryan 
Gunderson, ‘A Defence of the “Grand Hotel Abyss”: The Frankfurt School’s Nonideal Theory’ Acta 
Sociologica Vol. 58, No. 1, pp. 25-38 (2014), p. 35. 
58 Mills, pp. 171-172. 
59 A version of the ideological charge is also discussed by Valentini, who believes that certain ‘bad 
idealisations’ may be guilty of this. See Valentini, ‘On the Apparent Paradox of Ideal Theory’, p. 348. 
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national population’.60 In particular, idealisation’s popularity in Anglophonic ethics is 
due to the parallel overrepresentation of ‘middle-to-upper-class-white-males’ within 
academic philosophy. Given the relative privilege of this demographic, and their 
relative lack of personal exposure to various oppressive social forces that members of 
other groups disproportionately bear the brunt of, Mills believes it is unsurprising that 
ideal approaches to philosophy are so ‘dominant’. Without experience of these real 
injustices, it is far easier for philosophers to overlook them in their theorising.61  
In response to this charge we can first note that Mills quite clearly appears to be 
misrepresenting idealisation. As we have seen, normative idealisations are not a 
product of a lack of knowledge or understanding of nonideal phenomena but rather a 
conscious bracketing of these for clear methodological reasons. These reasons being 
in essence that such idealisations are the only means through which we can achieve 
the requisite distance from contemporary nonideal obstacles to allow us to know what 
actual justice demands. If the exploitation and oppression of particular groups are not 
considered by ideal theory it is not because ideal theorists are generally not members 
of these groups but due to methodological necessity. As we have noted elsewhere in 
this chapter, consideration of the specific forms that real world injustices take is the 
preserve of nonideal theory. Mills, it seems, falls into the common trap of assuming 
that ideal theory is a standalone enterprise that fails to address nonideal issues, when 
in reality it is one part of a joint theoretical process with nonideal theory. There is thus 
no reason that the same theorists who bracket various real world injustices in order to 
arrive at ideals would not also argue that robust analysis of these bracketed issues 
ought to be conducted at the level of nonideal theory. Indeed in some cases the same 
theorists may perform this work themselves in their capacity as nonideal theorists.  
In assessing the validity of idealised assumptions then it is not sufficient to simply ask 
‘cui bono?’,62 as the answer to this is not that ‘it is obvious that [idealisation] can only 
                                                 
60 Mills’s definition of ideology is thus slightly different from the Marxist sense of ideology discussed 
in Chapters 3 and 4.  
61 See Mills, pp. 171-172. Mills does not seek to blame this demographic, as he notes that the dominance 
of idealised methods is not an intentional ploy by white, male, middle class philosophers but rather an 
honest mistaken generalisation of their own privilege and the result of structural social forces that may 
reward certain approaches over others. See Mills, p. 174.  
62 ‘To whose benefit?’ 
152 
 
serve the interests of the privileged.’63 Rather, we have no grounds to assume that 
idealisations are inherently biased in favour of, or against, certain groups based on 
their social power. Instead, these assumptions perform a necessary methodological 
role and work in tandem with more concrete, nonideal theory, which does engage with 
the injustices ideal theory necessarily idealises away from.  
Indeed as we have seen, we can argue that normative idealisations are required in order 
to arrive at a position from where we can robustly critique injustices. We do not only 
see this in the perspectives afforded by idealised conceptions of compliance and 
objective conditions but also in the idealisations that are employed in the methods of 
specific forms of ideal theory. Once again, the original position argument demonstrates 
how idealisations can underpin an ideal that would, through extensive redistribution 
of wealth and guarantees of equality of liberties and opportunities, significantly 
decrease the relative social power of the white, middle class, male demographic of 
which Rawls himself was a part. Again, Rawls arrives at this ideal of justice only by 
setting aside consideration of actual injustices, through normative idealisations.64 This 
point is well made by Alex Callinicos who stresses that ‘it is its very remoteness from 
what counts as feasible in the debased currency of contemporary liberal-democratic 
politics’ that makes Rawls’s ideal of justice so bold.65 In an important sense then, the 
(relative) radicalism of Rawls’s ideal of justice is not achieved in spite of his use of 
idealisation, but rather because of it.66 
This is not to say that all ideal conceptions of justice will necessarily provide adequate 
responses to historical injustices or defend the rights and interests of oppressed groups. 
Nor does it suggest that where such inadequacies do occur that the biases and various 
social privileges of philosophers may not be a significant factor in contributing to this 
lacuna. Nor, finally, and by extension, is this to suggest that issues of diversity in 
                                                 
63 Mills, p. 172. 
64 Countering this position others have suggested that Rawls’s political theory is ideological. Willis H. 
Truitt for example places Rawls in a group of thinkers whose work ‘served, at least partly, as apologies 
for the social systems within the context of which they were written.’ See Willis. H. Truitt, Marxist 
Ethics: A Short Exposition (New York: International Publishers, 2005), p. 41. 
65 See Callinicos, The Resources of Critique (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), pp. 221-222.  
66 In saying this I do not want to cast doubt on my criticisms of liberal egalitarianism from the previous 
chapter. Recall that my objections there were not to the ideals of liberal egalitarianism per se but the 
belief that they could be feasible within a capitalist economy.  
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contemporary philosophy ought not to be taken seriously. These are all important 
points that should not be glossed over. However, the pertinent point in responding to 
Mills’s criticism is that the problem at hand here is not the use of idealisation. It is not 
that idealisation is inherently ideological, or merely a faulty method only used due to 
the myopic perspective of the privileged minority who hold the most power in 
philosophy departments. Rather, if idealisations do function in this way it is due to 
their misuse, something that genuinely could be caused by the overrepresentation of 
members of powerful, minority demographics in academic philosophy. Either way, 
where ideals are inadequate in some sense then this is due not to the use of idealisations 
in general but to the particular type of idealisation which that ideal is derived from.  
Mills’s solution to the problems he identifies with ideal theory is to stress the benefits 
of various forms of nonideal theorising. He correctly notes that nonideal theory is 
required if we wish to realise ideals, as it is able to identify and assess obstacles to 
ideal realisation. Similarly, he is right to state that nonideal theories are useful for 
considering the role of power and social structures in underpinning the prevalence of 
moral beliefs. He also contrasts such nonideal approaches with ideal theory, which he 
depicts as ignoring these issues and assuming that improving society ‘is just a matter 
of coming up with better arguments.’67  
Four points can be made in response to Mills. First, as we have seen throughout this 
chapter, ideal theory is not an alternative to nonideal theory and there is no reason, and 
certainly none that Mills outlines, why we cannot do both. Indeed as we have seen here 
and in Chapter 2, we require ideals in order to do make just choices in nonideal theory, 
and it is only when we have considered nonideal theories and factors, that we can 
arrive at feasible conceptions of ideals to inform such choices. Second, while ideal 
theory does focus on moral arguments it need not, as I have shown here and in Chapters 
3 and 4, do this without consideration of any other inputs. Rather I have defended the 
claim that ideal theory should generally concern itself with ideals that are possible, 
sufficiently probable, and stable. Third, related to the first and second points, a focus 
on moral arguments need not entail accepting that debates about ideals are the only or 
even the most important focus of research or debate. We can defend the position that 
                                                 
67 Mills, p. 182. 
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ideal theories of justice are important without suggesting that they are the most 
important type of work that can be done in this area. Finally, as Simmons notes, 
idealisation can also be useful as a means of problematising social power. In imagining 
worlds that are far better than our contemporary one, we can denaturalise some of the 
currently dominant power structures, and consider what a society without them would 
be like.68 
 
V. On Methodological Perspectives  
Before concluding this chapter I would like to address a final point related to the 
previous section’s discussion of the ideology critique. In making this criticism, Mills 
raises a broader point about questions of approach in philosophy. He begins by making 
the, somewhat ironic, claim that if one were to assume away one’s experience of 
philosophy and consider idealisation without any prior knowledge, one would be 
incredulous, asking, as Mills says, ‘How in God’s name could anybody think that this 
is the appropriate way to do ethics?’69 For Mills, this position would not demonstrate 
the ‘naïve[ty]’ of the hypothetical layperson but would rather be the appropriate 
response to a deficient method. As we know, in Mills’s mind ideals that inform just 
choice cannot be derived from idealisations.70  
A similar perspective is hinted at by Jack Knight, who stresses how ideal theory is 
‘grounded in a faulty conception of how we really think about moral and ethical 
questions.’71 Ideal theory is problematic in that it tries to engage with ethical questions 
in an objective and comprehensive fashion when in reality people tend to ‘think about 
                                                 
68 As Simmons rightly puts it, if we distance ourselves from certain nonideal factors then ‘many of the 
facts about the nonideal world we currently inhabit could cease to be facts.’ See Simmons, p. 32. In this 
sense, idealisations can perform a ‘critical theory’ role, which not only solves problems on established 
terms but questions the terms themselves. For a discussion of ‘problem solving theory’ and ‘critical 
theory’ see Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations 
Theory’ Millennium Journal of International Studies Vol.10, No. 2, pp. 126-155 (1981), pp. 128-130.  
69 Mills, p. 170. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Knight, pp. 361-362. 
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issues of justice [when they] are confronted by a problem to which [they] are uncertain 
how to respond.’72 
An interesting theme can be inferred from both Knight’s and Mills’s remarks. This is 
the suggestion that philosophical ethics ought to reflect, or at least be more responsive 
to, day-to-day or lay approaches to ethics. The claim that people generally take a more 
subjective and contextual approach to ethics certainly has, at the very least, an intuitive 
plausibility. I think people probably do, in general, address questions of justice when 
they are confronted by injustices in their lives, and the solutions they offer will 
probably be relatively short-term (in a non-technical sense). Conversely it seems far-
fetched to expect all people to hold robustly reasoned and comprehensive theories of 
justice, which they then adapt to the particular contexts they find themselves in. 
There are two broad points I would make in response to any claim that this represents 
a preferable approach to ethics. First, as we discussed in Chapter 2, by virtue of the 
fact that we are able to express a preference for one nonideal option over another 
nonideal option we must have some abstract, untheorised conception of what ideal 
justice is. The option then is not either to use ideals or not to use ideals but rather to 
theorise ideals properly or not to theorise them properly.  
Second, we should be sceptical that practices in academic ethics ought to mirror or at 
the very least set out from practices in lay ethics. For one, why should academic ethics 
be confined by ethical perceptions outside of academia? Accepting this approach 
would lead to an ethics that, rather than being proactive in looking to develop moral 
theory, would be reactionary in only responding to existing concerns and then doing 
so in a narrow and contextual manner. Secondly, such an approach overlooks the social 
division of labour where we can expect that different types of expertise are held by 
different professions, and that, in turn, members of a given profession should be 
expected to provide keener insight on their area of expertise than non-members of that 
profession should be. While it is a fact that all people will have opinions on ethical 
questions,73 and there is a compelling normative claim that such sensibilities ought to 
                                                 
72 Ibid. 
73 As Gramsci remarks, ‘all men are philosophers’. See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: 
International Publishers, 1971), p. 323.  
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be cultivated, this does not preclude those who focus on this area being able to provide 
special insight.  
Thirdly, this contrasts with the intuitive attitudes we would expect people to have 
towards other forms of expertise. It would be ridiculous to expect a mechanic to repair 
a car, a medical doctor to treat a patient, or a barber to cut hair, in a manner more 
similar to somebody who does not possess their specialised training. The example of 
the natural sciences is perhaps yet more instructive. Scientific progress often relies on 
the use of abstracting idealisations in the form of experiments in laboratory conditions. 
These allow scientists to isolate particular processes to study them independently from 
potentially disruptive variables. Were science to be confined to the simple observations 
of non-specialists then many of history’s scientific breakthroughs would not have 
occurred. Normative idealisations in theories of justice function in a similar way, 
allowing us to reach conclusions that would not be possible were we to adopt a more 
intuitive, contextual, and subjective approach. 
Finally, an approach that draws on both ideal theory and nonideal theory need not be 
insensitive to the lay approach. Indeed, considering how to exploit or adapt existing 
mainstream, popular attitudes to ethics will be an important aspect of nonideal theories 
attempts to shift levels of compliance towards the level required by a given ideal of 
justice. However, this understanding ought to be drawn on and engaged with rather 
than adopted as an example of good practice in philosophical ethics.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to clarify the definitive method used in ideal theorising: 
idealisation. As we have seen, idealisations are intentionally employed, non-
representative conceptualisations of real world phenomena. These are used to create 
theoretical spaces that allow one to pose questions one would not otherwise be able to. 
My defence of this method anticipated two significant concerns. The first was that the 
non-factualism of idealisation may conflict with the factual focus of the feasibility-
based approach to ideals defended in Chapters 3 and 4. The second was that 
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idealisations, in moving away from nonideal facts, may necessarily lead to ideals that 
would be unable to inform long-term just choice.  
In responding to these I first discussed how idealisations are a necessary part of various 
fundamental philosophical processes. Importantly, the feasibility assessments 
discussed earlier in this thesis can be shown to depend on the abstracting function that 
idealisations perform. I then turned to the more controversial, normative function, of 
idealisation. While it had been demonstrated why such idealisations were necessary if 
we wished to arrive at normatively accurate ideals that did not simply reflect existing 
conditions, the concern was that this normative ambition may come at the price of 
feasibility. Fortunately it was demonstrated that this is not the case. Idealisations ought 
to adhere to the same feasibility conditions that ideals do more broadly, and indeed 
assessing the feasibility of idealisations may be a significant part of this wider process. 
The result of this is that when performing normative idealising functions, those 
wishing to formulate long-term, feasible ideals ought to replace conventional Rawlsian 
notions of ‘strict compliance’ and ‘favourable conditions’ with ‘feasible compliance’ 
and ‘feasible conditions’ respectively. 
I also looked to defend the idealisation method from two further criticisms. First I have 
shown that idealisation is not inherently ‘ideological’, that is it does not necessarily 
distort our understanding of real world, nonideal, injustices. While idealisations can 
do this, this is not due to the essential character of idealisations but rather due to other 
theoretical inputs being unsatisfactory. Second, I considered the challenge that we 
should replace idealisation-based approaches with more intuitive approaches to ethics. 
In response to this I have drawn on a number of arguments about the importance of 
expertise in making progress within different specialisms.    
In defending idealisation and showing its synergy with feasibility I have met the fourth 
Key Objective of the thesis. Thus I have shown that one can arrive at feasible ideals 
while employing idealisations and that just choice informing ideals do not rely on 
contradictory methods. In doing this I have also indirectly given further support to the 





6. Ideal Theory and Just Choice 
This thesis began by stating the importance of just choice for political theory. However 
it also noted disagreement about political theory’s role in such choices. On one hand 
there are those who believe just choices are best supported by concrete and fact-
sensitive theorising, while on the other there are those who argue that these choices 
require the input of more abstract ideals of justice. In the preceding chapters I have 
looked to defend the latter ideal-based approach to just choice. However I have done 
this while stressing the caveat that such theorising must often be sensitive to a range 
of nonideal considerations. A balanced approach to ideal theory is necessary if we wish 
to arrive at ideals that can inform the long-term choices that are demanded by political 
circumstances.  
This balanced approach to ideal theory indicates that conventional understandings of 
the relationship between ideal theory and just choice, and by extension nonideal theory 
as a whole, ought to be reassessed. Conceptualisations of the relationship between 
these constituent parts of theories of justice that see a unidirectional process of ideal 
theory informing nonideal theory, fail to capture the complexities of this process. 
Instead this thesis has suggested that ideal theory has to be informed by a range of 
nonideal inputs. In this chapter I would like to discuss this more bidirectional and 
reciprocal conceptualisation of the ideal theory and nonideal theory relationship while 
also bringing together the significant claims made in each chapter to consider what 
they mean collectively for ideal theory and just choice.  
The following section will thus begin with an overview of the main claims made in 
this thesis. I want to show how the four Key Objectives stated in the introduction have 
been met and what this entails for how we think about ideals and just choice (§ I). 
After this I will turn to the broader question of the relationship between ideal theory 
and nonideal theory, contrasting the standard, unidirectional modelling of this with the 




I. Ideals, Ideal Theory, and Just Choice 
In Chapter 1 I outlined four Key Objectives that I intended to meet in this thesis:  
1. Demonstrate that it is only when choice is informed by ideals that we are able 
to consistently make just choices. 
2. Identify the conditions ideals have to satisfy in order to inform just choice.  
3. Identify the conditions that have to hold in order for it to be defensible to favour 
long-term choice over short-term choice. 
4. Demonstrate that we can arrive at feasible ideals while employing 
idealisations.  
Each objective served to establish either the necessity or viability of the ideal theory 
approach to just choice. In this section I would like to provide a summary of Chapters 
2-5, stressing how the claims I made in these chapters allowed me to meet the Key 
Objectives themselves while also defending an ideal theory approach to just choice.  
In Chapter 2 I considered the ‘ideal claim’, which states that we require ideals in order 
to arrive at short-term and long-term choices. I sought to defend this position in the 
face of criticism from Amartya Sen who looks to present an ‘ideal free’ alternative to 
short-term choice whereby we can arrive at these judgements without recourse to any 
account of what full justice demands. For Sen, it is possible to say which of two or 
more nonideal options would be most just without referring to an ideal. Sen defends 
this claim in part through various analogies he makes between comparing the justness 
of nonideal options and comparing other things, such as the height of mountains.1  
In responding to Sen’s claims I discussed how the structure of comparative judgements 
differs depending on the categories of judgement that we are using, drawing a 
distinction between internal categories on the one hand and external categories on the 
other. When making comparisons using internal categories we need make no reference 
to additional instantiations of that category. For example, if we want to compare the 
height of two mountains it is not necessary to know the height of any other mountains. 
This is because the category ‘height’ is an inherent, objective property within the 
                                                 
1 See Sen, pp. 214-238. 
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things being compared. We need not know anything about other instantiations of 
height, in mountains or otherwise, to be able to measure the height of a given thing. 
When making comparisons using external categories, however, we necessarily rely on 
external instantiations of the relevant category to inform us what standards of 
comparison to use. When comparing the relative justness of different nonideal options 
for instance, we need to refer to a further instantiation of justice that embodies certain 
principles that tell us what full justice demands. Without this external reference point, 
the different options will just be collections of facts stating allocations of rights or 
levels of equality that we might expect to result from each policy. Having an external 
instantiation of justice thus tells us whether these allocations and levels are just or not.  
I also considered the further challenge that this external instantiation of justice need 
not be an ideal but may instead be the most just society that currently exists. I showed 
that sub-ideal instantiations are unable to inform just choice in this manner. Firstly we 
require ideals to inform us what justice is and thus to determine which of a given set 
of real world societies is most just. Even setting aside this point though, sub-ideal 
instantiations are still likely to be problematic. This is because a society that is the 
pinnacle of real world justice may, by certain standards, still be less just than other real 
world societies. For example, a society that is deemed the most just in the world on 
account of its civil liberties may have less admirable laws on material equality. As 
such we could not look to this society to provide us with standards of comparison for 
assessing the material equality of other nonideal social forms.  
Having shown that ideals are necessary to make short-term just choices I then looked 
to show that they are also not overly demanding. Sen suggests that we should reject 
ideals of justice because they require us to painstakingly clarify the minutiae of 
governance in just societies before we can tackle the urgent real world injustices that 
motivate our political theorising.2 However I showed that this was not the case and 
that ideals ought not, and generally are not, pitched at theoretically disabling levels of 
specificity. This is not only necessary in order to proceed to matters of nonideal theory 
without undue delay, but also because it ensures that ideals will not be invalidated due 
to minor differences between their prescriptions and real world conditions. Thus while 
                                                 
2 Ibid., p. 223. 
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ideals ought not to be so broad as to be politically meaningless they do have to strive 
for at least a degree of compatibility with a range of social conditions. The ideal theory 
approach can thus be perfectly content to leave the clarifying of fine details that Sen 
speaks of to the real world practitioners who actually implement ideals.  
By the same token I argued that Sen is wrong to assume that ruling out discussion of 
ideals would lead to far easier agreement on more immediate matters. Sen claims that 
disagreement on ideals can prevent theorists from realising the points where they do 
agree.3 Setting aside the fact that this assumption may be premised on a somewhat 
uncharitable depiction of political theorists as particularly stubborn individuals, I 
suggested that his point did not hold. I used the example of a socialist and a right-wing 
libertarian agreeing, despite their diametrically opposed ideals, that a capitalist society 
is more just than a slave society. However what this example and Sen’s claim overlook 
are the range of disagreements that these two theorists may have at the nonideal level. 
Nonideal decision making is not only concerned with determining which option is 
most just but also which means ought to be used to arrive at it. Bracketing ideals does 
not automatically prevent such nonideal disagreements and indeed even those who 
share the exact same ideal may have profound and irreconcilable differences about 
which means are acceptable for achieving it.4  
Having shown both that ideals are necessary for short-term choice and are not overly 
demanding, I proceeded to consider the far less philosophically contentious claim that 
ideals are necessary for long-term choice. As long-term choice requires a goal to work 
towards this is a much more intuitive claim. I did address some anticipated challenges 
to this version of the ideal claim, such as the suggestion that we may be able to use a 
series of nonideal goals to inform our long-term choice in place of a single ideal goal. 
In response I argued that doing this may lead to issues of path dependency whereby, 
in pursuing a nonideal goal, we may find that we are unable to achieve our ideal goal 
and that as such it is better to operate with one’s primary end goal in clear sight.  
                                                 
3 Ibid., pp. 225-226. 
4 The divisive and often vitriolic debates within Marxism between revolutionary socialists and social 
democrats about the most appropriate route to socialism provide a clear illustration of this second point. 
For a discussion of this debate and a defence of the former position see e.g. Rosa Luxemburg, Reform 
or Revolution (New York: Pathfinder, 1973), pp. 45 and 60. 
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By defending both versions of the ideal claim i.e., the short term ideal claim and the 
long-term ideal claim, this chapter met the first Key Objective of this thesis, in showing 
why we can only consistently make just choices when our nonideal judgements are 
informed by ideals. Meeting this objective was a prerequisite for meeting the second, 
third, and fourth Key Objectives, as they are all premised on the assumption that ideals 
are necessary for just choice. More than this, it also allowed me to dismiss the 
particularly acute challenge posed by Sen. On the face of it, Sen’s challenge to the 
ideal claim only threatens ideal approaches to short-term choice. However were it the 
case that Sen is correct then he would offer an immediate, ideal-free, and 
uncomplicated route to just choice that would not only replace ideal approaches to 
short-term choice but also offer an appealing alternative to the complexities of long-
term choice.  
Having shown that we require ideals if we are to arrive at just choices, Chapter 3 was 
able to proceed to consider the conditions that ideals have to meet if they are to be able 
to perform this just choice informing role for either short-term or long-term choices. I 
began this discussion by making the fundamental claim that ideals that aim to inform 
long-term choice have to meet standards of feasibility, namely possibility, sufficient 
probability, and stability. The logic behind this is intuitive.  
Firstly, long-term choices aim at the full realisation of a given ideal of justice, and thus 
any ideal that cannot possibly be realised is clearly unsuitable for this task. This means 
that ideals ought to, at a minimum, adhere to laws of nature and laws of formal logic.  
Where possibility is concerned with whether or not something can happen, probability 
is concerned with whether or not something will happen. Standards of sufficient 
probability are thus necessary to ensure that ideals are not merely possible. There are 
innumerable ideals that, while possible, would be extremely hard to realise even with 
extensive investment of political resources. As long-term choice is a practical process 
aiming at the full realisation of ideals, we need to ensure that ideals represent sound 
investments in limited political resources. By saying that ideals need not just be 
possible but meet some established threshold of probability, we help lower the risk 
inherent in long-term choice.  
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Possibility and probability properly fall under the auspices of conventional 
understandings of ‘feasibility’, as they are concerned with whether or not ideals can 
and will occur in the future. The third condition, stability, relates to the different 
question of whether, once occurred, an ideal will be likely to be durable over time. For 
the sake of terminological simplicity, this conceptual difference was set to the side in 
order to include all three necessary conditions under the umbrella of ‘feasibility’.   
An ideal is stable if a society whose laws adhere to it can return to an equilibrium point 
following any deviations from equilibrium that are brought on by tendencies within 
the ideal itself. Particularly important are those ideals that create and compound 
instability over time. We saw this in the example of the right-libertarian, Entitlement 
Ideal where it was suggested that continued application of this ideal would lead to 
worsening levels of inequality, which would weaken the economy, severely impair 
social mobility, and prevent significant numbers of people from having access to basic 
goods. In these conditions we imagined that people might look to replace this ideal 
with one that did not generate these problems.  
Having clarified the conditions that ideals have to meet in order to inform long-term 
choice I set aside feasible ideal theory and turned to consider the alternative infeasible 
approach to ideal theory. While feasible ideal theory aims to provide normative 
guidance to inform practical decision making, infeasible ideal theory is primarily 
concerned with evaluative concepts that aim to improve our understanding of justice. 
I first looked to defend the validity of infeasible ideal theory in general. I sought to 
show that, contra critics such as Colin Farrelly,5 there is no conceptual inconsistency 
or logical fallacy inherent within theories of justice that do not aim to provide 
normative guidance.  
I also anticipated the criticism that infeasible ideal theory risks devaluing the concept 
of justice. Underpinning this criticism was the fact that in order for a society to be just 
or unjust it has to fall within what Hume refers to as ‘the circumstances of justice’.6 
This means that the society is one defined by ‘moderate scarcity’ and ‘limited 
                                                 
5 Farrelly, p. 845. 
6 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Ch. 3, § 22. 
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altruism’.7 The problems that justice addresses are thus in a large part caused by the 
fact that the objective conditions in society prevent all from having what they wish 
without depriving others, and the subjective fact that there are limits on what human 
beings will generally be willing to do to help others. Justice is therefore by nature a 
palliative concept rather than a curative concept. Approaching a problem from the 
perspective of justice means accepting that one’s solutions or conceptualisations may 
reduce the severity of a problem but will not fix the ultimate causes of it.   
One thus might worry that an approach to justice that is not constrained by feasibility 
will push the boundaries of the concept to breaking point. However I showed that this 
need not be the case and that there can be many ideals that are both infeasible and 
within the circumstances of justice. Insensitivity to some facts need not entail 
insensitivity to all facts. By the same token it is at least possible that in the future there 
may be societies that are feasible but outside the circumstances of justice.  
Having defended infeasible ideal theory I then looked to go further by showing that it 
is not only a conceptually coherent approach to theorising justice but that it may also 
have practical value. I illustrated the various ways that this could be the case by 
building on Zofia Stemplowska’s comments on the practical value of infeasible 
communism.8 We can imagine that even if communism is infeasible it will still be able 
to inform our short-term choices about what to do to make contemporary capitalist 
societies more just. Knowing that alienation is an ethical issue in capitalist societies 
and knowing that communism looks to solve this through increases in work place 
democracy and common ownership can, in theory, help us make those short-term 
choices that will yield results that are most similar to communism. Even if it is the case 
that a communist society cannot be achieved this need not prevent the ideal of 
communism from having practical value in informing short-term choice.  
Moreover I also suggested that the principle held even when conditions were so poor 
as to make any kind of institutional change impossible. In these circumstances 
communism might still tell us important things about capitalism’s failings. Equipped 
with this information we could then change our behaviour accordingly, perhaps 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 Stemplowska, ‘What’s Ideal about Ideal Theory?’, p. 334. 
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altering the way we approach social interactions with others or seeking to make 
changes to other aspects of our lives in an attempt to counter some of the worst effects 
of institutionally irreducible alienation.  
Overall this allowed me to make the central claim that in order for ideals to inform 
short-term choice they do not have to meet feasibility conditions. Instead, all that is 
required from ideals that are to inform short-term choice are standards of comparison.  
Having defended the practical value of infeasible ideals to short-term choice I returned 
to long-term choice, considering the merits of the ‘uncertainty gambit’. This argument 
stresses how, in conditions of uncertainty about what is and is not feasible, it is better 
to use very relaxed standards of feasibility or simply none at all. Underpinning this 
challenge is the idea that we do not want to risk losing out on desirable ideals due to 
mistaken feasibility assessments made as a result of imperfect information. In 
considering the uncertainty gambit I was especially interested in how Marxist theory 
might be used to support it. Marxism employs various arguments pertaining to the 
concept of ‘denaturalisation’, that is, concepts that aim to show that seemingly fixed 
concepts are in fact historically specific and contingent. Thus I considered the claim 
that in conditions of uncertainty about the fixedness of human nature, the 
unpredictability of technological development, and uncertainty about which seemingly 
natural facts are indeed historically specific ideologies, it is better to theorise ideals 
unconstrained by our uncertain conceptions of feasibility.  
I ultimately rejected all of these claims however. I first argued that even if we accept 
the historical character of human nature we can still refuse to employ it in ideal theory. 
This may be motivated by the concern that we might fail to properly predict 
developments in human nature and thus premise our ideal on what we later discover is 
an insufficiently probable conception of human nature. Alternatively we may worry 
that even if our conception of ideal human nature is correct, we will be unable to 
account for different historical instantiations of human nature en route to this and, as 
a result, be unable to plot a path between these different instantiations, thus rendering 
our ideal infeasible.  
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Much the same logic applied to the question of technological development. It is 
tempting to premise ideals on speculative technological changes, including those that 
would allow for material abundance and an escape from the circumstances of justice. 
However, once again, it is imprudent to base nonideal political action on achieving 
ideals that we cannot reasonably have significant confidence in. In both this case and 
in the case of human nature, the counter to the uncertainty gambit rests on wanting to 
avoid high risk investment of political resources. Even though the potential gains 
promised by these ideals may be significant, they are not sufficiently likely to warrant 
the risk involved. Moreover, an aspect of this risk is that we pursue such ideals at the 
cost of losing out on actually feasible ideals that we would have achieved had we been 
less ambitious.  
In doing this then I defended the claim that long-term ideals ought to take feasibility 
conditions seriously. This, along with the reverse claim about short-term choice and 
the absence of feasibility conditions, allowed me to meet the second Key Objective by 
showing the conditions ideals have to meet in order to inform just choice. As well as 
establishing an important rule for future ideal theorising this also allowed me to 
proceed to consider the question of the further conditions that have to hold in order to 
reasonably favour long-term choice over short-term choice.  
This question was taken up in Chapter 4. In looking to show that long-term choice can 
be defensible I began by discussing the intuitive assumption that long-term choice is, 
all other things being equal, more desirable than short-term choice. It promises 
significant gains, with the full realisation of an ideal of justice being the foremost one. 
However at the same time long-term choice is also problematic. It requires significant 
investment of political resources and while returns on these investments are high they 
are also, again all other things being equal, higher risk than investments in short-term 
choice are. For this reason one may assume that we ought to start from a default 
assumption that it is best to favour low-return and low-risk short-term choice over 
high-return and high-risk long-term choice.  
However this default position, while reasonable, is at odds with contemporary political 
circumstances that require radical change. As such this chapter looked to establish 
whether there is a workable conception of feasibility that would manage to lower the 
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risks associated with long-term choice to a level where it would be defensible to favour 
this approach over short-term choice.  
In pursuit of this I began Chapter 4 by further developing the general approach to 
feasible ideal theorising that was articulated in Chapter 3. I introduced the concept of 
‘obstacles’ to understand those standards that ideals have to meet in order to satisfy 
feasibility conditions. Obstacles can be either fixed, permanent features of society, or 
contingent, potentially removable features of society. While many obstacles in the 
former category are reasonably intuitive, those in the latter category are often complex. 
If it is sufficiently likely that a contingent obstacle can be overcome then its presence 
is not enough to render an ideal infeasible. In sum then, in order for an ideal to meet 
feasibility conditions it has to show that it can either avoid or remove the various 
feasibility obstacles that confront it.  
Having discussed the idea of obstacles, I turned to consider the question of how 
feasibility assessments are made in each feasibility category. I noted that being 
concerned with questions of logic and the laws of nature, possibility assessments are, 
at least in present circumstances, largely made through philosophical analysis and 
intuitive, common sense application of scientific laws. Probability and stability 
assessments on the other hand are more complex, requiring reference to social 
scientific and historical explanatory models. This is because the latter categories 
require conceptions of factors such as people’s tolerance of the costs associated with 
different ideals, and as such are, in essence, more multi-disciplinary and empirical.  
Following my discussion of feasibility assessments in general, this chapter saw a 
departure from the tone of the thesis up to this point. Until this stage I had sought to 
take a formal approach to the discussion. In looking to underlabour for ideal theory I 
wanted to show why ideal theory in general was necessary in order to arrive at just 
choices. Similarly, the second Key Objective looked to identify the conditions that 
ideals as a whole have to meet in order to inform each type of just choice. However in 
order to provide a defensible approach to long-term choice it was necessary to make 
specific claims about particular approaches to feasibility.  
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With this in mind I returned to Marxist theory. I wanted to show that Marxism provides 
the means to sufficiently lower the risks associated with long-term choice so as to 
make it defensible. The Marxist approach rests on claims about the inherent logic of 
capitalism, which suggest that the competitive, profit-motive inherent to its social 
relations make capitalist societies tend towards material inequalities and economic 
instability. I suggested that these amount to provisional obstacles confronting liberal 
ideals in general and liberal egalitarian ideals in particular. In the case of the former, 
the inherent economic instability and periodic crises that are produced by this 
economic system suggest that capitalist societies may be susceptible to compliance 
issues as people become dissatisfied with decreases in living standards and rising 
unemployment. In the case of the latter, capitalism’s tendency towards inegalitarian 
distributions of wealth suggests that attempts to make society more materially equal 
will have to work against the natural tendencies of the system.  
Next I considered the counter-argument that these tendencies can be corrected by ideal 
informed state intervention to stabilise markets and impose certain patterns of wealth 
distribution. My response to this claim, derived from Karl Marx’s metaphor of base 
and superstructure, suggested that dominant economic interests and processes shape 
the form that the rest of society’s levels take.9 As such, we can expect a society’s 
political and legal system to operate in favour of those who hold the most economic 
power and who, in material terms, have the most to lose from any attempts to intervene 
in the functioning of the economy. For this reason, attempts to use political solutions 
to fix economic problems may often meet significant resistance.  
I then considered two serious challenges to the Marxist position. First I addressed the 
claim that the Marxist conception of feasibility was so stringent as to exclude all ideals. 
In response I showed that socialism is able to meet Marxist feasibility conditions in 
various ways. Crucially it is premised on a non-competitive economic system where 
production is organised democratically rather than according to market processes. As 
such there is no necessary structural logic that tends towards inequality or instability. 
Moreover, socialism has excellent, responsive, synergy with capitalism as it responds 
                                                 
9 Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, ‘Preface’. 
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to problems that are produced by capitalism’s inherent logic, by seeking to replace this 
with a fairer, more rational system of production.  
The second challenge I considered was the claim that the Marxist conception of 
feasibility might place such a strong emphasis on economic processes that it renders 
ideal theory and just choice redundant. I argued that this only held for the abstract 
theoretical models used by Marxism. When applied to reality the laws postulated by 
these models can only be seen as tendencies that have to be considered alongside 
numerous other processes. Key among these processes are the conscious decisions of 
individuals, often based on the moral reasoning that underpins ideal theory and just 
choice.  
While I did not argue that the Marxist conception of feasibility could possibly provide 
absolute refutations of the feasibility of liberal ideals I do believe that it gives us 
compelling reasons to doubt the suitability of these ideals for informing long-term 
choice. Moreover Marxism suggests a model for understanding ideals and long-term 
choice within a particular social structure; something that is well captured by Marx’s 
comments that ‘[m]en make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; 
they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances 
existing already’.10 
In providing this stringent and exclusive approach, we are able to find in Marxism a 
sufficiently low-risk conception of feasibility as to make a strong case for favouring 
long-term choice over short-term choice. This case is further strengthened by the fact 
that Marxism casts doubt on the practical value of short-term choice in capitalist 
society. Given the incorrigibility of capitalism, attempts to reform it in order to 
increase the immediate justness of capitalist societies may be prone to fail and thus 
constitute unduly high-risk options. In demonstrating this I was collectively able to 
meet the third Key Objective in showing conditions in which it can be defensible to 
favour long-term choice over short-term choice.  
Chapter 5 marked a return to the more general level of discussion that defined most of 
the previous three chapters, considering once again formal questions about ideal theory 
                                                 
10 Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire, p. 5.  
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and just choice. However this chapter did mark a further change from earlier 
discussions in moving from questions about the conditions that ideals have to meet in 
order to inform just choice to questions concerning the methods that have to be used 
to arrive at these ideals. In this sense this chapter shifted from discussion 
predominantly surrounding the product of ideal theory and its relation to just choice, 
to the process of ideal theory and its relation to just choice.   
The key method in ideal theory is idealisation. Idealisations are conceptualisations of 
real world phenomena that do not accurately represent how those phenomena function 
in contemporary reality. Idealisations are beneficial as they create the theoretical space 
where we can pursue inquiries we otherwise would not logically be able to.   
I began this chapter by outlining three key functions that idealisations perform. I 
considered the abstracting function, whereby one brackets certain variables in order to 
assess a concept according to other variables. For example, we might assume that laws 
that adhere to an ideal would not face any compliance obstacles in order to allow us to 
assess that ideal’s stability or desirability instead, independently of any concerns about 
levels of support for it. I also considered the simplifying function that plays a 
facilitating role in theorising by allowing one to engage with simplified 
conceptualisations of phenomena. Without simplifications we would spend a virtually 
infinite amount of time trying to conceptualise phenomena in their full, real world 
complexities. In discussing these points I wanted to show that idealisations are a 
fundamental part of most forms of reasoning and are intrinsic to many forms of 
philosophical argument. In doing this I hoped to demonstrate that it was very difficult 
for any critic of idealisation to reject the method wholesale. 
I also considered the normative function of idealisations, which is a prerequisite for 
normatively accurate conceptions of justice. Normative idealisations provide theories 
with non-representative conceptions of phenomena such as compliance and objective 
social conditions from which to derive ideals. I illustrated this function with reference 
to an egalitarian philosopher looking to arrive at an ideal of justice. If she was to derive 
her ideals from contemporary standards of compliance then she would be unlikely to 
arrive at an egalitarian ideal as she would likely realise that such an ideal would be 
unpopular at present given current attitudes to taxation and wealth redistribution, 
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especially among the wealthy and powerful. However we may see this result as counter 
intuitive, feeling that obstacles such as these can be overcome, and that, more 
generally, our ideals should specify standards that people ought to adhere to, not just 
standards that they will adhere to anyway. Normative idealisations thus employ non-
representative models in order to allow us to arrive at ideals not constrained by current 
nonideal limitations.   
However the necessity of normative idealisations raises a possible contradiction at the 
heart of feasible ideal theory. Chapters 3 and 4 focused on the need for the ideals that 
inform long-term choice to meet feasibility conditions, while Chapter 5 stressed that 
ideals ought to be theorised with idealisations. It thus appeared that ideal theory had 
to be both fact-sensitive and fact-insensitive and thus that the two main aspects of the 
ideal theory process were pulling ideals in opposite directions. A further criticism was 
also raised, namely that the idealisations that are required if we are to arrive at 
normatively accurate ideals may result in ideals that are too distant from reality to ever 
be achieved, and thus unable to inform long-term choice. This is what Laura Valentini 
refers to as ‘the paradox of ideal theory’.11 
The sharpest version of the informing critique that motivates the paradox of ideal 
theory suggests that for an idealisation to be ‘good’ it cannot describe an infeasible 
state of affairs that has to be realised in order for the ideal derived from it to be feasible. 
As normative idealisations use idealised conditions to generate ideals, it follows that 
the ideals will only hold where these conditions also hold. The solution to this is to 
reconfigure normative idealisations in light of this criticism.   
I thus argued that it was necessary, when making idealised assumptions, to replace 
‘strict compliance’ with ‘feasible compliance’. This latter category does not assume 
the impossible condition that all people fully adhere to laws. Rather it is a projection 
of the optimal, feasible, form of compliance that can be expected. I argued that the 
same rationale should be applied to how we conceptualise objective conditions, to 
ensure that this too does not exceed standards of feasibility and thus lead to ideals that 
are in turn infeasible.  
                                                 
11 Valentini, ‘On the Apparent Paradox’, p. 333. 
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Following this point I considered Charles W. Mills’s claim that idealisations are 
necessarily ‘ideological’.12 Mills argues that idealisations actively distort our 
understanding of real world injustices and marginalise the plight of oppressed groups. 
Mills attributes the popularity of idealisation to the overrepresentation of middleclass, 
white men in academic philosophy departments who have little experience of the 
phenomena that idealisation distorts. In response to this I repeated the claim that ideals, 
and by extension idealisations, are necessary for us to engage critically with real world 
injustices. Idealisations do not ignore or overlook injustices but rather consciously 
bracket them. Making idealisations thus allows us to generate ideals that inform just 
choices that overcome these injustices.  
In responding to these criticisms and defending a revised approach to idealisation I 
sought to meet the fourth Key Objective of this thesis by demonstrating that the 
apparent contradiction between feasibility’s fact-sensitivity and idealisation’s fact-
insensitivity could in fact be reconciled. Showing this also allowed me to make the 
further claim in support of long-term theorising that as well as being a politically 
urgent and broadly defensible approach to ideal theory, it is also a methodologically 
coherent one.  
By meeting these four objectives I have looked to defend an ideal theory approach to 
just choice. I have shown that ideals and thus ideal theory are necessary should we 
want to make consistently just choices, both short-term and long-term. I have also 
sought to show the role that both infeasible and feasible ideal theory can respectively 
play in informing these choices. In particular I have looked to defend the viability and 
importance of feasible ideal theory and long-term choices.  
 
II. Ideal Theory and Nonideal Theory (2) 
One of the broader implications of this thesis is that it challenges conventional 
conceptualisations of the relationship between ideal theory and nonideal theory. In this 
section I will outline a reconstruction of this relationship in light of the different claims 
                                                 
12 Mills, pp. 171-172. 
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made throughout the previous four chapters. I will begin by restating the conventional 
unidirectional approach outlined in Chapter 1, before discussing the necessity of a new, 
bidirectional approach that emphasises the necessity of extensive dialogue between the 
two enterprises.    
We saw earlier that, for Rawls, ideal theory is responsible for generating ideals of 
justice, while nonideal theory is responsible for using these ideals to inform just choice 
in nonideal conditions. Recall that we also saw that this approach was in clear 
opposition to those, such as Charles W. Mills and Shane J. Ralston,13 for whom ideal 
theory and nonideal theory are opposing enterprises each offering different ways of 
theorising justice. For Rawls then, ideal theory provides the requisite philosophical 
support to allow us to engage with the ‘urgent’ questions of nonideal theory.14 
I do not believe that we ought to question this fundamental premise of the ideal theory 
and nonideal theory relationship; indeed Chapter 2 focused on defending this claim in 
the face of Sen’s criticisms. Nothing that I have claimed disputes the fact that we are 
unable to arrive at just choices at the level of nonideal theory unless this process is 
informed by ideals formulated by ideal theory. Moreover, I accept that this model 
holds unproblematically for the ideals that are to inform short-term choice.  
However this thesis does suggest that should we wish to theorise ideals that are to 
inform long-term choice it is necessary to admit significant input from nonideal 
perspectives. This is a challenge to the assumption that the proper relationship between 
ideal theory and nonideal theory is a unidirectional one where ideal theory imparts 
information to nonideal theory with little to no input moving in the other direction.   
Indeed, what is clear from this research is that if we wish to theorise feasible ideals 
then we have to commence ideal theorising with an existing sense of the feasibility 
conditions that we want our ideal to meet. This means that the conventional approach 
to the ideal theory and nonideal theory relationship has to be challenged. It is not 
sufficient to ideal theorise and then apply the product of this to nonideal theory, rather 
it is the latter enterprise that ought to have ‘temporal priority’ in theories of justice, 
                                                 
13 See Mills, p. 182 and Ralston, p. 78. 
14 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 8. 
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with conceptions about what is and is not feasible informing the basic assumptions of 
ideal theory.  
Accepting this does not mean we have to accept the claim that ideal theory loses its 
‘logical priority’.15 As stressed above, unless we have ideals to inform nonideal 
choices we will not be able to arrive at just choices. However, we can accept this while 
also accepting that unless we have a sense of feasibility we will be unable to arrive at 
these ideals in the first place. If we do not do this then we will risk informing long-
term choice with infeasible ideals and wasting political resources that would be better 
invested elsewhere.  
We saw in the previous section that one of the ways we can ensure that ideal theory is 
feasible is by rethinking the normative idealisations used in theories of justice. Where 
we want to arrive at ideals for informing long-term choice it is necessary that the 
idealisations that these ideals are derived from are feasible themselves. Providing that 
the idealisations in question capture the optimal level of compliance or objective 
conditions that we can expect then these assumptions will yield ideals that will be both 
normatively accurate and achievable.   
Conventional characterisations of ideal theory and nonideal theory thus risk 
overlooking the extent to which ideal theory is reliant on input from nonideal theory. 
This is due to the fact that ideal theory relies on methodological insights from nonideal 
theory. However it is also the case that the reverse holds as well and that nonideal 
theory may rely on insight from methods traditionally defined as being part of ideal 
theory’s domain.  
While it may be intuitive to assume that ideal theory uses idealisation while nonideal 
theory does not, this is unlikely to be the case. Indeed nonideal theory will almost 
certainly require the use of all three of the functions of idealisation. First, as we saw 
earlier it is likely the case that virtually all forms of reasoning rely on simplifying 
idealisations. Attempts to engage with any social process in its full complexity may 
                                                 
15 See Simmons, p.36 and Hendrix, p. 133. 
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even be necessarily impossible, but even if they are not, the time it would take to arrive 
at a full theory of any process would be theoretically debilitating in its duration.  
Similarly, like ideal theory, nonideal theorists will also need to use abstracting 
idealisations in order to understand the world around them. We can think of two uses 
that this function may be put to. First, it can be used to create explanatory models such 
as Marx’s theory of the logic of capitalism. Clearly, understanding real world social 
processes is a vital component of any attempt to plot a course from nonideal conditions 
to ideal conditions. Without such an understanding we would be unable to anticipate 
possible obstacles to realising an ideal. Second, like ideal theorists, nonideal theorists 
will also have to bracket certain concepts for normative purposes as well. We saw in 
Chapter 5 that somebody theorising the Entitlement Ideal might want to bracket 
questions of compliance in order to assess that ideal’s stability or desirability. Nonideal 
theorists may also have to do exactly this. We can imagine that a nonideal theorist will 
want to assess whether or not a given stage that lies between current conditions and 
ideal conditions is worth trying to reach. It might be expected that if society can be 
brought to this point then it will make the final push to realise the ideal significantly 
easier. However it may also be that this middle-stage is considered improbable. In 
these circumstances it would be prudent to assess the stability of this stage anyway, in 
case earlier predictions about its probability prove incorrect.  
Finally, nonideal theory will also have to employ normative idealisations. In order to 
plot a course through these various stages between contemporary society and ideal 
society, nonideal theorists will have to determine which conceptions of nonideal 
justice will be compatible with the different levels of compliance or the different levels 
of objective conditions found in each stage. Knowing the conceptions of justice that 
may be able to be implemented in different conditions will allow nonideal theorists to 
try to tie together these different stages in order to realise the ideal in full.  
For these reasons, any attempt to distinguish between ideal theory and nonideal theory 
in terms of inherent differences in the methods they use will likely be unhelpful. As 
such, Luca Jacopo Uberti’s claim that ideal theory is ‘formed under idealised or 
simplified assumptions’ while nonideal theory ‘represents social reality in its full 
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complexity’ is only partially correct.16 Nonideal theory will also always be formed 
under idealised assumptions, and many of ideal theory’s idealised assumptions will be 
tempered by feasibility.    
This more nuanced conceptualisation of ideal theory and nonideal theory is well 
illustrated by the spectrum based approach discussed in the previous chapter. This 
approach can be illustrated with the concept of compliance. Imagine a spectrum 
running from full non-compliance on one hand to strict-compliance on the other. We 
require nonideal theory to determine what the level of compliance is at present, relying 
perhaps on a combination of social scientific theories and concrete data. Ideal theory 
on the other hand has to determine, with nonideal input, what the optimal level of 
feasible compliance is. Here it will probably make more use of predictive models, 
social theories, and philosophical reasoning to attempt to conceptualise what optimal 
feasible compliance is.  
The next step then is for nonideal theory to work towards shifting contemporary 
compliance so it is in line with optimal feasible compliance, in order that the ideal in 
question can be realised. This is the process of predicting different nonideal stages en 
route to an ideal and trying to plot courses between them. In doing this it will employ 
a range of idealised models in order to predict future, suboptimal stages of feasible 
compliance. What is implied by this then is a dynamic process of moving back and 
forth between ideal theory and nonideal theory with each enterprise using inputs from 
the other.  
Despite the bidirectional nature of the relationship between ideal theory and nonideal 
theory and the concomitant blurring of methodological boundaries, the two disciplines 
remain categorically distinct. For one, as I stressed at the outset, it remains the case 
that nonideal theory requires ideal theory to present it with a target to work towards. 
Indeed nonideal theory cannot begin to accurately theorise compliance until it has a 
sense of the ideal that is to be realised as different ideals will have different compliance 
issues. Also, while being informed by nonideal inputs, ideal theory still establishes a 
standard of optimal feasible compliance (or whatever other category is being 
                                                 
16 Uberti, p. 206. 
177 
 
theorised) and nonideal theory works to decrease the distance between contemporary 
compliance and optimal feasible compliance, by attempting to make choices that will 
shift the former closer to the latter.  
 
III. Conclusion 
As I noted in Chapter 1, most of the normative statements presented in this thesis are 
methodologically, rather than morally, prescriptive. This thesis has not aimed to 
provide an ideal theory of justice but rather to underlabour for such theories. In 
meeting the objectives discussed in Section II and conceptualising the ideal theory and 
nonideal theory relationship discussed in Section III I hope to have contributed towards 
this. I have sought to provide a framework for future ideal theorising, especially 
feasible ideal theorising, and the discussions of feasibility conditions in Chapters 3 and 
4, as well as the discussion about idealisation in Chapter 5, have looked to provide 
theoretical support for this approach. An outcome of my research, particularly in 
looking to outline a defensible approach to long-term choice, has been to emphasise 
the contribution that Marxism can make to feasible ideal theory, and further work in 
this area may be particularly profitable.  
Whichever normative approach is employed though, it ought to be one that aims to 
inform long-term choice. This thesis has cast doubt on the practical efficacy of short-
term choice, while stressing the urgent need for more radical, long-term approaches to 
theorising justice. In demonstrating how the risks associated with the latter can be 
reduced I intend to have shown that long-term choice can be a viable and defensible 







Distance: The difference, which just choice aims to decrease, between a given 
nonideal state of affairs and an ideal. Distance can be measured either in terms of 
similarity or closeness. Similarity is the standard generally relevant to short-term 
choice and is concerned with the extent to which a given nonideal state of affairs 
directly resembles the ideal; for example, a society would become more similar to a 
strict-egalitarian ideal if that society’s Gini coefficient fell. Closeness is the standard 
generally relevant to long-term choice and is concerned with how much nonideal 
‘space’ exists between a given nonideal state of affairs and an ideal; for example, a 
society would become closer to an ideal if the time or political resources required to 
fully realise the ideal decreased. Some actions may lead to a decrease in distance as 
closeness while leading to an increase in distance as similarity, for example, ‘one-step 
forward and two-steps back choices’.  
External and Internal Categories: The terminology employed to refer to the 
categories used for comparative judgements. External categories are those categories 
where standards of comparison have to be derived from other instantiations of the 
category, for example in order to say which of two alternative states of affairs would 
be more just we have to consult an ideal of justice, in order to know what justice 
demands. Internal categories are those categories where standards of comparison are 
inherent within the things being compared, for example if we are comparing the height 
of two mountains we do not need to refer to any external instantiation of height.  
Feasibility Conditions: The conditions ideals have to meet in order to be feasible and 
thus able to inform long-term choice. Requires satisfying given standards of 
possibility, sufficient probability, and stability. What this entails is dependent on how 
particular approaches conceptualise feasibility conditions. See also, ‘possibility’, 
‘sufficient probability’, and ‘stability’. 
Ideal, also, ideal of justice; ideal conception of justice: A conceptualisation of the 
rules that would govern political decision-making in a just society. Used to inform just 
choice, ideals may be feasible or infeasible. Feasible ideals are those that satisfy 
feasibility conditions and may be used to inform both long-term choice and short-term 
choice. Generally infeasible ideals may only be used to inform short-term choice.   
Ideal Claim: The claim that in order to generally make just choices it is necessary that 
those choices be informed by an ideal of justice. Takes the form of the long-term ideal 
claim (LIC), which states that ideals are generally necessary to make long-term 
choices, and the short-term ideal claim (SIC), which states that ideals are generally 
necessary to make short-term choices.  
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Idealisation: The intentional use of conceptualisations of real world phenomena that 
do not accurately represent those phenomena. Uses three functions to create the 
theoretical space necessary to pursue inquiries that would otherwise be logically 
unsound. The simplifying function simplifies phenomena in order to avoid the 
necessity of conceptualising them in their full, impractical, complexity. The 
abstracting function brackets categories that may otherwise prevent ideals from being 
assessed by another category. For the normative function of idealisation, see, 
‘normative idealisation’.  
Ideal Theory: One of two constituent branches of theories of justice. Defined by the 
product of its theorising, i.e. ideals, and by the process of its theorising, i.e. 
idealisation. Ideal theory can be divided into feasible ideal theory and infeasible ideal 
theory with the former producing feasible ideals and the latter producing infeasible 
ideals. See also, ‘nonideal theory’. 
Just Choice: The choices made by nonideal theory that aim to increase the justness of 
society. Can be separated into short-term choice and long-term choice. Short-term 
choice aims to make society immediately more just, while long-term choice aims to 
achieve full justice over time.  
Normative Idealisation: The type of idealisation that is the distinctive and central 
method of ideal theory. Uses non-representative conceptualisations of real world 
phenomena in order to arrive at normatively accurate ideals. For example, assuming 
strict compliance to prevent ideals being derived from current levels of compliance. 
See also, ‘idealisation’. 
Nonideal Theory: One of two constituent branches of theories of justice. Uses various 
explanatory and ethical theories to implement ideals of justice in order to make just 
choices. See also, ‘ideal theory’. 
Obstacles: The impediments that prospective ideals have to either avoid or remove in 
order to satisfy each of the three feasibility conditions. For example, an ideal that 
required humans to live without sustenance would be confronted by the possibility 
obstacle that human beings require sustenance to live. Obstacles can be further divided 
into fixed and contingent types. Fixed obstacles are those that cannot be removed, and 
thus ideals must avoid them in order to ensure feasibility. Contingent obstacles can be 
removed, though the likelihood of being able to do so will differ according to the 
specifics of the obstacle and ideal involved.  
Political Resources: The ‘currency’ of nonideal theory. May include a range of goods 
that are invested in just choices including time, money, labour, opportunities, and 
‘political energy’. All other things being equal long-term choice requires a greater 
investment of political resources than short-term choice does. By extension, long-term 
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choice is therefore, all other things being equal, a higher-risk investment than short-
term choice. 
Possibility: The most fundamental feasibility condition, which assesses whether ideals 
can be achieved. Can be divided into logical possibility and natural possibility, the 
former ensuring ideals do not violate laws of logic and the latter ensuring ideals do not 
violate laws of nature. Assessments are generally made using philosophical analysis 
and, largely common sense, natural scientific knowledge.  
Stability: The feasibility condition that assesses whether ideals, if realised, will be 
durable over time. Durability entails that a society that adheres to an ideal is able, 
without external assistance, to return to an equilibrium point following any deviations 
from equilibrium caused by mechanisms internal to the ideal itself. Stability is 
conceptualised and assessed by using social science, social theory, and historical 
theory.  
Sufficient probability: The feasibility condition that assesses whether ideals will be 
achieved. Sufficient probability implies that ideals have to meet a given standard of 
probability, in order to lower the likelihood of long-term choice being informed by 
improbable ideals. Sufficient probability is conceptualised and assessed by using 
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